« Ajournements » : différence entre les versions

De Le carnet de droit pénal
m Remplacement de texte : « ==General Principles== » par « ==Principes généraux== »
m Remplacement de texte : « ([0-9])L\.R\. » par « $1; L.R. »
 
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{{En|Adjournments}}
[[en:Adjournments]]
{{fr|Ajournements}}
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{{Currency2|January|2019}}
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==Principes généraux==
==Principes généraux==
An adjournment is re-scheduling of a court proceeding, be it arraignment, plea, trial, sentencing, or otherwise.  
Un ajournement est une modification de la date d'une procédure judiciaire, qu'il s'agisse d'une mise en accusation, d'un plaidoyer, d'un procès, d'une condamnation ou autre.


The granting of an adjournments is at the discretion of the judge (e.g. see s.571 and 645; 669.1(2)), but in practice is a frequent occurrence.
L'octroi d'un ajournement est à la discrétion du juge (voir par exemple les articles 571 et 645 ; 669.1(2)), mais dans la pratique, c'est un cas fréquent.


; Powers of Clerk to Adjourn on Instructions
; Pouvoirs du greffier d'ajourner sur instructions
A judge may direct a clerk to adjourn court to a subsequent day.
Un juge peut ordonner à un greffier d'ajourner l'audience à un jour ultérieur.
{{quotation3|
{{quotation3|
474<br>
474<br>
{{removed|(1)}}
{{removed|(1)}}
; Adjournment on instructions of judge
;Ajournement à la demande du juge
(2) A clerk of the court for the trial of criminal cases in any territorial division may, at any time, on the instructions of the presiding judge or another judge of the court, adjourn the court and the business of the court to a subsequent day.
(2) Le greffier du tribunal chargé de l’instruction de causes criminelles dans une circonscription territoriale peut, en tout temps, à la demande d’un juge de ce tribunal, ajourner les affaires de celui-ci à une date ultérieure.
<br>
 
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31.
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 31

|{{CCCSec2|474}}
|{{CCCSec2|474}}
|{{NoteUp|474|2}}
|{{NoteUp|474|2}}
|[[Criminal Code and Related Definitions|"judge"]] (s. 2)
|[[Code criminel et définitions connexes|"judge"]] (s. 2)
}}
}}


The procedure found in s. 474(2) cannot be extended to municipal or regulatory provisions whereby the clerk can adjourn a summary trial on behalf of the justice of the peace.<Ref>
La procédure prévue au par. 474(2) ne peut être étendue aux dispositions municipales ou réglementaires en vertu desquelles le greffier peut ajourner un procès sommaire au nom du juge de paix.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|1283499 ontario Inc|6m3g|2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA)|176 CCC (3d) 522}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|1283499 ontario Inc|6m3g|2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA)|176 CCC (3d) 522}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}
</ref>
</ref>
Ligne 28 : Ligne 28 :
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Jurisdiction to Adjourn a Matter==
==Compétence pour ajourner une affaire==
{{seealso|Definition of Judicial Officers and Offices}}
{{seealso|Définition des officiers et des bureaux judiciaires}}


The statutory authority to adjourn a matter comes from different sections of the Code depending on the level of court and the class of offence charged.
Le pouvoir légal d'ajourner une affaire provient de différents articles du Code selon le niveau de tribunal et la catégorie d'infraction reprochée.


===Summary Offence Matters===
===Affaires sommaires===


; Provincial Court Judge power to adjourn summary trial
; Pouvoir du juge de la cour provinciale d'ajourner un procès sommaire
A provincial court judge dealing with a summary matter is governed by s. 803 found in Part XXVII {{AnnSec|Part XXVII}}:
Un juge de la cour provinciale qui traite d'une affaire sommaire est régi par le par. 803 trouvé dans la partie XXVII {{AnnSec|Partie XXVII}} :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Adjournment
;Ajournement
803 (1) The summary conviction court may, in its discretion, before or during the trial, adjourn the trial to a time and place to be appointed and stated in the presence of the parties or their counsel or agents.
803 (1) La cour des poursuites sommaires peut, à sa discrétion, ajourner un procès, même en cours, et le faire tenir aux lieu et date déterminés en présence des parties et leurs avocats ou représentants respectifs.
 


{{removed|(2), (3) and (4)}}
{{removed|(2), (3) et (4)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 803;  
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 803; {{LegHistory90s|1991, ch. 43}}, art. 9;  
{{LegHistory90s|1991, c. 43}}, s. 9;  
{{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 79;  
{{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 79; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 112; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 45.
{{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 112;
{{LegHistory00s|2008, ch. 18}}, art. 45
|{{CCCSec2|803}}
|{{CCCSec2|803}}
|{{NoteUp|803|1}}
|{{NoteUp|803|1}}
}}
}}


This section permits the judge to adjourn a matter where the accused fails to appear without issuing a bench warrant.<ref>
Cet article permet au juge d'ajourner une affaire lorsque l'accusé ne comparaît pas sans avoir émis un mandat d'arrêt.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Szoboszloi|htx04|1970 CanLII 1083 (ON CA)|5 CCC 366}}{{perONCA-H|Aylesworth JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|Szoboszloi|htx04|1970 CanLII 1083 (ON CA)|5 CCC 366}}{{perONCA-H|Aylesworth JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Adjourn summary proceedings other than trial
; Ajournement des procédures sommaires autres que le procès
General adjournments of summary offences is found in Part XX {{AnnSec|Part XX}}:
Les ajournements généraux des infractions sommaires se trouvent à la partie XX {{AnnSec|Partie XX}} :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
669.1 <br>
669.1 <br>
{{removed|(1) [Jurisdiction]}}
{{removed|(1) [Jurisdiction]}}
; Adjournment
; Ajournement
(2) Any court, judge or provincial court judge having jurisdiction to try an accused or a defendant, or any clerk or other proper officer of the court, or in the case of an offence punishable on summary conviction, any justice, may, at any time before or after the plea of the accused or defendant is taken, adjourn the proceedings.
(2) Un tribunal, un juge, un juge de la cour provinciale ayant juridiction pour juger le prévenu ou le défendeur, un greffier ou autre fonctionnaire du tribunal qui sont compétents ou un juge de paix dans le cas d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire peuvent ajourner les procédures, à tout moment, avant que le plaidoyer du prévenu ou du défendeur ne soit reçu ou après qu’il l’a été.
<br>
 
R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 137
L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 137
|{{CCCSec2|669.1}}
|{{CCCSec2|669.1}}
|{{NoteUp|669.1|2}}
|{{NoteUp|669.1|2}}
Ligne 69 : Ligne 71 :
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


===Indictable Matters===
===Affaires criminelles===
; Preliminary inquiry judge
; Juge d'enquête préliminaire
A Preliminary Inquiry Judge may adjourn under s.537:
Un juge d'enquête préliminaire peut ajourner en vertu de l'art. 537 :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Powers of justice
;Pouvoirs du juge de paix
537 (1) A justice acting under this Part {{AnnSec|Part XVIII}} may
537 (1) Un juge de paix agissant en vertu de la présente partie peut :
:(a) adjourn an inquiry from time to time and change the place of hearing, where it appears to be desirable to do so by reason of the absence of a witness, the inability of a witness who is ill to attend at the place where the justice usually sits or for any other sufficient reason;  
:a) ajourner l’enquête de temps à autre et changer le lieu de l’audition, lorsque la chose paraît opportune en raison de l’absence d’un témoin, de l’impossibilité pour un témoin malade d’être présent à l’endroit où le juge de paix siège ordinairement, ou pour tout autre motif suffisant;


{{removed|(1.01), (1.02), (1.1), (2), (3) and (4)}}
{{removed|(1.01), (1.02), (1.1), (2), (3) et (4)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 537;  
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 537; {{LegHistory90s|1991, ch. 43}}, art. 9; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 53; {{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 64;
{{LegHistory90s|1991, c. 43}}, s. 9;  
{{LegHistory00s|2002, ch. 13}}, art. 28;
{{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 53; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 64; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 28; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 22.
{{LegHistory00s|2008, ch. 18}}, art. 22;
{{LegHistory10s|2019, ch. 25}}, art. 242;
{{LegHistory20s|2022, ch. 17}}, art. 35
{{Annotation}}
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|537}}
|{{CCCSec2|537}}
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}}
}}


; Provincial Court Judge or Superior Court Justices with Indictable Matters Without Jury
; Juge de la Cour provinciale ou juge de la Cour supérieure avec des affaires criminelles sans jury
A provincial court judge dealing with an indictable matter or superior court justice without jury is governed by s. 571:
Un juge de la Cour provinciale qui traite d'une affaire criminelle ou un juge de la Cour supérieure sans jury est régi par l'art. 571 :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Adjournment of non-jury trial
;Ajournement
571 A judge or provincial court judge acting under this Part {{AnnSec|Part XIX}} may from time to time adjourn a trial until it is finally terminated.
 
571 Un juge ou juge de la cour provinciale agissant en vertu de la présente partie peut, à l’occasion, ajourner un procès jusqu’à ce qu’il soit définitivement terminé.


R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 203 <br>
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 571;
L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 203
{{Annotation}}
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|571}}
|{{CCCSec2|571}}
Ligne 98 : Ligne 104 :
}}
}}


The term "judge" for the purpose of s. 571 &mdash; found in Part XIX {{AnnSec|Part XIX}}&mdash;is defined in s. 552 as a ''superior court judge''.<ref>
Le terme {{Tr}}« juge » aux fins de l'art. 571, qui se trouve dans la partie XIX, est défini à l'art. 552 comme un {{Tr}}« juge de la cour supérieure ».<ref>
see [[Definition of Judicial Officers and Offices]]</ref>
voir [[Définition des officiers et des fonctions judiciaires]]</ref>


; Superior Court Justices with Indictable Offences Triable by Jury
; Juges de la cour supérieure dont les actes criminels sont jugés par jury
Adjournments of trials on indictable matters under Part XX {{AnnSec|Part XX}}:
Ajournements de procès sur des actes criminels en vertu de la partie XX :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
606<br>
606<br>
{{removed|(1), (1.1), (1.2) and (2)}}
{{removed|(1), (1.1), (1.2) et (2)}}
; Allowing time
Délai
(3) An accused is not entitled as of right to have his trial postponed but the court may, if it considers that the accused should be allowed further time to plead, move to quash or prepare for his defence or for any other reason, adjourn the trial to a later time in the session or sittings of the court, or to the next of any subsequent session or sittings of the court, on such terms as the court considers proper.
 
(3) L’accusé n’est pas admis, de droit, à faire remettre son procès, mais le tribunal, s’il estime qu’il y a lieu de lui accorder un délai plus long pour plaider, proposer l’arrêt des procédures, préparer sa défense ou pour tout autre motif, peut ajourner le procès à une date ultérieure de la session ou à toute session subséquente, aux conditions qu’il juge appropriées.
 
 
{{removed|(4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) et (5)}}
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 606;
L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 125;
{{LegHistory00s|2002, ch. 13}}, art. 49;
{{LegHistory10s|2015, ch. 13}}, art. 21;
{{LegHistory10s|2019, ch. 25}}, art. 268;
{{LegHistory20s|2022, ch. 17}}, art. 37


{{removed|(4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (5)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 606; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 125; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 49; {{LegHistory10s|2015, c. 13}}, s. 21.
|{{CCCSec2|606}}
|{{CCCSec2|606}}
|{{NoteUp|606|3}}
|{{NoteUp|606|3}}
}}
}}


Any judge dealing with an indictable matter with a jury:
Tout juge traitant d’une affaire criminelle avec jury :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Trial continuous
;Instruction continue
645 (1) The trial of an accused shall proceed continuously subject to adjournment by the court.
 
; Adjournment
645 (1) Le procès d’un accusé se poursuit continûment, sous réserve d’ajournement par le tribunal.
(2) The judge may adjourn the trial from time to time in the same sittings.
; Formal adjournment unnecessary
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2) {{AnnSec6|645(2)}}, no formal adjournment of trial or entry thereof is required.


{{removed|(4) and (5)}}
; Ajournement
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 645; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 133; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 76; {{LegHistory00s|2001, c. 32}}, s. 43.
 
(2) Le juge peut ajourner le procès de temps à autre au cours d’une même session.
 
; Ajournement formel non nécessaire
 
(3) À cette fin, aucun ajournement formel du procès n’est requis, et il n’est pas nécessaire d’en faire une inscription.
{{removed|(4) et (5)}}
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 645;
L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 133; {{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 76;
{{LegHistory00s|2001, ch. 32}}, art. 43
{{Annotation}}
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|645}}
|{{CCCSec2|645}}
Ligne 132 : Ligne 152 :




; Clerk Authorized to Adjourn Jury Matter
; Le greffier est autorisé à ajourner l'affaire du jury


{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Adjournment when no jury summoned
;Ajournement lorsque aucun jury n’a été convoqué
474 (1) Where the competent authority has determined that a panel of jurors is not to be summoned for a term or sittings of the court for the trial of criminal cases in any territorial division, the clerk of the court may, on the day of the opening of the term or sittings, if a judge is not present to preside over the court, adjourn the court and the business of the court to a subsequent day.
 
474 (1) Le greffier du tribunal peut, lorsque l’autorité compétente a décidé qu’aucune liste de jurés ne doit être convoquée pour une session du tribunal aux fins d’instruction de causes criminelles dans une circonscription territoriale, le jour de l’ouverture de la session, en l’absence d’un juge pour présider le tribunal ajourner les affaires de celui-ci à une date ultérieure.
 
<br>
<br>
{{removed|(2)}}
{{removed|(2)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31.
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 31
|{{CCCSec2|474}}
|{{CCCSec2|474}}
|{{NoteUp|474|1}}
|{{NoteUp|474|1}}
}}
}}


===Codified Reasons to Adjourn===
===Motifs codifiés d'ajournement===


; Non-Appearance of Prosecutor
; Non-comparution du procureur
Provincial court judge under Part XXII {{AnnSec|Part XXII}} may adjourn a matter due to non-appearance of the prosecutor:
Le juge du tribunal provincial en vertu de la partie XXII {{AnnSec|Partie XXII}} peut ajourner une affaire en raison de la non-comparution du procureur :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Non-appearance of prosecutor
;Non-comparution du poursuivant
799 Where, in proceedings to which this Part {{AnnSec|Part XXII}} applies, the defendant appears for the trial and the prosecutor, having had due notice, does not appear, the summary conviction court may dismiss the information or may adjourn the trial to some other time on such terms as it considers proper.
 
<br>
799 Lorsque, dans des procédures que vise la présente partie, le défendeur comparaît pour le procès et que le poursuivant, ayant été dûment avisé, ne comparaît pas, la cour des poursuites sommaires peut rejeter la dénonciation ou ajourner le procès aux conditions qu’elle estime opportunes.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 734.
 
S.R., ch. C-34, art. 734
{{Annotation}}
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|799}}
|{{CCCSec2|799}}
Ligne 158 : Ligne 181 :
}}
}}


; Problems with Charging Document
; Problèmes avec le document d'accusation
Where the accused has been misled or prejudiced by any issues found in the indictment or information, the accused may adjourn a matter. (see s. 485, 547, and 601)
Lorsque l'accusé a été induit en erreur ou a subi un préjudice en raison de problèmes relevés dans l'acte d'accusation ou la dénonciation, il peut ajourner l'affaire. (voir art. 485, 547 et 601)


; Failure to Give Expert Notice
; Défaut de donner un avis d'expert
Where a party wishes to call an expert witness and did not give notice, the available remedy is an adjournment under s. 657.3 (5).
Lorsqu'une partie souhaite appeler un témoin expert et n'a pas donné d'avis, le recours disponible est un ajournement en vertu de l'art. 657.3 (5).


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Discretion of the Judge==
==Discrétion du juge==
It is a discretionary decision on whether to grant or refuse a request for an adjournment.<ref>
Il s'agit d'une décision discrétionnaire d'accorder ou de refuser une demande d'ajournement.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|White|287w8|2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII)|252 CCC (3d) 248}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) {{atL|287w8|14}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|White|287w8|2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII)|252 CCC (3d) 248}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) {{atL|287w8|14}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Manhas v The Queen|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 59}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}
{{CanLIIRPC|Manhas v The Queen|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (CSC)|[1980] 1 RCS 59}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}
</ref>
</ref>
The discretion should be exercised judicially, giving proper reasons.<ref>
Le pouvoir discrétionnaire doit être exercé de manière judiciaire, en donnant des motifs appropriés.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (SCC)|[1977] 2 SCR 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}} (6:3) at 124-125<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (CSC)|[1977] 2 RCS 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}} (6:3) at 124-125<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|fxcwd|2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII)|553 AR 72}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|fxcwd|2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII)|553 AR 72}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|JCG|230fz|2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA)|189 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perQCCA|Dalphond JA}}{{atL|230fz|8}}
{{CanLIIRP|JCG|230fz|2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA)|189 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perQCCA|Dalphond JA}}{{atL|230fz|8}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Appellate Standard Review
; Examen standard en appel
The decision is reviewable on the circumstances of the particular case, including the ability and quality of the accused.<ref>
La décision est révisable en fonction des circonstances de l'affaire en question, notamment de la capacité et de la qualité de l'accusé.<ref>
{{supra1|White}}</ref>
{{supra1|White}}</ref>
The question for the reviewing judge is whether sufficient weight was given to "all relevant considerations."<ref>
La question qui se pose au juge de révision est de savoir si l'on a accordé suffisamment de poids à « toutes les considérations pertinentes ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Gerlitz|gdt09|2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}{{atL|gdt09|21}} ("The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations")<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Gerlitz|gdt09|2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}{{atL|gdt09|21}} ( {{Tr}}« The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations» )<br>
{{supra1|JCG}}{{atL|230fz|9}}<br>
{{supra1|JCG}}{{atL|230fz|9}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


This exercise of discretion is afforded considerable deference.<ref>  
Cet exercice de discrétion bénéficie d'une déférence considérable.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Toor|5rkh|2001 ABCA 88 (CanLII)|155 CCC (3d) 345}}{{perABCA|Paperny JA}} (alone){{atL|5rkh|15}} ("[t]he granting of adjournments and the exercise of judicial discretion are generally afforded a considerable degree of deference, and the law is well established in the area.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Toor|5rkh|2001 ABCA 88 (CanLII)|155 CCC (3d) 345}}{{perABCA|Paperny JA}} (alone){{atL|5rkh|15}} ("[t]he granting of adjournments and the exercise of judicial discretion are generally afforded a considerable degree of deference, and the law is well established in the area.» )<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Travis|ftj3x|2012 ABQB 629 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Yamauchi J}}{{atsL|ftj3x|61| to 63}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Travis|ftj3x|2012 ABQB 629 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Yamauchi J}}{{atsL|ftj3x|61| à 63}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The judge does not need to mention every factor considered.<ref>
Le juge n’a pas besoin de mentionner tous les facteurs pris en considération.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|126 NSR (2d) 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}}{{atsL|16| and 29}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|126 NSR (2d) 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}}{{atsL|16| et 29}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Tortora|2dpv9|2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 128}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} (3:0){{atL|2dpv9|23}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Tortora|2dpv9|2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 128}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} (3:0){{atL|2dpv9|23}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The trial judge is not in error for failure to give full reasons so long as the record shows evidence that permits the necessary inferences to justify the decision.<ref>
Le juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en ne donnant pas de motifs complets tant que le dossier contient des éléments de preuve qui permettent de tirer les conclusions nécessaires pour justifier la décision.<ref>
{{supra1|EWB}} ("On an appeal from a refusal it would appear that a court of appeal will not find the learned trial judge erred notwithstanding his reasons may not be fully articulated if the record discloses evidence from which it can be inferred that the absence of counsel was brought about by the accused for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.")
{{supra1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« On an appeal from a refusal it would appear that a court of appeal will not find the learned trial judge erred notwithstanding his reasons may not be fully articulated if the record discloses evidence from which it can be inferred that the absence of counsel was brought about by the accused for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.» )
</ref>
</ref>


Where the appeal concerns a refusal to adjourn for the accused to obtain counsel, the appellant must show that the refusal deprived the accused of full answer and defence which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.<ref>
Lorsque l'appel concerne un refus d'ajourner l'audience pour permettre à l'accusé d'obtenir les services d'un avocat, l'appelant doit démontrer que le refus a privé l'accusé d'une défense pleine et entière, ce qui a entraîné une erreur judiciaire.<ref>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Factors to Consider
; Facteurs à prendre en compte
A judge is typically not inclined to adjourn trial matters. The cost of resources to bring a matter to trial and the desire to bring a matter to a conclusion speaks to the judge's interest in having a matter proceed. This is balanced against the accused's right to a fair trial and right to be tried within a reasonable time.
Un juge n'est généralement pas enclin à ajourner les affaires de première instance. Le coût des ressources nécessaires pour porter une affaire devant un tribunal et le désir de mener une affaire à terme témoignent de l'intérêt du juge à ce que l'affaire se poursuive. Cela est mis en balance avec le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable et à son droit d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable.


Where the judge has grounds to believe that the request for an adjournment is a sham, the judge may refuse the adjournment.<ref>
Lorsque le juge a des motifs de croire que la demande d’ajournement est une imposture, il peut refuser l’ajournement.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Amos|frdtr|2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII)|292 OAC 298}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}} (3:0)</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Amos|frdtr|2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII)|292 OAC 298}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}} (3:0)</ref>


The trial judge should consider all circumstances, including:<Ref>
Le juge du procès doit tenir compte de toutes les circonstances, notamment :<Ref>
{{supra1|JCG}}{{atsL|230fz|12| to 13}} ("...“the gravity of the charge, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the Crown and for the accused")<br>
{{supra1|JCG}}{{atsL|230fz|12| à 13}} ( {{Tr}}« ...“the gravity of the charge, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the Crown and for the accused» )<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|MacLean|fwx4z|2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}}{{atL|fwx4z|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|MacLean|fwx4z|2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}}{{atL|fwx4z|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0)  
{{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0)  
</ref>
</ref>
* the gravity of the charges
* la gravité des accusations
* the number of previous postponements
* le nombre de remises antérieures
* the consequences to the Crown and accused by a postponement
* les conséquences d'une remise pour la Couronne et l'accusé
* the accused criminal record as a reflection on his experience in the system<ref>
* le casier judiciaire de l'accusé en tant que reflet de son expérience dans le système<ref>
{{ibid1|EWB}}
{{ibid1|EWB}}
</ref>
</ref>
* the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice<ref>
* l'intérêt public dans l'administration ordonnée et rapide de la justice<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JEB|1zg4q|1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA)|52 CCC (3d) 224}}{{perNSCA-H|MacDonald JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|JEB|1zg4q|1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA)|52 CCC (3d) 224}}{{perNSCA-H|MacDonald JA}}<br>
{{supra1|Beals}}{{atL|1z9n|18}}
{{supra1|Beals}}{{atL|1z9n|18}}
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


===Adjournment to Obtain Counsel===
===Ajournement pour obtenir un avocat===


When faced with a request to adjourn to obtain counsel, the trial judge should consider whether a fair trial requires counsel given the seriousness or complexity of the charges.<ref>
Lorsqu'il est confronté à une demande d'ajournement pour obtenir un avocat, le juge du procès doit se demander si un procès équitable nécessite la présence d'un avocat compte tenu de la gravité ou de la complexité de l'affaire accusations.<ref>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The judge may also consider the "personality and skills" of the accused.<Ref>
Le juge peut également tenir compte de la {{Tr}}« personnalité et des compétences » de l'accusé.<Ref>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br>
Ligne 242 : Ligne 264 :
</ref>
</ref>


The right to retain counsel requires that the accused to act honestly and diligently.<ref>
Le droit de retenir les services d'un avocat exige que l'accusé agisse honnêtement et avec diligence.<ref>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|EWB|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0) ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|EWB|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0) ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.<ref>
En règle générale, une demande ne devrait pas être refusée lorsque le fait de ne pas avoir eu recours à un avocat au procès n'était pas de sa faute, mais plutôt de la faute de l'avocat de la défense.<ref>
{{ibid1|EWB}} ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.")<br>
{{ibid1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Ligne 263 : Ligne 285 :
The discretion to allow an adjournment must be based on reasons well-founded in the law.<ref>
The discretion to allow an adjournment must be based on reasons well-founded in the law.<ref>
{{supra1|Beals}}<br>
{{supra1|Beals}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (SCC)|[1977] 2 SCR 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (CSC)|[1977] 2 RCS 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}}
</ref>
</ref>


Ligne 277 : Ligne 299 :
</ref>
</ref>
* the right to counsel is not absolute;<ref>
* the right to counsel is not absolute;<ref>
see also {{CanLIIRP|McCallen|1f97c|1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA)|131 CCC (3d) 518}}{{perONCA|O'Connor JA}}{{atL|1f97c|40}}<br>
voir également {{CanLIIRP|McCallen|1f97c|1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA)|131 CCC (3d) 518}}{{perONCA|O'Connor JA}}{{atL|1f97c|40}}<br>
{{supra1|Beals}} ("The right to counsel at trial is not absolute")<br>
{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« The right to counsel at trial is not absolute» )<br>
</ref>
</ref>
* each application for an adjournment must be decided on its own facts;
* each application for an adjournment must be decided on its own facts;
Ligne 299 : Ligne 321 :
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br>
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br>
{{supra1|Beals}} (3:0) ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br>
{{supra1|Beals}} (3:0) ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.<ref>
Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.<ref>
{{ibid1|EWB}} ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.")<br>
{{ibid1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Ligne 310 : Ligne 332 :
; Constitutional Protections
; Constitutional Protections
Consideration should be on whether the accused was deprived of the right to a fair trial, their right to make full answer and defence, or whether there would be a miscarriage of justice.<ref>
Consideration should be on whether the accused was deprived of the right to a fair trial, their right to make full answer and defence, or whether there would be a miscarriage of justice.<ref>
{{infra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} (in upholding refusal the SKCA said "We are all of the view the appellants were not deprived of their right to a fair trial or their right to make full answer in defence and there was no miscarriage of justice.")
{{infra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} (in upholding refusal the SKCA said "We are all of the view the appellants were not deprived of their right to a fair trial or their right to make full answer in defence and there was no miscarriage of justice.» )
</ref>
</ref>


Ligne 321 : Ligne 343 :
From these principles, the factors courts should consider include the following:<ref>
From these principles, the factors courts should consider include the following:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hayter|htp2c|2018 SKCA 65 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 413}}{{perSKCA|Caldwell JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hayter|htp2c|2018 SKCA 65 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 413}}{{perSKCA|Caldwell JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rak|1l76t|1999 CanLII 12229 (SK CA)|172 Sask R 301 (CA)}}{{perSKCA|Lane JA}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} ("The appellants had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and their refusal to cooperate with counsel led to a refusal of Legal Aid.  The failure to have counsel did not result in an unfair trial.  Gregory Rak handled the defence rather adroitly on his own and his father’s behalf and was effective in his cross-examination.  He demonstrated a clear ability to understand the documentary evidence.  As well the trial judge was extremely helpful to the appellants throughout the course of the trial.")
{{CanLIIRP|Rak|1l76t|1999 CanLII 12229 (SK CA)|172 Sask R 301 (CA)}}{{perSKCA|Lane JA}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} ( {{Tr}}« The appellants had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and their refusal to cooperate with counsel led to a refusal of Legal Aid.  The failure to have counsel did not result in an unfair trial.  Gregory Rak handled the defence rather adroitly on his own and his father’s behalf and was effective in his cross-examination.  He demonstrated a clear ability to understand the documentary evidence.  As well the trial judge was extremely helpful to the appellants throughout the course of the trial.» )
</ref>
</ref>
* whether the accused has failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently;
* whether the accused has failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently;
Ligne 351 : Ligne 373 :
** Has the accused had an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel?
** Has the accused had an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel?
** Has the accused been warned that he or she will have to proceed with trial without counsel? Has the accused been made aware of the potential consequences of that?
** Has the accused been warned that he or she will have to proceed with trial without counsel? Has the accused been made aware of the potential consequences of that?
** Has Legal Aid or private counsel withdrawn or refused to represent the accused? If so, when was the accused advised of this? Keeping in mind the principles in ''Cunningham''<ref>2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 SCR 331</ref>, does the record disclose why counsel withdrew?
** Has Legal Aid or private counsel withdrawn or refused to represent the accused? If so, when was the accused advised of this? Keeping in mind the principles in ''Cunningham''<ref>2010 CSC 10, [2010] 1 RCS 331</ref>, does the record disclose why counsel withdrew?
** Has the accused acted or failed to act so as to thwart the appointment of counsel? Has the accused acted in any other way to delay the proceedings?
** Has the accused acted or failed to act so as to thwart the appointment of counsel? Has the accused acted in any other way to delay the proceedings?
** Is there evidence that the absence of counsel at trial is part of an orchestrated attempt by the accused to delay the proceedings?
** Is there evidence that the absence of counsel at trial is part of an orchestrated attempt by the accused to delay the proceedings?
Ligne 386 : Ligne 408 :
</ref>
</ref>
Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .<ref>  
Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .<ref>  
{{supra1|Beals}} ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br>
{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Manhas|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|17 CR (3d) 331}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Manhas|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (CSC)|17 CR (3d) 331}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.<Ref>
Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.<Ref>
{{supra1|Beals}} ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter")
{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter» )
{{supra1|Barrette}}
{{supra1|Barrette}}
</ref>
</ref>
Ligne 398 : Ligne 420 :
{{ibid1|Le(TD)}}{{atL|frj5d|37}}<br>
{{ibid1|Le(TD)}}{{atL|frj5d|37}}<br>
{{ibid1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br>
{{ibid1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br>
{{supra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|2}} ("The standard of review of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in refusing an adjournment may be reviewed by an appellate court “if it is based upon reasons that are not well-founded in law and results in a deprivation of the accused’s right to make full answer in defence” ... the right to make full answer in defence “must be weighed conscientiously and delicately along with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice”.")
{{supra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|2}} ( {{Tr}}« The standard of review of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in refusing an adjournment may be reviewed by an appellate court “if it is based upon reasons that are not well-founded in law and results in a deprivation of the accused’s right to make full answer in defence” ... the right to make full answer in defence “must be weighed conscientiously and delicately along with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice”.» )
</ref>
</ref>
An appeal should not be granted  for refusing an adjournment unless it can be shown that the right to full answer and defence was impacted such that there was an error in principle and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.<ref>
An appeal should not be granted  for refusing an adjournment unless it can be shown that the right to full answer and defence was impacted such that there was an error in principle and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.<ref>
{{supra1|Beals}} ("The scope of review by an appeal court of a refusal, notwithstanding it involves the review of the exercise of a discretionary power, is wide as the consequences of a refusal are to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel. On appeal the appellant must show that in refusing the adjournment the trial judge deprived the appellant of his right to make full answer and defence and thus made an error in principle which constituted a miscarriage of justice (Barrette v R. and Manhas v R., supra).")
{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« The scope of review by an appeal court of a refusal, notwithstanding it involves the review of the exercise of a discretionary power, is wide as the consequences of a refusal are to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel. On appeal the appellant must show that in refusing the adjournment the trial judge deprived the appellant of his right to make full answer and defence and thus made an error in principle which constituted a miscarriage of justice (Barrette v R. and Manhas v R., supra).» )
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Ligne 423 : Ligne 445 :
{{CanLIIRP|Shergill|22kpr|2009 BCCA 55 (CanLII)|269 BCAC 1}}{{perBCCA|Hall JA}} -- judge should have granted the crown adjournment for missing witness<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Shergill|22kpr|2009 BCCA 55 (CanLII)|269 BCAC 1}}{{perBCCA|Hall JA}} -- judge should have granted the crown adjournment for missing witness<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacDonald|26z7p|1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA)|132 CCC (3d) 205}}{{perNLCA|Cameron JA}} -- short adjournment for crown for missing witness<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacDonald|26z7p|1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA)|132 CCC (3d) 205}}{{perNLCA|Cameron JA}} -- short adjournment for crown for missing witness<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Darville v the Queen|hsqkr|1956 CanLII 463 (SCC)|116 CCC 113 (SCC)}}{{perSCC|Taschereau J}}{{atsL|hsqkr|13| to 14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Darville v the Queen|hsqkr|1956 CanLII 463 (CSC)|116 CCC 113 (CSC)}}{{perSCC|Taschereau J}}{{atsL|hsqkr|13| à 14}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
#that the absent witnesses are material in the case;  
#that the absent witnesses are material in the case;  
Ligne 436 : Ligne 458 :


===Late Disclosure===
===Late Disclosure===
A failure for the judge to grant a request for adjournment due to late disclosure can amount to an [[Abuse of Process|abuse of process]] requiring a new trial.<ref>
A failure for the judge to grant a request for adjournment due to late disclosure can amount to an [[Abus de procédure|abuse of process]] requiring a new trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Chu|gvx60|2016 SKCA 156 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 51}}{{perSKCA|Jackson JA}}{{atL|gvx60|82}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Chu|gvx60|2016 SKCA 156 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 51}}{{perSKCA|Jackson JA}}{{atL|gvx60|82}}<br>
</ref>  
</ref>  
Ligne 453 : Ligne 475 :
* [[Adjournments (Cases)]]
* [[Adjournments (Cases)]]


==See Also==
==Voir également==
* [[Precedent - Procedural - Adjournment]]
* [[Precedent - Procedural - Adjournment]]

Dernière version du 9 novembre 2024 à 09:14

Cette page a été mise à jour ou révisée de manière substantielle pour la dernière fois janvier 2019. (Rev. # 32035)
n.b.: Cette page est expérimentale. Si vous repérez une grammaire ou un texte anglais clairement incorrect, veuillez m'en informer à [email protected] et je le corrigerai dès que possible.

Principes généraux

Un ajournement est une modification de la date d'une procédure judiciaire, qu'il s'agisse d'une mise en accusation, d'un plaidoyer, d'un procès, d'une condamnation ou autre.

L'octroi d'un ajournement est à la discrétion du juge (voir par exemple les articles 571 et 645 ; 669.1(2)), mais dans la pratique, c'est un cas fréquent.

Pouvoirs du greffier d'ajourner sur instructions

Un juge peut ordonner à un greffier d'ajourner l'audience à un jour ultérieur.

474
[omis (1)]

Ajournement à la demande du juge

(2) Le greffier du tribunal chargé de l’instruction de causes criminelles dans une circonscription territoriale peut, en tout temps, à la demande d’un juge de ce tribunal, ajourner les affaires de celui-ci à une date ultérieure.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; 1994, ch. 44, art. 31 

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 474(2)


"judge" (s. 2)

La procédure prévue au par. 474(2) ne peut être étendue aux dispositions municipales ou réglementaires en vertu desquelles le greffier peut ajourner un procès sommaire au nom du juge de paix.[1]

  1. R c 1283499 ontario Inc, 2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA), 176 CCC (3d) 522, par Doherty JA

Compétence pour ajourner une affaire

Voir également: Définition des officiers et des bureaux judiciaires

Le pouvoir légal d'ajourner une affaire provient de différents articles du Code selon le niveau de tribunal et la catégorie d'infraction reprochée.

Affaires sommaires

Pouvoir du juge de la cour provinciale d'ajourner un procès sommaire

Un juge de la cour provinciale qui traite d'une affaire sommaire est régi par le par. 803 trouvé dans la partie XXVII  :

Ajournement

803 (1) La cour des poursuites sommaires peut, à sa discrétion, ajourner un procès, même en cours, et le faire tenir aux lieu et date déterminés en présence des parties et leurs avocats ou représentants respectifs.


[omis (2), (3) et (4)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 803; 1991, ch. 43, art. 9; 1994, ch. 44, art. 79; 1997, ch. 18, art. 112; 2008, ch. 18, art. 45

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 803(1)

Cet article permet au juge d'ajourner une affaire lorsque l'accusé ne comparaît pas sans avoir émis un mandat d'arrêt.[1]

Ajournement des procédures sommaires autres que le procès

Les ajournements généraux des infractions sommaires se trouvent à la partie XX  :

669.1
[omis (1) [Jurisdiction]]

Ajournement

(2) Un tribunal, un juge, un juge de la cour provinciale ayant juridiction pour juger le prévenu ou le défendeur, un greffier ou autre fonctionnaire du tribunal qui sont compétents ou un juge de paix dans le cas d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire peuvent ajourner les procédures, à tout moment, avant que le plaidoyer du prévenu ou du défendeur ne soit reçu ou après qu’il l’a été.

L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 137

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 669.1(2)


  1. R c Szoboszloi, 1970 CanLII 1083 (ON CA), 5 CCC 366, par Aylesworth JA

Affaires criminelles

Juge d'enquête préliminaire

Un juge d'enquête préliminaire peut ajourner en vertu de l'art. 537 :

Pouvoirs du juge de paix

537 (1) Un juge de paix agissant en vertu de la présente partie peut :

a) ajourner l’enquête de temps à autre et changer le lieu de l’audition, lorsque la chose paraît opportune en raison de l’absence d’un témoin, de l’impossibilité pour un témoin malade d’être présent à l’endroit où le juge de paix siège ordinairement, ou pour tout autre motif suffisant;

[omis (1.01), (1.02), (1.1), (2), (3) et (4)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 537; 1991, ch. 43, art. 9; 1994, ch. 44, art. 53; 1997, ch. 18, art. 64; 2002, ch. 13, art. 28; 2008, ch. 18, art. 22; 2019, ch. 25, art. 242; 2022, ch. 17, art. 35
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 537(1)

Juge de la Cour provinciale ou juge de la Cour supérieure avec des affaires criminelles sans jury

Un juge de la Cour provinciale qui traite d'une affaire criminelle ou un juge de la Cour supérieure sans jury est régi par l'art. 571 :

Ajournement

571 Un juge ou juge de la cour provinciale agissant en vertu de la présente partie peut, à l’occasion, ajourner un procès jusqu’à ce qu’il soit définitivement terminé.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 571; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 203
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 571

Le terme [TRADUCTION] « juge » aux fins de l'art. 571, qui se trouve dans la partie XIX, est défini à l'art. 552 comme un [TRADUCTION] « juge de la cour supérieure ».[1]

Juges de la cour supérieure dont les actes criminels sont jugés par jury

Ajournements de procès sur des actes criminels en vertu de la partie XX :

606
[omis (1), (1.1), (1.2) et (2)]
Délai

(3) L’accusé n’est pas admis, de droit, à faire remettre son procès, mais le tribunal, s’il estime qu’il y a lieu de lui accorder un délai plus long pour plaider, proposer l’arrêt des procédures, préparer sa défense ou pour tout autre motif, peut ajourner le procès à une date ultérieure de la session ou à toute session subséquente, aux conditions qu’il juge appropriées.


[omis (4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) et (5)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 606; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 125; 2002, ch. 13, art. 49; 2015, ch. 13, art. 21; 2019, ch. 25, art. 268; 2022, ch. 17, art. 37

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 606(3)

Tout juge traitant d’une affaire criminelle avec jury :

Instruction continue

645 (1) Le procès d’un accusé se poursuit continûment, sous réserve d’ajournement par le tribunal.

Ajournement

(2) Le juge peut ajourner le procès de temps à autre au cours d’une même session.

Ajournement formel non nécessaire

(3) À cette fin, aucun ajournement formel du procès n’est requis, et il n’est pas nécessaire d’en faire une inscription. [omis (4) et (5)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 645; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 133; 1997, ch. 18, art. 76; 2001, ch. 32, art. 43
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 645(1), (2) et (3)


Le greffier est autorisé à ajourner l'affaire du jury
Ajournement lorsque aucun jury n’a été convoqué

474 (1) Le greffier du tribunal peut, lorsque l’autorité compétente a décidé qu’aucune liste de jurés ne doit être convoquée pour une session du tribunal aux fins d’instruction de causes criminelles dans une circonscription territoriale, le jour de l’ouverture de la session, en l’absence d’un juge pour présider le tribunal ajourner les affaires de celui-ci à une date ultérieure.


[omis (2)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; 1994, ch. 44, art. 31

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 474(1)

Motifs codifiés d'ajournement

Non-comparution du procureur

Le juge du tribunal provincial en vertu de la partie XXII peut ajourner une affaire en raison de la non-comparution du procureur :

Non-comparution du poursuivant

799 Lorsque, dans des procédures que vise la présente partie, le défendeur comparaît pour le procès et que le poursuivant, ayant été dûment avisé, ne comparaît pas, la cour des poursuites sommaires peut rejeter la dénonciation ou ajourner le procès aux conditions qu’elle estime opportunes.

S.R., ch. C-34, art. 734
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]

CCC (CanLII), (Jus.)


Note: 799

Problèmes avec le document d'accusation

Lorsque l'accusé a été induit en erreur ou a subi un préjudice en raison de problèmes relevés dans l'acte d'accusation ou la dénonciation, il peut ajourner l'affaire. (voir art. 485, 547 et 601)

Défaut de donner un avis d'expert

Lorsqu'une partie souhaite appeler un témoin expert et n'a pas donné d'avis, le recours disponible est un ajournement en vertu de l'art. 657.3 (5).

Discrétion du juge

Il s'agit d'une décision discrétionnaire d'accorder ou de refuser une demande d'ajournement.[1] Le pouvoir discrétionnaire doit être exercé de manière judiciaire, en donnant des motifs appropriés.[2]

Examen standard en appel

La décision est révisable en fonction des circonstances de l'affaire en question, notamment de la capacité et de la qualité de l'accusé.[3] La question qui se pose au juge de révision est de savoir si l'on a accordé suffisamment de poids à « toutes les considérations pertinentes ».[4]

Cet exercice de discrétion bénéficie d'une déférence considérable.[5]

Le juge n’a pas besoin de mentionner tous les facteurs pris en considération.[6]

Le juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en ne donnant pas de motifs complets tant que le dossier contient des éléments de preuve qui permettent de tirer les conclusions nécessaires pour justifier la décision.[7]

Lorsque l'appel concerne un refus d'ajourner l'audience pour permettre à l'accusé d'obtenir les services d'un avocat, l'appelant doit démontrer que le refus a privé l'accusé d'une défense pleine et entière, ce qui a entraîné une erreur judiciaire.[8]

Facteurs à prendre en compte

Un juge n'est généralement pas enclin à ajourner les affaires de première instance. Le coût des ressources nécessaires pour porter une affaire devant un tribunal et le désir de mener une affaire à terme témoignent de l'intérêt du juge à ce que l'affaire se poursuive. Cela est mis en balance avec le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable et à son droit d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable.

Lorsque le juge a des motifs de croire que la demande d’ajournement est une imposture, il peut refuser l’ajournement.[9]

Le juge du procès doit tenir compte de toutes les circonstances, notamment :[10]

  • la gravité des accusations
  • le nombre de remises antérieures
  • les conséquences d'une remise pour la Couronne et l'accusé
  • le casier judiciaire de l'accusé en tant que reflet de son expérience dans le système[11]
  • l'intérêt public dans l'administration ordonnée et rapide de la justice[12]
  1. R c White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, par curiam (3:0) , au para 14
    Manhas v The Queen, 1980 CanLII 172 (CSC), [1980] 1 RCS 59, par Martland J
  2. R c Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (CSC), [1977] 2 RCS 121, par Pigeon J (6:3) at 124-125
    R c Anderson, 2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII), 553 AR 72, par curiam (3:0)
    R c JCG, 2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA), 189 CCC (3d) 1, par Dalphond JA, au para 8
  3. White, supra
  4. R c Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII), par Gates J, au para 21 ( [TRADUCTION] « The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations» )
    JCG, supra, au para 9
    White, supra, au para 15
  5. R c Toor, 2001 ABCA 88 (CanLII), 155 CCC (3d) 345, par Paperny JA (alone), au para 15 ("[t]he granting of adjournments and the exercise of judicial discretion are generally afforded a considerable degree of deference, and the law is well established in the area.» )
    R c Travis, 2012 ABQB 629 (CanLII), par Yamauchi J, aux paras 61 à 63
  6. R c Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 126 NSR (2d) 130, par Hallett JA, aux et 29 paras et 29{{{3}}}
    R c Tortora, 2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 297 BCAC 128, par Bennett JA (3:0), au para 23
  7. EWB, supra ( [TRADUCTION] « On an appeal from a refusal it would appear that a court of appeal will not find the learned trial judge erred notwithstanding his reasons may not be fully articulated if the record discloses evidence from which it can be inferred that the absence of counsel was brought about by the accused for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.» )
  8. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
  9. R c Amos, 2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII), 292 OAC 298, par Watt JA (3:0)
  10. JCG, supra, aux paras 12 à 13 ( [TRADUCTION] « ...“the gravity of the charge, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the Crown and for the accused» )
    White, supra, au para 16
    R c MacLean, 2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII), par Ouellette J, au para 14
    R c Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 352 APR 130, par Hallett JA (3:0)
  11. , ibid.
  12. R c JEB, 1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA), 52 CCC (3d) 224, par MacDonald JA
    Beals, supra, au para 18

Ajournement pour obtenir un avocat

Lorsqu'il est confronté à une demande d'ajournement pour obtenir un avocat, le juge du procès doit se demander si un procès équitable nécessite la présence d'un avocat compte tenu de la gravité ou de la complexité de l'affaire accusations.[1]

Le juge peut également tenir compte de la [TRADUCTION] « personnalité et des compétences » de l'accusé.[2]

Le droit de retenir les services d'un avocat exige que l'accusé agisse honnêtement et avec diligence.[3]

En règle générale, une demande ne devrait pas être refusée lorsque le fait de ne pas avoir eu recours à un avocat au procès n'était pas de sa faute, mais plutôt de la faute de l'avocat de la défense.[4]

The judge has discretion to adjourn a trial on request of the accused for reason that they are not represented by counsel. The judge must consider the accused constitutional right to a fair trial. The accused nevertheless has the right to represent himself. The right to be represented by counsel must be exercised "diligently and honestly", thus they may be refused if they have not acted honestly and diligently. The accused cannot be refused where the absence of counsel is not their fault.[5]

Exercise of Discretion

The discretion to allow an adjournment must be based on reasons well-founded in the law.[6]

Choice to Self-Rep Not Ground of Appeal

However, an accused who chooses not to have counsel cannot appeal a conviction on the grounds of not having effective representation.[7]

Principles

When considering whether to allow an adjournment by a self-represented accused to seek counsel, the judge should consider principles including:[8]

  • the right to counsel is not absolute;[9]
  • each application for an adjournment must be decided on its own facts;
  • generally, an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel is not his fault, but that of his counsel;
  • the right of an accused to retain counsel must be exercised honestly and diligently so as not to delay a scheduled trial; and
  • the scope of review by an appeal court of the exercise of the discretionary power to adjourn a scheduled trial is relatively wide as the consequences of a refusal may be to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel.
Self-Represented Accused Request to Adjourn to Obtain Counsel

When faced with a request to adjourn to obtain counsel, the trial judge should consider whether a fair trial requires counsel given the seriousness or complexity of the charges.[10]

The judge may also consider the "personality and skills" of the accused.[11]

The right to retain counsel requires that the accused to act honestly and diligently.[12]

Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.[13]

See a review of principles at White, supra, au para 17

Constitutional Protections

Consideration should be on whether the accused was deprived of the right to a fair trial, their right to make full answer and defence, or whether there would be a miscarriage of justice.[14]

There is no constitutional right to state-funded trial counsel.[15]

Factors

From these principles, the factors courts should consider include the following:[16]

  • whether the accused has failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently;
  • whether granting an adjournment would inordinately delay the trial;
  • opportunity to obtain with counsel;
  • efforts to cooperate with counsel[17]
  • the ability of the accused to understand the documentary evidence

The Court should consider relevant the facts such as:[18]

  • whether or not there have been prior adjournments due to the unavailability of counsel and the accused was warned well in advance of trial that the trial would be proceeding on the scheduled date with or without counsel...;
  • the accused’s criminal record which reflects on the accused’s degree of familiarity with the criminal justice system and legal aid programmes...;
  • whether the charge against the accused is simple or complex which fact impacts on the critical question whether or not the accused can get a fair trial without counsel...;
  • the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice...;
  • if the accused has been refused legal aid and when the refusal was communicated to the accused.

By one authority, the consideration of all the circumstances should focus on the following questions:[19]

  • Has the accused failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently?
    • Has the accused had an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel?
    • Has the accused been warned that he or she will have to proceed with trial without counsel? Has the accused been made aware of the potential consequences of that?
    • Has Legal Aid or private counsel withdrawn or refused to represent the accused? If so, when was the accused advised of this? Keeping in mind the principles in Cunningham[20], does the record disclose why counsel withdrew?
    • Has the accused acted or failed to act so as to thwart the appointment of counsel? Has the accused acted in any other way to delay the proceedings?
    • Is there evidence that the absence of counsel at trial is part of an orchestrated attempt by the accused to delay the proceedings?
  • Would granting an adjournment inordinately delay the trial?
    • How long has it been since the charges were laid? Is this the first scheduled date for trial? If not, how many times has the matter been postponed or adjourned since the charges were laid? Who was responsible for prior adjournments? Were any of the prior postponements due to unavailability of defence counsel?
    • Is the accused in custody? If not, what are the terms of interim release?
    • How serious is the offence with which the accused has been charged?
    • How long of an adjournment is the accused requesting? Is it reasonable in the circumstances? Would a shorter adjournment suffice?
    • When is the next available trial date? Would the accused and the Crown consent to a change in venue if that would facilitate an earlier trial date?
    • Does the accused agree that the delay brought about by the requested adjournment will not count against the s. 11(b) of the Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time?
  • Would granting an adjournment potentially affect trial fairness from the Crown’s perspective?
    • Are there co-accused? Are they being tried separately? If so, when are their trials scheduled? If not, what is the co-accuseds’ position on an adjournment?
    • What is the expected duration of the trial?
    • How many witnesses is the Crown expected to call? What are their characteristics? Are any of them children? Elderly? Infirm? Experts? Will any of them require a translator?
    • Was the Crown put to subpoenaing its witnesses? Is there a real risk a witness may fail or be unable, for any reason, to testify at an adjourned trial? Is there evidence that the accused may be seeking a tactical adjournment to see if that risk materialises?
    • Where are the witnesses located? Will it be inordinately difficult for the Crown to arrange for witness attendance at a later trial date?
    • Is there a real risk that physical evidence may be lost or destroyed before trial if the matter were adjourned?
    • What, if anything, can be done to address or mitigate the consequences of an adjournment?
  • Is the accused reasonably capable of making full answer and defence to the charges without the assistance of legal counsel?
    • What is the accused’s level of education and intellectual sophistication? Is the accused in good physical and mental health? What is the accused’s employment background? What level of family or other support is available to the accused?
    • Is the accused’s criminal record such that it indicates the accused would be familiar with the criminal justice system and the criminal trial process?
    • Was there a preliminary hearing? If so, what does the transcript indicate about the issues that will arise?
    • Was the matter case managed such that the legal issues have been narrowed before trial? Is there an agreed statement of facts?
    • Will the trial be lengthy, complex or legally complicated? Is the matter likely to give rise to complex or unusual points of law or of evidence or complicated defence strategies?
    • Is the accused facing multiple charges or charges with multiple lesser-included offences?
    • Is the accused in jeopardy of serving a significant incarceral term if convicted?
Diligence

The accused has an obligation to acts "diligently and honestly" in attempting to obtain counsel.[21] Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .[22] Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.[23]

Standard of Review

The proper standard of review on appeal of this decision is one of whether the discretion was "exercised judicially", which requires asking "whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations."[24] An appeal should not be granted for refusing an adjournment unless it can be shown that the right to full answer and defence was impacted such that there was an error in principle and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.[25]

  1. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
  2. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
    White, supra, au para 16
    R c Hodgson, 2004 ABCA 183 (CanLII), 348 AR 383, par curiam (3:0), au para 4
  3. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
    White, supra, au para 17
    R c EWB, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 352 APR 130, par Hallett JA (3:0) ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )
  4. , ibid. ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )
  5. R c Halnuck, 1996 CanLII 5275 (NS CA), 107 CCC (3d) 401, par Clarke CJ
    R c Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), (1993) 126 NSR (2d) 130 (CA), par Hallett JA
    R c Marzocchi, 2006 CanLII 13096 (ON CA), 69 WCB (2d) 410, par curiam
    R c Bitternose, 2009 SKCA 54 (CanLII), 244 CCC (3d) 218, par Wilkinson JA
    R c Bissonette, 2003 ABCA 93 (CanLII), par Conrad JA
  6. Beals, supra
    R c Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (CSC), [1977] 2 RCS 121, par Pigeon J
  7. R c Harris, 2009 SKCA 96 (CanLII), 331 Sask R 283, par Richards JA, au para 27
  8. R c Le (TD), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 427, par Scott CJ, au para 36
    R c White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, par curiam, au para 17
    Beals, supra
  9. voir également R c McCallen, 1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA), 131 CCC (3d) 518, par O'Connor JA, au para 40
    Beals, supra ( [TRADUCTION] « The right to counsel at trial is not absolute» )
  10. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
  11. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
    White, supra, au para 16
    R c Hodgson, 2004 ABCA 183 (CanLII), 348 AR 383, par curiam (3:0), au para 4
  12. Gerlitz, supra, au para 24
    White, supra, au para 17
    Beals, supra (3:0) ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )
  13. , ibid. ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )
  14. Rak, infra, au para 7 (in upholding refusal the SKCA said "We are all of the view the appellants were not deprived of their right to a fair trial or their right to make full answer in defence and there was no miscarriage of justice.» )
  15. R c Prosper, 1992 CanLII 2476 (NS CA), 113 NSR (2d) 156 (NSCA), par Chipman JA
    Beals, supra
  16. R c Hayter, 2018 SKCA 65 (CanLII), 365 CCC (3d) 413, par Caldwell JA
    R c Rak, 1999 CanLII 12229 (SK CA), 172 Sask R 301 (CA), par Lane JA, au para 7 ( [TRADUCTION] « The appellants had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and their refusal to cooperate with counsel led to a refusal of Legal Aid. The failure to have counsel did not result in an unfair trial. Gregory Rak handled the defence rather adroitly on his own and his father’s behalf and was effective in his cross-examination. He demonstrated a clear ability to understand the documentary evidence. As well the trial judge was extremely helpful to the appellants throughout the course of the trial.» )
  17. Rak, supra
  18. Beals, supra
    R c White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, par curiam
    R c Tortora, 2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 265 CCC (3d) 264, par Bennett JA
    R c Le (T.D.), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 427, par Scott CJ
    R c Bitternose, 2009 SKCA 54 (CanLII), 244 CCC (3d) 218, par Wilkinson JA
  19. Hayter, supra, au para 30
  20. 2010 CSC 10, [2010] 1 RCS 331
  21. R c Richard and Sassano (1992), 55 OAC 43(*pas de liens CanLII)
  22. Beals, supra ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )
    R c Manhas, 1980 CanLII 172 (CSC), 17 CR (3d) 331, par Martland J
  23. Beals, supra ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter» ) Barrette, supra
  24. , ibid., au para 37
    , ibid., au para 15
    Rak, supra, au para 2 ( [TRADUCTION] « The standard of review of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in refusing an adjournment may be reviewed by an appellate court “if it is based upon reasons that are not well-founded in law and results in a deprivation of the accused’s right to make full answer in defence” ... the right to make full answer in defence “must be weighed conscientiously and delicately along with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice”.» )
  25. Beals, supra ( [TRADUCTION] « The scope of review by an appeal court of a refusal, notwithstanding it involves the review of the exercise of a discretionary power, is wide as the consequences of a refusal are to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel. On appeal the appellant must show that in refusing the adjournment the trial judge deprived the appellant of his right to make full answer and defence and thus made an error in principle which constituted a miscarriage of justice (Barrette v R. and Manhas v R., supra).» )

Other Reasons for Adjournment

Lack of Preparation

It is often expected that an adjournment will be granted where there is late arriving evidence.[1]

Where a lawyer fails to properly prepare, an adjournment is not required as there is a breach of their duty to the court and client.[2]

  1. R c Johnston, 1991 CanLII 7056 (ON CA), (1991), 47 OAC 66, 5 C.R.(4th) 185, 64 CCC (3d) 233, par Finlayson JA
  2. R c ERS, 1994 ABCA 176 (CanLII), 149 AR 285, par curiam

Missing witnesses

In order to adjourn a trial matter on the grounds of missing witnesses, the applicant must establish:[1]

  1. that the absent witnesses are material in the case;
  2. that the party applying has not been guilty of laches or neglect in arranging for the attendance of the witnesses; and
  3. that there is a reasonable expectation that the witnesses will attend court on the date sought by the party applying for the adjournment.

The judge may also consider other relevant circumstances.[2]

  1. R c LeBlanc, 2005 NSCA 37 (CanLII), 729 APR 235, par MacDonald CJ -- no adjournment for crown in failing to subpoena witnesses
    R c Rose (D.A.), 1995 CanLII 4458, 140 NSR (2d) 151 (SC), par Glube CJ
    R c AT, 1991 CanLII 6104 (AB QB), 69 CCC (3d) 107, par Mcdonald J - factors to consider
    R c Shergill, 2009 BCCA 55 (CanLII), 269 BCAC 1, par Hall JA -- judge should have granted the crown adjournment for missing witness
    R c MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), 132 CCC (3d) 205, par Cameron JA -- short adjournment for crown for missing witness
    Darville v the Queen, 1956 CanLII 463 (CSC), 116 CCC 113 (CSC), par Taschereau J, aux paras 13 à 14
  2. R c Dang, 2005 ABCA 441 (CanLII), 380 AR 367, par Costigan JA -- consequences of delay by adjournment

Late Disclosure

A failure for the judge to grant a request for adjournment due to late disclosure can amount to an abuse of process requiring a new trial.[1] Before ordering a new trial for refusing to adjourn on account of late disclosure, the court should consider:[2]

  1. the Crown’s assurance that disclosure was complete,
  2. the timing and volume of disclosure,
  3. the seriousness of the charges,
  4. the requirements of a proper review procedure, and
  5. the co-operative approach of defence counsel
  1. R c Chu, 2016 SKCA 156 (CanLII), 344 CCC (3d) 51, par Jackson JA, au para 82
  2. , ibid., au para 82

Case Digests

Voir également