Condamnations pour infractions sexuelles sur enfants

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Voir également: Sexual Offences (Sentencing)

Jeunes et enfants victimes

Voir également: Les victimes comme facteur de détermination de la peine

Le Parlement a « indiqué très clairement que la protection des enfants est une valeur fondamentale de la société canadienne que les tribunaux doivent défendre ».[1] Les tribunaux sont appelés à se concentrer sur les délits d'exploitation des enfants en raison de leur nombre croissant.[2]

Les infractions sexuelles contre les enfants sont intrinsèquement violentes.[3]

Nécessité de protéger les enfants

La loi doit protéger les enfants non seulement contre l’exploitation sexuelle mais aussi contre tout contact sexuel avec des adultes. Cela est nécessaire en raison du déséquilibre de pouvoir inhérent et des « conséquences physiques et psychologiques » du contact sexuel.[4]

Les enfants victimes sont différents des victimes adultes

Les juges chargés de la détermination de la peine ne devraient pas s'appuyer sur une jurisprudence similaire antérieure dans laquelle la victime est un adulte comme exemple de parité.[5]

Technologie et opportunités

L'avènement des médias sociaux et des technologies de communication a accru les possibilités de victimisation des enfants.[6]

Exploitation inhérente

Tout contact sexuel entre l'enfant et l'adulte est de facto de nature exploitante.[7]

Femmes et groupes marginalisés

Les victimes qui sont des femmes ou issues de communautés marginalisées sont reconnues comme étant les plus à risque.[8]

Dommages causés par les infractions sexuelles

Le préjudice reconnu des infractions sexuelles sur les enfants est « profond » et comprend : Erreur de référence : Balise fermante </ref> manquante pour la balise <ref>

Préjudice réel et préjudice potentiel

Le tribunal peut aller au-delà de la mesure du préjudice réel et considérer le préjudice potentiel, car le préjudice total ne peut être connu au moment de la détermination de la peine.[9]

Gravité des infractions sexuelles contre les jeunes victimes

Les enfants sont un « atout inestimable ». Il est « extrêmement important » de dénoncer tout comportement tirant parti de leur vulnérabilité.[10]

Il est suggéré que « la force est inhérente à toutes les agressions sexuelles contre des enfants ».[11]

De nombreux tribunaux ont exprimé l'inquiétude de la société face aux crimes, notamment sexuels, commis contre des enfants.[12]

Les infractions sexuelles prédatrices sont une catégorie d'infractions sexuelles dans lesquelles le délinquant utilise le déséquilibre de pouvoir entre lui et une victime, généralement des enfants, pour satisfaire ses besoins sexuels au moyen d'une infraction pénale.

Sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, la dénonciation, la dissuasion générale et spécifique et la nécessité de séparer les délinquants de la société ont préséance sur tous les autres objectifs de la détermination de la peine.[13]

Les enfants sont reconnus comme l'un des « atouts les plus précieux et les plus vulnérables ». Ils sont généralement incapables de se défendre et sont donc facilement ciblés.[14] C'est pour cette raison que les tribunaux doivent se concentrer sur la protection des enfants.[15]

Children are vulnerable as they cannot protect themselves.[16]

A child is inherently vulnerable. Accordingly, they can be coerced without threats ever being articulated.[17]

  1. ↑ R c Allen, 2012 BCCA 377 (CanLII), 293 CCC (3d) 455, par Ryan JA, au para 60
  2. ↑ R c B(R), 2013 ONCA 36 (CanLII), 114 OR (3d) 465, par LaForme JA, aux paras 26 to 28
  3. ↑ R c Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), 391 CCC (3d) 309, par Wagner CJ and Rowe J, au para 5 (“sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities.” )
  4. ↑ R c AB, 2015 ONCA 803 (CanLII), par Feldman JA, au para 45 ("[T]he protection for children is not simply from sexual exploitation but from any sexual contact or the invitation to sexual contact with adults. Parliament viewed the protection to be necessary because of the inherent power imbalance that undermines consent, and because of the physical and psychological consequences of a sexual encounter between a child and an adult stemming from that imbalance.")
  5. ↑ , ibid., au para 116
  6. ↑ , ibid., aux paras 46 à 48
  7. ↑ , ibid., au para 53
  8. ↑ , ibid., aux paras 68, 70 à 73
  9. ↑ Friesen, supra, aux paras 79 à 86
  10. ↑ R c DG, 2014 BCCA 84 (CanLII), 351 BCAC 146, par Bennett JA, au para 37
    R c SCW, 2019 BCCA 405 (CanLII), par Goepel JA, au para 22
  11. ↑ R c CT, 2008 NLTD 112 (CanLII), 846 APR 314, par Goulding J, au para 36
  12. ↑ voir R c Springer, 1988 CanLII 8011 (NB CA), 88 NBR (2d) 177
    R c DC et M.G, 2009 NBCA 59 (CanLII), 904 APR 341, par J.A. Deschênes (3:0)
  13. ↑ R c DD, 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), 163 CCC (3d) 471, par Moldaver JA (3:0), aux paras 33 à 45
    R c Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 (CanLII), 276 CCC (3d) 86, par Moldaver JA (3:0){{atsL|fn76l|75| à 77}>
  14. ↑ DD, supra, au para 35
  15. ↑ R c Nisbet, 2011 ONCA 26 (CanLII), OJ No 101, par curiam (3:0) (Child pornography is "an abhorrent crime that victimizes the most vulnerable members of our society and hence the need for sentences to reflect denunciation and deterrence.")
  16. ↑ R c DVB, 2010 ONCA 291 (CanLII), 215 CCC (3d) 505, par Moldaver JA (3:0), au para 81 ("Children cannot protect themselves. They are generally vulnerable and helpless. When it comes to their safety, we must be vigilant")
  17. ↑ R c Taylor, 1995 CanLII 10546 (NLSCTD), 134 Nfld. & PEIR 181 (Nfld. T.D.), par Mercer J, au para 8 (" the courts have recognized that in a situation involving an adult, particularly where the adult is in a position of trust, the child is in an inherently vulnerable position and threats do not have to be articulated for the child to feel coercion")

Friesen Principles and Factors

There are several considerations required in sentencing for child sexual offences that are sometimes referred to as "Friesen" principles:[1]

  • The prevalence of sexual violence against children, especially in light of "new technologies". (para 50)
  • The disproportionately low sentences of the past;
  • It is an error to treat sexual interference (ie. sexual touching) as less grave than sexual assault involving intercourse.[2]

The factors Friesen requires to be emphasized, include:[3]

  • Courts must consider the likelihood of re-offence (paras 122 to 124)
  • Abuse of a Position of Trust (paras 125 to 130)
  • Duration and frequency of the offence (paras 131 to 133)
  • age of the victim (paras 134 to 136)
  • Degree of physical interference (paras 137 to 147)
  • The degree of "participation" from the victim is not a mitigating factor (paras 148 to 154)

The "wrongfulness and harmfulness" of offences upon children manifest in ways including:[4]

  1. the harm to the personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity and equality of children (at paras 51–59);
  2. the direct damage to immediate familial and community relationships (at paras 60–61);
  3. the indirect damage to families, communities and society (at paras 62–64);
  4. the wrongfulness of exploiting children’s weaker position in society (at paras 65–67);
  5. the disproportionate impact on girls and the links to violence against women (at paras 68–69); and
  6. the disproportionate impact on Indigenous people and other vulnerable persons (at paras 70–73).

A more modern approach to sentencing for child sexual offences should include the following:[5]

  1. account for harmfulness and wrongfulness in the proportionality assessment (Friesen at para 75);
  2. address and reaffirm the gravity of the offence, with particular emphasis on
    1. the inherent wrongfulness of the offence (at paras 77–78);
    2. the potential harms to the child (at paras 79–84); and
    3. the actual harm (at paras 85–86);
  3. recognize the degree of responsibility of the offender and avoid stereotypes that minimize the harms (at paras 87–92); and
  4. still apply proportionality, even if there does not seem to be a specific victim (at paras 93–94).
  1. ↑ R c Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2020] 1 SCR 424
  2. ↑ , ibid., aux paras 119 to 120
  3. ↑ , ibid., aux paras 121 to 154
  4. ↑ R c LA, 2023 SKCA 136 (CanLII), au para 34
  5. ↑ LA, supra, au para 35

Objectives

Primary objectives

Section 718.01 directs courts to give primacy to denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve "the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years."[1] This section simply codifies already existing principles.[2]

Denunciation and deterrence have the highest priority in sentencing for offences involving the abuse of children.[3]

Failure to give primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence is an error in principle.[4]

Rehabilitative factors must still be considered.[5] However, the principles of restraint and rehabilitation are still a factor but are secondary for offences involving young victims.[6]

It is prohibited to put any secondary objective above denunciation and deterrence.[7]

  1. ↑ NB: this section came into force by 2005, c. 32, s. 24.
    R c Inksetter, 2018 ONCA 474 (CanLII), 141 OR (3d) 161, par Hoy ACJ, au para 16
    see R c Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), 391 CCC (3d) 309, par Wagner CJ and Rowe J, au para 104
  2. ↑ R c GJO, 2006 NLTD 90 (CanLII), 779 APR 61, par Seaborn J, au para 26 ("As to general deterrence, s. 718.01, a recent amendment to the Criminal Code, codifies the existing sentencing law in mandating that in sentencing for offences, such as these, which involved the abuse of persons under 18 years of age, primary consideration is to be given to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.")
    R c Cazon, 2006 NWTTC 11 (CanLII), par Schmaltz J, au para 26
  3. ↑ R c Oliver, 2007 NSCA 15 (CanLII), 250 NSR (2d) 296 (CA), par Saunders JA (3:0), au para 20 (“highest ranking among all of the principles of sentencing in cases involving the abuse of children. Parliament's intention is clearly stated.”)
    R c Michel, 2005 NWTSC 94 (CanLII), [2005] NWTJ No 105, par Schuler J, au para 62 ("The priority objectives of a sentence in the case of the sexual violation of a young person must always be denunciation and deterrence. The sentence must be sufficient punishment so as to reflect society's abhorrence of such conduct so as to discourage others who might engage in similar conduct. Courts have long said that those are the important objectives.")
  4. ↑ R c MacLean, 2021 NLCA 24 (CanLII), aux paras 55 and 56
  5. ↑ R c Michel, 2005 NWTSC 94 (CanLII), [2005] NWTJ No 105, par Schuler J, au para 63
    See s. 718.01
  6. ↑ R c BCM, 2008 BCCA 365 (CanLII), 238 CCC (3d) 174, par Neilson JA (3:0), au para 35 (“the principles of restraint and rehabilitation, while still operative, are given secondary status in offences involving young victims.”)
  7. ↑ Friesen, supra, au para 104

Psychological Harm

It has been recognized by courts that child victims of sexual offences suffer from long-lasting damage.[1] They suffer from emotional trauma that is often permanent. As adults they "may become incapable of forming loving relationship, always fearful of re-victimization by sexual partners. Further, the matured victim may become a sexual predator himself. It is often that an offender will report being victimized by other sexual predators as a child."[2]

The judge should consider the "likelihood of psychological harm to the victim."[3] But the judge does not need to take judicial notice of the psychological harm caused by a sexual offence.[4]

  1. ↑ R c DD, 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), , 163 CCC (3d) 471, par Moldaver JA (3:0), au para 36
  2. ↑ DD, supra, aux paras 37 to 38
  3. ↑ R c Rosenthal, 2015 YKCA 1 (CanLII), par Schuler JA (3:0), au para 6 - the "likelihood is a reason that the principle of general deterrence is significant in sentencing for sexual assault"
    R c McDonnell, 1997 CanLII 389 (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 948, par Sopinka J (5:4)
  4. ↑ Rosenthal, supra, au para 6

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Section 718.2(a)(ii.1) deems aggravating where there is "evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years."[1]

Any offence where children are the target, should be treated as an aggravating factor to sentence. This is especially so where the perpetrator is a family member.[2]

Violence

Any form of violence or threat of violence beyond the inherent violence to sexual offences against a person under the age of 18 will be treated as an aggravating factor.[3]

Awareness of Accused

It has been recognized that, except in rare cases, the accused will have at least some awareness of the harm that their actions caused.[4]

Voluntary Participation of the Victim

See Victims as a Factor in Sentencing#Victim Under 18 Years of Age

Good Character

It has been recognized that previous good character has little importance when sentencing offenders for child sexual offences.[5]

Significant Factors

There are certain factors that are considered "significant" for child sex offences:[6]

  • Likelihood to re-offend
  • Abuse of a position of trust or authority
  • Duration and Frequency
  • Age of the Victim
  • Degree of Physical Interference
  • Victim Participation
  1. ↑ NB: this section came into force by 2005, c. 32. But it can be considered codification of common law.
  2. ↑ R c TLB, 2007 ABCA 61 (CanLII), 218 CCC (3d) 11, par Fraser CJ (3:0), au para 20
  3. ↑ R c SJB, 2018 MBCA 62 (CanLII), par Mainella JA (3:0), au para 22
    R c Sidwell, 2015 MBCA 56 (CanLII), 319 Man R (2d) 144, par Steel JA (3:0), au para 53
  4. ↑ R c Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), par Wagner CJ and Rowe J, au para 88
  5. ↑ R c BSM, 2011 ABCA 105 (CanLII), par Cote JA, au para 16
    {{CanLIIR|Hepburn|g0qgp|2013 ABQB 520 (CanLII)}, aux paras 36 to 37
  6. ↑ Friesen, supra
    R c SPW, 2021 NSPC 24 (CanLII), par Tax J, au para 65

Grooming

Any form of targeting of a specific victim will enhance the gravity of the offence.[1]

Evidence of "grooming" a youthful victim before or during the commission of the offence is an aggravating factor in sexual offences involving children. [2]

Grooming can take the form of cultivating a relationship of trust or undertaking a process of relinquishing inhibitions all with a view to advancing a plan to sexually exploit a young person.[3]

  1. ↑ R c Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), 391 CCC (3d) 309, par Wagner CJ and Rowe J, au para 90
  2. ↑ R c GCF, 2004 CanLII 4771 (ON CA), 188 CCC (3d) 68, par Borins JA (3:0), au para 21
    R c RJH, 2012 NLCA 52 (CanLII), 295 CCC (3d) 301, par Welsh JA (3:0)
    R c SJB, 2018 MBCA 62 (CanLII), par Mainella JA (3:0), au para 26 ("If proven, it is an aggravating factor that the offender groomed the person under age 18 for sexual activity before the commission of the offence...")
  3. ↑ R c Legare, 2009 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2009] 3 SCR 551, par Fish J (7:0) at 28, 30

Psychology of Child Sexual Offences

Experts in topics such as pedophilia have given evidence claiming some of the following:

  • pedophilia is a life-long condition. A pedophile is always at risk of re-offence[1]
  1. ↑ R c Stuckless, 1998 CanLII 7143 (ON CA), 127 CCC (3d) 225, par Abella JA (3:0) , au para 17

Available Sentences

Conditional Sentences

Given the need to raise the penalties for child sex offences, conditional sentences will only be "rarely" imposed. There must be an "exceptional circumstance" that renders incarceration inappropriate.[1] Exceptional circumstances can include medical hardships that cannot be accommodated by the correctional facility.[2]

  1. ↑ R c MM, 2022 ONCA 441 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 16 ("Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate. Their availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate – for example, where it gives rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility")
    R c BM, 2023 ONCA 224 (CanLII), au para 2 ("Absent limited exceptional circumstances, conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will very rarely be appropriate")
    R c Simpson, 2021 ONSC 6032 (CanLII), par Quigley J
    R c Reid, 2022 ONSC 2987 (CanLII), par Boswell J
    R c Jenkins, 2021 PESC 6 (CanLII), par Cann J
  2. ↑ , ibid.

Ranges

It is suggested that a first time offender convicted of a single incident of intercourse with a child should be in the mid to upper single digits sentence is appropriate.[1]

In Ontario, a person in a position of trust who abuses children over a longer period of time will normally receive a sentence in the upper single digits or more.[2]

In Alberta, the "starting point" for "a single serious sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust is 4 years."[3]

In Manitoba, "major sexual assaults [against] a young person within a trust relationship by means of violence, threats of violence or by means of grooming" have starting range of 4 to 5 years.[4]

It has been suggested that sexual abuse of a child, particularly sexual intercourse, by a person in authority, is in a range of 3 to 5 years.[5]

Any sort of series of sexual offences against young persons by adults in positions of trust over a long duration should attract sentences in the "high" range single-digit of years.[6]

Friesen Increase

The precedent of Friesen does not require lengthier sentences in every case involving children.[7] The precedent covers all forms of child sexual contact, not limited to offences of sexual contact.[8]

  1. ↑ R c RF, 2020 ONSC 7931 (CanLII), par Mew J, au para 36
    R c Audet, 2020 ONSC 5039 (CanLII), OJ No 3554, par Smith J
  2. ↑ R c MD, 2012 ONCA 520 (CanLII), 288 CCC (3d) 564, par Feldman JA (3:0)
  3. ↑ R c S(WB), 1992 CanLII 2761 (AB CA), 127 AR 65, par curiam
    R c AGA, 1010 ABCA 61 (CanLII), 474 AR 304, par curiam (3:0), au para 9
  4. ↑ R c Sidwell, 2015 MBCA 56 (CanLII), 8 WWR 494, par Steel JA (3:0), au para 38
  5. ↑ see for example R c WWM, 2006 CanLII 3262 (ON CA), [2006] OJ No 440, par Juriansz JA (3:0), au para 14
  6. ↑ R c Stuckless, 1998 CanLII 7143 (ON CA), 127 CCC (3d) 225, par Abella JA (3:0)
  7. ↑ R c CDC, 2021 NSSC 287 (CanLII), par Murray J, au para 27
  8. ↑ R v Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26 (CanLII) at para 32

Sentencing Cases

See Also

v • e
 
Agression sexuelle
Offences
Contacts sexuels (151), Incitation à des contacts sexuels (152), Exploitation sexuelle (153), Inceste (155), Bestialité (160), Voyeurisme (162), Publication, etc. non consensuelle d’une image intime (162.1), Matériel obscène (163), Pornographie juvénile (163.1), Père, mère ou tuteur qui sert d’entremetteur (170), Maître de maison qui permet des actes sexuels interdits (171), Rendre accessible à un enfant du matériel sexuellement explicite (171.1), Leurre d'enfants (172.1), Entente ou arrangement — infraction d’ordre sexuel à l’égard d’un enfant (172.2), Actions indécentes (173), Interférence à la circulation (213), Agression sexuelle (271), Agression sexuelle armée, menaces à une tierce personne ou infliction de lésions corporelles (272), Agression sexuelle grave (273), Traite des personnes (279.01-.3), Obtention de services sexuels moyennant rétribution (286.1-5)
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