« Scellement et descellement des autorisations judiciaires » : différence entre les versions
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Even where there is no sealing order granted, the court may also restrict and prohibit access to court-record materials where it would "subvert" the "ends of justice" or "might" be used for an "improper purpose."<ref> | Even where there is no sealing order granted, the court may also restrict and prohibit access to court-record materials where it would "subvert" the "ends of justice" or "might" be used for an "improper purpose."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|AG (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre|1lpbp|1982 CanLII 14 (CSC)|[1982] 1 RCS 175}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{atp|189}} (SCR) ("Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.")<Br> | {{CanLIIRPC|AG (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre|1lpbp|1982 CanLII 14 (CSC)|[1982] 1 RCS 175}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{atp|189}} (SCR) ("Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.")<Br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Garofoli| | {{CanLIIRP|Garofoli|1fss4|1990 CanLII 52 (CSC)|[1990] 2 RCS 1421}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} ("The power to edit clearly exists and derives from the supervisory and protecting power which a court possesses over its own records") | ||
</ref> | </ref> |
Version du 8 octobre 2024 à 22:32
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n.b.: Cette page est expérimentale. Si vous repérez une grammaire ou un texte anglais clairement incorrect, veuillez m'en informer à [email protected] et je le corrigerai dès que possible. |
General Principles
Once a judicial authorization is executed (be it a warrant, production order or otherwise), the authorization and the supporting documents (usually the Information to Obtain) must be made available to the public unless the warrant is placed under a sealing order.[1]
Under s. 487.3(1), an application to seal a warrant and ITO can be made prohibiting disclosure of any information related to the warrant on the basis that access to it would subvert the ends of justice or the information would be put to an improper purpose.
Once an order is made, it must be made public "unless an applicant seeking a sealing order can demonstrate that public access would subvert the ends of justice."[2]
Section 487.3 provides statutory authority for a [[Définition des officiers et des bureaux judiciaires |judge or justice]] to issue a sealing order:
- Order denying access to information
487.3 (1) On application made at the time an application is made for a warrant under this or any other Act of Parliament, an order under any of sections 487.013 to 487.018 or an authorization under section 529 [entrée en résidence pour arrêter] or 529.4 [exécuter un mandat pour entrer dans une résidence d'arrestation], or at a later time, a justice, a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge of the Court of Quebec may make an order prohibiting access to, and the disclosure of, any information relating to the warrant, order or authorization on the ground that
- (a) the ends of justice would be subverted by the disclosure for one of the reasons referred to in subsection (2) [ordonnance de mise sous scellés relative aux mandats – motifs de mise sous scellés] or the information might be used for an improper purpose; and
- (b) the reason referred to in paragraph (a) [ordonnance de mise sous scellés relative aux mandats – motifs de mise sous scellés] outweighs in importance the access to the information.
[omis (2), (3) and (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
Sealing orders are to be the exception to the rule of openness.[3]
It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to be the responding party to any application to unseal where privilege may be at issue.[4]
Confidential police investigations require "a high level of secrecy to be effective" at least until after the warrant is executed.[5] Once the search is complete the presumption moves to one of openness.[6]
- Burden of Proof
Where a court document is subject to a discretionary sealing, the burden is upon the party seeking to maintain the sealing order.[7] The exception to this burden include the mandatory sealings provisions under s. 187(1)(a)(ii) relating to wiretaps.[8]
- Duty to Unseal is On the Crown
The burden is on the Crown to unsealing judicial authorization materials. This duty is part of the Crown's Stinchcombe disclosure obligations.[9]
- Effect of Sealing Order
The predominant view suggests that sealing orders function as an order restricting access to the court file rather than as a confidentiality order.[10]
- Residual Authority to Control Access
Even where there is no sealing order granted, the court may also restrict and prohibit access to court-record materials where it would "subvert" the "ends of justice" or "might" be used for an "improper purpose."[11]
- ↑ Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v Ontario, 2005 CSC 41 (CanLII), [2005] 2 RCS 188, par Fish J
- ↑
, ibid.
Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, 1982 CanLII 14 (CSC), [1982] 1 RCS 175, par Dickson J
- ↑
Application by the Winnipeg Free Press, 2006 MBQB 43 (CanLII), 70 WCB (2d) 54, par McKelvey J, au para 10
- ↑ Re Regina and Atout, 2013 ONSC 1312 (CanLII), OJ No 899, par Campbell J
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, par Tilleman J, au para 10
- ↑
, ibid., au para 10
- ↑
R c Verrilli, 2019 NSSC 263 (CanLII), par Arnold J, au para 56
cf. National Post Co. v Ontario, 2003 CanLII 13 (ONSC), 176 CCC (3d) 432, par McKinnon J - ↑ Michaud v Quebec (Attorney General), 1996 CanLII 167 (CSC), [1996] 3 RCS 3, par Lamer CJ, aux to 5 paras 3 to 5{{{3}}}
- ↑
R c Osei, 2007 CanLII 5681 (ON SC), 152 CRR (2d) 152, par Nordheimer J
- ↑
R c Moosemay, 2001 ABPC 156 (CanLII), 297 AR 34, par Fradsham J, aux paras 19 to 31
Konstan v Berkovits, 2016 ONSC 7958 (CanLII), par Myers J, aux paras 8 to 9
Konstan v Berkovits, 2016 ONSC 3957 (CanLII), par Myers J, au para 10 - ↑
AG (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre, 1982 CanLII 14 (CSC), [1982] 1 RCS 175, par Dickson J, au p. 189 (SCR) ("Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.")
R c Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (CSC), [1990] 2 RCS 1421, par Sopinka J ("The power to edit clearly exists and derives from the supervisory and protecting power which a court possesses over its own records")
Grounds to Sealing
|Interdiction légale de publication d'informations sur l'identité ]] Under s. 487.3(2), set out the basis of how the ends of justice would be subverted.
487.3
[omis (1)]
- Reasons
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) [ordonnance de mise sous scellés relative aux mandats – motifs de mise sous scellés], an order may be made under subsection (1) [ordonnance de mise sous scellés relative aux mandats] on the ground that the ends of justice would be subverted by the disclosure
- (a) if disclosure of the information would
- (i) compromise the identity of a confidential informant,
- (ii) compromise the nature and extent of an ongoing investigation,
- (iii) endanger a person engaged in particular intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby prejudice future investigations in which similar techniques would be used, or
- (iv) prejudice the interests of an innocent person; and
- (b) for any other sufficient reason.
[omis (3) and (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
There is a presumption in favour of access to information.[1]
- Dagenais/Mentuck Test
The Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to seal orders.[2] The test permits discretionary court orders prohibiting access to legal proceeding where:
- an order is necessary to prevent a "serious risk" to the "proper administration of justice" because "reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk"; and
- the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice
- Standard of Proof
The risks of keeping the record unsealed must be established to be a "risk the reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence."[3]
- Proper Administration of Justice
The risk to "administration of justice" will include "real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial."[4]
The preservation of a witness's evidence is not a justification for sealing as the witnesses are free to speak to whomever they want and thier prior statement is already preserved in their statement. [5]
It is not a general rule that the mere fact of publication that a witness cooperated with police is a reason to protect their identity. There would need to be evidence supporting a specific risk to the witness.[6]
- Other Options to Sealing
It is an error of law for the authorizing judge or justice to fail "to consider alternative measures short of a full-fledged non-access order."[7]
- "Ongoing investigation"
The risk posed to the investigation must be satisfied on a case-by-case basis and is not to be used as a class of prohibited records.[8] Generalized or abstract assertions of potential prejudice is insufficient.[9] However, generalized assertions are all that can be offered and that it may be that a "perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at that early stage."[10]
Denial of access cannot be granted on the basis that there is an "investigative advantage" to the police in having documents sealed.[11]
- "innocent person"
Section 487.3(2)(iv) permits a court to seal a record where disclosure could "prejudice the interests of an innocent person".
"Innocent persons" include third parties whose premises have been searched and nothing was found.[12]This does not mean that where something is seized from the premises that they can no longer be innocent persons.[13]
Prejudice to innocent persons is "entitled to significant weight."[14]
The interests of "innocent persons" includes preventing an "innocent person subject to intense media scrutiny that may irreparably tarnish that person’s reputation."[15] Where the allegations found in the ITO may be "extremely harmful to [the] reputations" of innocent persons, including the suspect, then the public interest will be against releasing information identifying them.[16]
An "innocent person" does not include the accused as "reporting of ...evidence is a price" that they must pay for "insuring the public accountability of those involved in the administration of justice" once the accused has "surrendered to the judicial process."[17]
It is unsettled whether notice is required to be given to innocent third-parties with cases going both ways.[18]
- Right to a Fair Trial
Releasing information regarding an ongoing investigation can be "highly prejudicial to a person's right to a fair trial."[19]
The release of certain types of "incriminating evidence" against the accused may result in such prejudice as to be unfair to be released to the public.[20] Such evidence would have the effect of "place irreversible ideas in the minds of potential jurors that would prevent them from being impartial at trial, or that would make it impossible for them to distinguish between evidence heard during the trial and information acquired outside of the courtroom."[21]
There is some suggestion that protecting of trial rights are better protected by a publication ban rather than a sealing order.[22]
- Commercial Interests
A "real and substantial risk" to commercial interests of a company in revealing the allegations in the ITO may create a public interest in confidentiality.[23]
- "any other sufficient reasons"
"Other sufficient reasons" within the meaning of s. 487.3 include "serious threat to trial fairness."[24]
- Procedure
The applicant must be specific on the grounds of sealing, there must be "particularized grounds". Generalized assertions are not enough.[25]
- Ruling
The Judge must give reasons for any decision to issue the sealing of a public record.[26]
- ↑ Phillips v Vancouver Sun, 2004 BCCA 14 (CanLII), 182 CCC (3d) 483, par Prowse JA
- ↑
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 1994 CanLII 39 (CSC), [1994] 3 RCS 835, par Lamer CJ
R c Mentuck, 2001 CSC 76 (CanLII), [2001] 3 RCS 442, par Iacobucci J - ↑ Mentuk, supra at 34 ("he first branch of the test contains several important elements that can be collapsed in the concept of ‘necessity’, but that are worth pausing to enumerate. One required element is that the risk in question be a serious one, or as Lamer C.J. put it at p.878 in Dagenais, a ‘real and substantial’ risk. That is, it must be a risk the reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence. It must also be a risk that poses a serious threat to the proper administration of justice. ")
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, par Tilleman J, au para 8
- ↑
R c CBC, 2018 ONSC 5167 (CanLII), par Goldstein J, au para 36
- ↑
, ibid., au para 36 (". I also do not accept that as a general rule mere publication of the fact of cooperation with the police will prejudice future cooperation. It might. People might be willing to cooperate with the police only where they do not believe that the fact of cooperation is unknown. Such an assertion would require specific evidence — such as in the case of a person fearing physical harm in a gang-related case. ")
- ↑
R c CBC, 2008 ONCA 397 (CanLII), 231 CCC (3d) 394, par Juriansz JA, aux paras 18, 26
- ↑
R c Vice Media Canada Inc, 2016 ONSC 1961 (CanLII), 352 CRR (2d) 60, par MacDonnell J, au para 64 - appealed to 2017 ONCA 231 (CanLII) and 2018 CSC 53 (CanLII)
- ↑
, ibid., au para 66
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 CSC 41 (CanLII), [2005] 2 RCS 188, par Fish J, au para 23 ("the ground must not just be asserted in the abstract; it must be supported by particularized grounds related to the investigation that is said to be imperilled")
- ↑ Application by the Winnipeg Free Press, 2006 MBQB 43 (CanLII), 200 Man R (2d) 196, 70 WCB (2d) 54, au para 71 ("... the R.C.M.P. is seeking to limit public access to information on the basis that resultant publicity through the media would harm the nature and extent of an ongoing investigation and subvert the ends of justice. The R.C.M.P. is put in an unenviable position of endeavouring to support an application by reliance upon, in some respects, generalized assertions. However, to do otherwise or to give specifics could well result in jeopardizing the very information that is sought to be protected by the R.C.M.P. from coming into the public domain. ...However, “ … the perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at that early stage.”")
- ↑
Toronto Star, supra ("...access to court documents cannot be denied solely for the purpose of giving law enforcement officers an investigative advantage...")
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, supra, au para 16
MacIntyre, supra - ↑
Globe & Mail, supra, au para 16
Phillips v Vancouver Sun, supra
- ↑ Phillips v Vancouver Sun, supra, au para 66
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, par Tilleman J, au para 15
- ↑
, ibid., au para 18
- ↑
R c DM, 1993 CanLII 5661 (NS CA), par Kelly JA
- ↑
Vice Media Canada Inc, supra, au para 73
R c CBC, 2013 ONSC 6983 (CanLII), par Nordheimer J, au para 11
R c Esseghaier, 2013 ONSC 5779 (CanLII), par Durno J, au para 160
- ↑
, ibid., au para 21
Flahiff v Cour Du Québec, 1998 CanLII 13149 (QC CA), [1998] RJQ 327, 157 DLR (4th) 485, par Rothman JA, aux pp. 19 to 20
- ↑
, ibid., au p. 91
CBC, supra, aux paras 29 to 32
- ↑
CBC, supra, au para 32
- ↑
CBC, supra, aux paras 43 to 46
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, supra, au para 18
Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 CSC 41 (CanLII), [2002] 2 RCS 522, par Iacobucci J
- ↑ Flahiff v Cour Du Québec, 1998 CanLII 13149 (QC CA), 123 CCC (3d) 79, par Rothman JA
- ↑
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Canada, 2005 CanLII 47737 (ON SC), 204 CCC (3d) 397, par Nordheimer J, aux paras 36 to 42
- ↑
CBC, supra, au para 55
Sealing Procedure
487.3
[omis (1) and (2)]
- Procedure
(3) Where an order is made under subsection (1) [ordonnance de mise sous scellés relative aux mandats], all documents relating to the application shall, subject to any terms and conditions that the justice or judge considers desirable in the circumstances, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any term or condition concerning the duration of the prohibition, partial disclosure of a document, deletion of any information or the occurrence of a condition, be placed in a packet and sealed by the justice or judge immediately on determination of the application, and that packet shall be kept in the custody of the court in a place to which the public has no access or in any other place that the justice or judge may authorize and shall not be dealt with except in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the order or as varied under subsection (4). [omis (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
Unsealing
Wiretaps
- Manner in which application to be kept secret
187 (1) All documents relating to an application made pursuant to any provision of this Part [Pt. VI – Atteintes à la vie privée (art. 183 à 196.1)] are confidential and, subject to subsection (1.1) [manière dont la demande doit être gardée secrète – exception], shall be placed in a packet and sealed by the judge to whom the application is made immediately on determination of the application, and that packet shall be kept in the custody of the court in a place to which the public has no access or in such other place as the judge may authorize and shall not be dealt with except in accordance with subsections (1.2) to (1.5) .
- Exception
(1.1) An authorization given under this Part [Pt. VI – Atteintes à la vie privée (art. 183 à 196.1)] need not be placed in the packet except if, under subsection 184.3(8) [écoute téléphonique avec consentement d'une seule partie par télémandat – lorsque les télécoms produisent un écrit' '], the original authorization is in the hands of the judge, in which case that judge must place it in the packet and the copy remains with the applicant.
[omis (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.5), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 187; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 24; 1993, c. 40, s. 7; 2005, c. 10, s. 24; 2014, c. 31, s. 10; 2022, c. 17, s. 8.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
Non-Disclosure Order for Production Orders
A non-disclosure order is an order available to prohibit a named person or organization from disclosing the existence of a preservation demand, preservation order, or production order.
- Order prohibiting disclosure
487.0191 (1) On ex parte application made by a peace officer or public officer, a justice or judge may make an order prohibiting a person from disclosing the existence or some or all of the contents of a preservation demand made under section 487.012 [ordre de préservation] or a preservation or production order made under any of sections 487.013 to 487.018 during the period set out in the order.
- Conditions for making order
(2) Before making the order, the justice or judge must be satisfied by information on oath in Form 5.009 [formes] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure during that period would jeopardize the conduct of the investigation of the offence to which the preservation demand or the preservation or production order relates.
- Form
(3) The order is to be in Form 5.0091 [formes].
- Application to revoke or vary order
(4) A peace officer or a public officer or a person, financial institution or entity that is subject to an order made under subsection (1) [ordonnance interdisant la divulgation des ordonnances de préservation ou de production] may apply in writing to the justice or judge who made the order — or to a judge in the judicial district where the order was made — to revoke or vary the order.
2014, c. 31, s. 20.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
- peace officer and public officer
Section 2 defines "peace officer."[1] Section 487.011 defines "public officer."[2]
- judge and justice
Section 2 defines "justice."[3] Section 487.011 defines "judge."[4]
- ↑ Peace Officers
- ↑ [[Définitions des parties, des personnes, des lieux et des organisations ]]
- ↑ [[Définition des officiers et des bureaux judiciaires ]]
- ↑ [[Définition des officiers et des bureaux judiciaires ]]