Négociations de plaidoyer

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Introduction

Une négociation de plaidoyer est un accord entre la Couronne et la défense par lequel la défense accepte de plaider coupable à des infractions particulières en échange d'une proposition particulière de peine. Si la défense accepte l'offre de peine, l'accord est présenté au juge comme une peine recommandée conjointement.

Internationalement

L'UE a examiné la légalité du recours à la négociation de plaidoyer et a jugé qu'elle était conforme au droit européen des droits de l'homme.[1]

  1. ↑ Babar Ahmad v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR

Recommandations conjointes

Une recommandation conjointe (RC) est un accord sur la pénalité entre la Couronne et la Défense visant à présenter une seule recommandation de pénalité que le juge est invité à adopter.

La norme appropriée à appliquer à un JR est le « test de l’intérêt public » :[1]

  1. La sentence jette-t-elle le discrédit sur l'administration de la justice ?
  2. La peine est-elle par ailleurs contraire à l'intérêt public ?

Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine doit supposer que toutes les dispositions et options de détermination de la peine ont été examinées et rejetées par les parties, sauf erreur manifeste, comme le défaut de demander une ordonnance obligatoire.[2]

Le critère de l’intérêt public ne peut s’appliquer aux condamnations contestées après un plaidoyer de culpabilité, quelles que soient les négociations qui les ont précédées.[3]

  1. ↑ R c Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 204, par Moldaver J, au para 32 ("Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal are helpful in this regard.")
    R c Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 (CanLII), 418 CCC (3d) 417, par Moldaver J, au para 1
  2. ↑ , ibid., au para 51
    R c Espinoza-Ortega, 2019 ONCA 545 (CanLII), au para 30
  3. ↑ R c Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 (CanLII), au para 4

Test d'intérêt public

Lorsqu'une recommandation conjointe ou un accord de plaidoyer est présenté à un juge, « le juge ne devrait pas s'écarter d'une proposition conjointe sur la peine, à moins que la peine proposée ne jette le discrédit sur l'administration de la justice ou ne soit autrement contraire à l'intérêt public. »[1]

Le test vise à placer la barre haute à atteindre.[2]

Objectif du test

La raison d'être du critère de l'intérêt public est d'encourager un accord entre les parties, protégeant ainsi les ressources judiciaires qui autrement seraient submergées par le volume de procès requis.[3] Il encourage les plaidoyers de culpabilité, évite aux victimes de témoigner et de procès coûteux et longs.[4] Il donne à l'accusé un « degré élevé de certitude » quant à sa peine finale.[5]

S'applique uniquement aux pénalités

Un JR n'a pas besoin d'englober tous les aspects de la peine. Il peut y avoir une recommandation commune sur une partie d'une peine, comme la forme de la sanction, tout en gardant des aspects de la sanction en litige, comme la durée de la sanction, les conditions associées à la sanction ou les ordonnances accessoires. [6] The test should be applied whenever the judge is considering jumping or undercutting a proposed sentence.[7]

Limité uniquement aux propositions complètes

La recommandation conjointe doit couvrir tous les aspects de la peine proposée, y compris la durée de la peine, les peines et les ordonnances accessoires. Il faut que ce soit « généralisé, ou pas du tout ».[8]

Plage inférieure

Une soumission conjointe indique souvent une gamme de peine inférieure.[9] La motivation pour un accord est souvent due à un aspect faible de la preuve de la Couronne ou au risque que le juge impose une sanction plus élevée que celle qui serait demandée par la défense sans accord.

Une recommandation commune peut même être acceptée lorsqu’elle est plus indulgente que la limite inférieure de la fourchette normale.[10]

Une recommandation conjointe « de bas de gamme » peut être fondée sur les « faiblesses potentielles de la preuve de la Couronne en cas de procès ».[11]

Valeur jurisprudentielle d’une recommandation commune

Les peines découlant d'une recommandation commune "ont peu ou pas de valeur de précédent."[12]

Processus d’évaluation des recommandations conjointes

Les considérations appropriées lors de l’adoption d’une soumission conjointe devraient inclure les éléments suivants :

  1. la soumission conjointe doit être évaluée « telle quelle », ce qui signifie que toutes les modalités, conditions et ordonnances individuelles qui ont été incluses ou omises doivent être considérées comme une expression de l'intention des parties et ne doivent être modifiées qu'individuellement en fonction du norme « intérêt public ».[13]
  2. Le test de l'intérêt public est appliqué chaque fois que le juge envisage de « sauter » ou de « saper » une recommandation commune.[14]
  3. le juge peut avoir besoin de connaître les circonstances ayant conduit à la recommandation conjointe lorsque celle-ci est controversée. Le juge peut considérer les avantages obtenus par la Couronne et les concessions faites par la défense comme des facteurs lorsque la peine semble par ailleurs indûment clémente.[15]
Résumé des faits

Les avocats sont tenus de donner une description complète et un compte rendu « des circonstances du contrevenant, de l'infraction et de la présentation conjointe ». Ils doivent s'assurer qu'ils « justifient amplement leur position sur les faits de l'affaire tels que présentés en audience publique ».[16]

Exceptions to this obligation exist where there are "safety or privacy concerns", or where an ongoing investigation may be jeopardized. Instead, counsel must consider other alternatives to to communicate these considerations to the court.[17]

Undercutting a Recommendation

Where the judge is considering to undercut a joint recommendation, different considerations may be taken given that the concerns do not include fair trial rights or undermine the confidence in the certainty of a plea. Rather, the judge should take special care where the accused is self-represented or where there is "power imbalance" between the parties, which may undermine the public interest. [18]

Illegal Terms of a Joint Recommendations

Where a joint recommendation does not include mandatory terms or orders, or is otherwise illegal, the public interest cannot justify supporting it.[19]

Notice of Disagreement and Option to Withdraw Guilty Plea

Where a judge is concerned with the adoption of the plea agreement, they must notify counsel and give them an opportunity to provide further submissions. [20] The judge may also want to provide counsel with an opportunity to apply to withdraw the guilty plea.[21]

Obligation to Provide Reasons for Departing from Recommendation

Where the judge ultimately decides to reject the recommendation, the judge must provide "clear and cogent reasons" for doing so.[22]

No Application of Fitness Text

The use of the "less stringent" standards of the "fitness test" or "demonstrably unfit" test are now defunct.[23] This further eliminates the use of a blended test combining the unfitness and public interest tests.[24]

  1. ↑ R c Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 204, par Moldaver J, au para 32 ("Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal are helpful in this regard.")
  2. ↑ R c Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 (CanLII), par Moldaver J, au para 26
  3. ↑ , ibid., au para 26 R c Keeping, 2013 CanLII 64708 (NL PC), par Porter J - some have brought this rationale into question
    R c Harasuik, 2023 ONCA 594 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 21 (" an overburdened system, joint submissions are beneficial to the efficient administration of justice. They also provide the value of a high degree of certainty to the Crown, the accused, and victims.")
  4. ↑ , ibid., au para 26
  5. ↑ , ibid., au para 26
  6. ↑ e.g. R c Parsons, 2012 CanLII 81320 (NLSCTD), par Goulding J - length of CSO and ancillary orders in dispute alone
  7. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 52
  8. ↑ , ibid., au para 27 ("To be clear, a joint submission covers off every aspect of the sentence proposed. To the extent that the parties may agree to most, but not all, aspects of the sentence — be it the length or type of the sentence, or conditions, terms, or ancillary orders attached to it — the submission will not constitute a joint submission. The public interest test does not apply to bits and pieces of a sentence upon which the parties are in agreement; it applies across the board, or not at all.")
  9. ↑ R c Kane, 2012 NLCA 53 (CanLII), 1009 APR 78, par Welsh JA
  10. ↑ R c Oake, 2010 NLCA 19 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 498, par Rowe JA, au para 64
  11. ↑ R c Bungay-Lloyd, 2016 NSSC 110 (CanLII), par Chipman J, au para 18
  12. ↑ R c Johnston, 2011 NLCA 56 (CanLII), 274 CCC (3d) 388, par White JA
    R c Johnson, 2010 ABQB 546 (CanLII), par Sullivan J
    R c Benlolo, 2006 CanLII 19284 (ON CA), 81 OR (3d) 440, par Feldman JA
  13. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 51 ("First, trial judges should approach the joint submission on an “as-is” basis. That is to say, the public interest test applies whether the judge is considering varying the proposed sentence or adding something to it that the parties have not mentioned, for example, a probation order. If the parties have not asked for a particular order, the trial judge should assume that it was considered and excluded from the joint submission. However, if counsel have neglected to include a mandatory order, the judge should not hesitate to inform counsel. The need for certainty in joint submissions cannot justify failing to impose a mandatory order.")
  14. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 52 ("Second, trial judges should apply the public interest test when they are considering “jumping” or “undercutting” a joint submission (DeSousa, per Doherty J.A.). That is not to say that the analysis will be the same in either case. On the contrary, from the accused’s perspective, “undercutting” does not engage concerns about fair trial rights or undermine confidence in the certainty of plea negotiations. In addition, in assessing whether the severity of a joint submission would offend the public interest, trial judges should be mindful of the power imbalance that may exist between the Crown and defence, particularly where the accused is self-represented or in custody at the time of sentencing. These factors may temper the public interest in certainty and justify “undercutting” in limited circumstances. At the same time, where the trial judge is considering “undercutting”, he or she should bear in mind that the community’s confidence in the administration of justice may suffer if an accused enjoys the benefits of a joint submission without having to serve the agreed-upon sentence ...")
  15. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 53 ("Third, when faced with a contentious joint submission, trial judges will undoubtedly want to know about the circumstances leading to the joint submission — and in particular, any benefits obtained by the Crown or concessions made by the accused. The greater the benefits obtained by the Crown, and the more concessions made by the accused, the more likely it is that the trial judge should accept the joint submission, even though it may appear to be unduly lenient. For example, if the joint submission is the product of an agreement by the accused to assist the Crown or police, or an evidentiary weakness in the Crown’s case, a very lenient sentence might not be contrary to the public interest. On the other hand, if the joint submission resulted only from the accused’s realization that conviction was inevitable, the same sentence might cause the public to lose confidence in the criminal justice system.")
  16. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 54 ("Counsel should, of course, provide the court with a full account of the circumstances of the offender, the offence, and the joint submission without waiting for a specific request from the trial judge. As trial judges are obliged to depart only rarely from joint submissions, there is a “corollary obligation upon counsel” to ensure that they “amply justify their position on the facts of the case as presented in open court” (Martin Committee Report, at p. 329). Sentencing — including sentencing based on a joint submission — cannot be done in the dark. The Crown and the defence must “provide the trial judge not only with the proposed sentence, but with a full description of the facts relevant to the offender and the offence”, in order to give the judge “a proper basis upon which to determine whether [the joint submission] should be accepted”")
  17. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 56 ("There may, of course, be cases where it is not possible to put the main considerations underlying a joint submission on the public record because of safety or privacy concerns, or the risk of jeopardizing ongoing criminal investigations (see Martin Committee Report, at p. 317). In such cases, counsel must find alternative means of communicating these considerations to the trial judge in order to ensure that the judge is apprised of the relevant considerations and that a proper record is created for appeal purposes.")
  18. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 52 ("Second, trial judges should apply the public interest test when they are considering “jumping” or “undercutting” a joint submission (DeSousa, per Doherty J.A.). That is not to say that the analysis will be the same in either case. On the contrary, from the accused’s perspective, “undercutting” does not engage concerns about fair trial rights or undermine confidence in the certainty of plea negotiations. In addition, in assessing whether the severity of a joint submission would offend the public interest, trial judges should be mindful of the power imbalance that may exist between the Crown and defence, particularly where the accused is self-represented or in custody at the time of sentencing. These factors may temper the public interest in certainty and justify “undercutting” in limited circumstances. At the same time, where the trial judge is considering “undercutting”, he or she should bear in mind that the community’s confidence in the administration of justice may suffer if an accused enjoys the benefits of a joint submission without having to serve the agreed-upon sentence")
  19. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 51 (" First, trial judges should approach the joint submission on an “as-is” basis. That is to say, the public interest test applies whether the judge is considering varying the proposed sentence or adding something to it that the parties have not mentioned, for example, a probation order. If the parties have not asked for a particular order, the trial judge should assume that it was considered and excluded from the joint submission. However, if counsel have neglected to include a mandatory order, the judge should not hesitate to inform counsel. The need for certainty in joint submissions cannot justify failing to impose a mandatory order.")
  20. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 58 ("Fourth, if the trial judge is not satisfied with the sentence proposed by counsel, “fundamental fairness dictates that an opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further submissions in an attempt to address the . . . judge’s concerns before the sentence is imposed” (G.W.C., at para. 26). The judge should notify counsel that he or she has concerns, and invite further submissions on those concerns, including the possibility of allowing the accused to withdraw his or her guilty plea, as the trial judge did in this case.")
  21. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, aux paras 58 and 59
  22. ↑ Anthony-Cook, supra, au para 60 ("Finally, trial judges who remain unsatisfied by counsel’s submissions should provide clear and cogent reasons for departing from the joint submission. These reasons will help explain to the parties why the proposed sentence was unacceptable, and may assist them in the resolution of future cases. Reasons will also facilitate appellate review.")
  23. ↑ See Anthony-Cook, supra
  24. ↑ See Anthony-Cook, supra
    R c Flanagan, 2012 SKCA 45 (CanLII), 393 Sask.R. 126, par Richards JA, au para 12 citing both unfitness and public interests test

Deference

A joint recommended sentence is a sentence for which the courts do not readily overturn. [1] The court may only do so where the sentence in not within a reasonably appropriate range for the circumstances.[2] The judge must give reasons for not adopting a joint recommendation.

A judge should give serious consideration to a joint sentencing proposal.[3]

There is less weight given to "joint recommendations" that do not involve a "quid pro quo" (i.e. some reduced recommendation on sentence).[4] Likewise, where the accused was without counsel less deference is given.[5]

  1. ↑ R c JWIB, 2003 MBCA 92 (CanLII), 176 CCC (3d) 13, par Freedman JA
    R c Pashe (S.J.), 1995 CanLII 6256 (MB C.A.), par Huband JA and Twaddle JA
  2. ↑ R c Smith, 2004 BCCA 657 (CanLII), 206 BCAC 262, par Newbury JA
    R c Gartner, 2010 BCCA 600 (CanLII), par Hall JA
    R c Wickstrom, 2011 BCSC 745 (CanLII), par Bernard J
    R c Cerasuolo, 2001 CanLII 24172 (ON CA), 151 CCC (3d) 445, par Finlayson JA
    R c DeSousa, 2012 ONCA 254 (CanLII), 286 CCC (3d) 152, par Doherty JA
  3. ↑ R c GWC, 2000 ABCA 333 (CanLII), 150 CCC (3d) 513, par Berger JA, au para 17
  4. ↑ R c Wolonciej, 2011 MBCA 91 (CanLII), 270 Man R (2d) 241, par Monnin and Steel JJA (3:0), au para 10
  5. ↑ R c Bambrick, 2011 NLCA 79 (CanLII), 981 APR 202, par Welsh JA, au para 14

"Joint Recommendation" After Trial

A common recommendation on sentence by both counsel after trial is not a "joint submission" as there was no exchange of sentence for a guilty plea. Consequently, the deference accorded to joint submissions is not required.[1]

  1. ↑ R c Dunkers, 2018 BCCA 363 (CanLII), par MacKenzie JA, aux paras 35 à 44

Rejecting or "Jumping" a Joint Recommendation

A sentencing judge may only reject a joint recommendation where the sentence would either bring the administration of justice into disrepute or contrary to public interest. (Anthony-Cook, see above)

A judge need not accept a joint recommendation that is "facially disproportionate" to the offence.[1]

It is not sufficient for the judge to merely believe that the sentence is "demonstrably unfit."[2]

Failure to provide notice does not violate the common law principle of audi alteram partem.[3]

A judge adding probation on a joint recommendation without notice can be set aside. [4]

Rare Occurrence

A joint recommendation should only be rejected in "rare cases."[5]

Procedure - Notice to Parties

If a judge has reservations to adopt a joint recommendation, they should allow counsel an opportunity to respond.[6] Anytime a judge is looking to go beyond the range set by counsel, the judge should equally provide notice to the parties before going above or below the range.[7] Similarly, where a judge wishes to impose a condition that was not contemplated by either party nor could it have been easily foreseen, then the judge should also provide notice before doing so.[8]

Further Submissions

Documents and discussions arising out of plea negotiations are settlement privileged.[9] However, the parties can jointly agree to waive privilege in order to present additional information about to assist the judge in understanding the recommendation.[10] If there is still need for confidentiality, the parties can agree to provide the information in a more private way such as a sealed affidavit.[11]

  1. ↑ R c Gibson, 2015 ABCA 41 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 17
  2. ↑ Harasuik, supra, au para
  3. ↑ R c Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 (CanLII), par Moldaver J, aux to 57 paras 54 to 57{{{3}}}
  4. ↑ R c Wickstrom, 2011 BCSC 745 (CanLII), par Bernard J
  5. ↑ R c Harasuik, 2023 ONCA 594 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 22
    R c Fuller, 2020 ONCA 115 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 16
  6. ↑ R c GWC, 2000 ABCA 333 (CanLII), 150 CCC (3d) 513, par Berger JA, au para 26 ("In addition to the foregoing, the procedure followed by the sentencing judge in rejecting the joint submission in this case is a matter of concern. Once a sentencing judge concludes that he might not accede to a joint submission, fundamental fairness dictates that an opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further submissions in an attempt to address the sentencing judge’s concerns before the sentence is imposed. In this case, lengthy submissions were made by both counsel in support of a probationary term which evoked no expressions of concern by the sentencing judge. He then retired to consider the disposition of the case. It was only upon his return to the courtroom, and in the course of giving reasons for rejecting the joint submission, that counsel had any indication of concern on his part. As a result, they were afforded no opportunity to address that concern. Indeed, had the sentencing judge made his concern known to counsel in a timely fashion, the foundation upon which the joint submission rested might well have been laid. I do not suggest that any particular procedure is de rigueur; I say only that the principle of audi alteram partem should be followed.")
  7. ↑ R c Hood, 2011 ABCA 169 (CanLII), 505 AR 243, par Martin JA, au para 14 ("Before closing, we return to the sentencing judge’s rejection of the range of sentence proposed by counsel: 90 intermittent days by defence counsel, and nine months imprisonment by Crown counsel. In particular, we note the sentencing judge signalled to counsel that he was not inclined to impose a sentence in that range and then invited further submissions, including submissions on whether the offence attracted the starting point sentence of four years imprisonment...")
    R c Abel, 2011 NWTCA 4 (CanLII), 527 WAC 136, par curiam, au para 23
    R c Burback, 2012 ABCA 30 (CanLII), 544 WAC 352, par Conrad J
  8. ↑ R c Beal, 2011 ABCA 35 (CanLII), 502 AR 177, par curiam
  9. ↑ R c Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 (CanLII), par Moldaver J, au para 49 R c Shyback, 2018 ABCA 331 (CanLII), 366 CCC (3d) 197, par curiam, au para 28
  10. ↑ Nahanee, supra, au para 49
  11. ↑ Nahanee, supra, au para 49

Notice to Victims

Voir également: Rôle de la victime et des tiers

Section 606 (4.1) requires the judge after accepting a guilty plea for serious personal injury offences to inquire of the prosecutor whether "reasonable steps were taken to inform the victims of the agreement". Failing to take reasonable steps will not necessarily stop sentencing but will require the prosecutor to take steps at a later point to inform the victims.

Where the offence is prosecuted by indictment and punishable by imprisonment of 5 years or more, s. 606(4.2) requires the judge shall inquire whether any victims notified them of their desire to be informed of the agreement, and if so, whether reasonable steps were taken to inform them.

Other Issues

Where the accused misapprehended the joint recommendation, it can be grounds for a successful appeal of a sentence.[1] Where an offender is unaware of a significant consequence of a particular sentence agreed upon, such as deportation without appeal, the court may reopen the consideration of sentence.[2]

  1. ↑ e.g. R c Kinney, 2011 SKCA 122 (CanLII), 377 Sask R 107, par Caldwell JA
  2. ↑ R c Jamieson, 2011 NSCA 122 (CanLII), 983 APR 392, par Saunders JA

Repudiating a Plea Bargain

Voir également: Plaidoyer de culpabilité et Abus de procédure par le procureur de la Couronne

If the Crown renegs on a plea deal on sentence, the Defence may make application to withdraw the guilty plea.[1] It may also be grounds for a stay of proceedings due to abuse of process.

A Crown may agree to a joint sentence and then, based on new information, determine that the agreed sentence is contrary to the public interest under the Anthony-Cook test. In such a case, a request to withdraw the guilty plea should be allowed.[2]

  1. ↑ R c M (R.N.-Z.), 2006 CanLII 32999 (ON SC), 213 CCC (3d) 107, par Hill J
    R c Chen, 2009 ONCJ 453 (CanLII), 73 CR (6th) 181, par Fairgrieve J
    see also: R c Tallon, 2003 CanLII 27268 (ON CA), 181 CCC (3d) 261, par Rosenberg JA
  2. ↑ R c Espinoza-Ortega, 2019 ONCA 545 (CanLII), par Feldman JA, au para 46

Utiliser la négociation de plaidoyer comme preuve

En règle générale, un juge ne devrait pas admettre de preuve concernant une négociation de plaidoyer, sauf si elle concerne une peine conjointe recommandée ou si elle porte sur la culpabilité ou l'innocence de l'accusé.[1] This can include questions of credibility of a co-accused who was offered a lesser sentence for cooperation.[2]

Once a proposal for settlement is rejected and a trial is held, "previous negotiations [become] irrelevant", including for the purpose of sentencing.[3]

  1. ↑ R c Bremner, 2006 NSSC 367 (CanLII), 792 APR 285, par Goodfellow J, aux paras 1 à 9
  2. ↑ , ibid., au para 6
  3. ↑ Bremner, supra, au para 8
    R c Howell, 1995 CanLII 4282 (NSCA), 103 CCC (3d) 302, par Chipman JA, au para 100
    See R c Pabani, 1994 CanLII 8723 (ON CA), 29 CR (4th) 364, par Finlayson JA
    R c White (1982), 39 Nfld. and PEIR 196 (Nfld. C.A.) (*pas de liens CanLII)

Case Digests

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