« Limitations justifiables des droits » : différence entre les versions

De Le carnet de droit pénal
← Modification précédente
VisuelWikicode
m Remplacement de texte : « \{\{En\|([^\}\}]+)\}\} » par « en:$1 »
Balises : Modification par mobile Modification par le web mobile
m Remplacement de texte : « 1frnq » par « 1frnr »
 
(30 versions intermédiaires par le même utilisateur non affichées)
Ligne 1 : Ligne 1 :
[[en:Justifiable_Limitations_on_Rights]]
[[en:Justifiable_Limitations_on_Rights]]
{{Fr|Limitations_justifiables_des_droits}}
{{Currency2|janvier|2019}}
{{Currency2|janvier|2019}}
{{LevelZero}}
{{LevelZero}}
Ligne 6 : Ligne 5 :
==Principes généraux==
==Principes généraux==


Section 1 of the ''Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'' states:
L'article 1 de la {{Tr}}« Charte canadienne des droits et libertés » stipule :
{{quotation2|
{{quotation2|
; Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
; Garantie des droits et libertés
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
; Droits et libertés au Canada
1 La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés qui y sont énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par une règle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la


|[http://canlii.ca/t/8q7l#sec1 CCRF]
|[http://canlii.ca/t/dfbx#sec1 CCRF]
|{{NoteUpCCRF|1}}
|{{NoteUpCCRF|1}}
}}
}}


This provision is also known as the "reasonable limits clause" or "limitations clause", as it legally allows the government to limit an individual's Charter rights. Wherever there is a violation of the legal rights (s. 7 to 12) of the ''Charter'', s. 1 governs whether the violation is permissible and exempted from any remedy under s. 24 of the ''Charter''.
Cette disposition est également connue sous le nom de {{Tr}}« clause de limites raisonnables » ou {{Tr}}« clause de limitation », car elle permet légalement au gouvernement de limiter les droits d'un individu garantis par la Charte. Partout où il y a une violation des droits légaux (art. 7 à 12) de la « Charte », l'art. 1 détermine si la violation est permise et exempte de tout recours en vertu de l'art. 24 de la « Charte ».


; Burden and Standard of Proof
; Fardeau et norme de preuve
Where a violation of a legal right has been found, the burden is upon the Crown to justify limiting the right under s. 1.<ref>
Lorsqu'une violation d'un droit légal a été constatée, il incombe à la Couronne de justifier la limitation de ce droit en vertu de l'art. 1.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv6|1986 CanLII 46 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv5|1986 CanLII 46 (CSC)|[1986] 1 RCS 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}
</ref>
</ref>
The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities.<ref>
La norme de preuve repose sur la prépondérance des probabilités.<ref>
{{ibid1|Oakes}}<br>
{{ibid1|Oakes}}<br>
R v Sharpe at para 102{{fix}}
R v Sharpe at para 102{{fix}}
</ref>
</ref>


; "Demonstrably Justified"
 
The phrase "demonstrably justified" means that there must be a "cogent and persuasive."<ref>
; « Démontrablement justifié »
{{ibid1|Oakes}} ("Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a s. 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit")
L'expression « manifestement justifié » signifie qu'il doit y avoir un {{Tr}}« argument convaincant et convaincant ».<ref>
{{ibid1|Oakes}} ( {{Tr}}« Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a s. 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit » )
</ref>
</ref>


Generally, the Crown must demonstrate the justification using empirical evidence.
En général, la Couronne doit démontrer la justification à l'aide de preuves empiriques.


Where the science or social science justifying the limitation is inconclusive, the Crown may rely on "reason and logic."<ref>
Lorsque les données scientifiques ou sociales justifiant la limitation ne sont pas concluantes, la Couronne peut s'appuyer sur {{Tr}}« la raison et la logique ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Libman v Quebec (A.G.)|1fr09|1997 CanLII 326 (SCC)|[1997] 3 SCR 569}}{{TheCourtSCC}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Libman v Quebec (A.G.)|1fr08|1997 CanLII 326 (CSC)|[1997] 3 RCS 569}}{{TheCourtSCC}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1995] 3 SCR 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général)|1frh0|1995 CanLII 64 (CSC)|1995] 3 RCS 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (A.G.)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Thomson Newspapers Co. c. Canada (Procureur général)|1fqtz|1998 CanLII 829 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523f|2001 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523g|2001 CSC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 RCS 45}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Harper v Canada (A.G.)|1h2c9|2004 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 827}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1h2c9|77}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Harper c. Canada (Procureur général)|1h2c8|2004 CSC 33 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 RCS 827}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1h2c9|77}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Bryan|1qsvr|2007 SCC 12 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 527}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1qsvr|16| to 19}}, {{atsL-np|1qsvr|29|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Bryan|1qsvq|2007 CSC 12 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 RCS 527}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1qsvr|16| à 19}}, {{atsL-np|1qsvr|29|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General)|gfxx8|2015 SCC 1 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ and LeBel J}}{{atsL|gfxx8|143| to 144}}
{{CanLIIRPC|Association de la police montée de l’Ontario c. Canada (Procureur général)|gfxx9|2015 CSC 1 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ and LeBel J}}{{atsL|gfxx8|143| à 144}}
</ref>
</ref>
In cases of minimal breaches, the absence of social science is of less importance.<ref>
Dans les cas de violations minimes, l’absence de sciences sociales est de moindre importance.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRPC|B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v British Columbia (Attorney General)|gx3xm|2017 SCC 6 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 93}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRPC|B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association c. Colombie‑Britannique (Procureur général)|gx3xn|2017 CSC 6 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 RCS 93}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Section 7 Violations===
===Violations d'article 7===


; Overbroad and Grossly Disproportionate
; Exagération et manifestement disproportionnée
Where legislation is found to be overbroad or grossly disproportionate it is generally not justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.<ref>
Lorsqu’une loi est jugée trop large ou manifestement disproportionnée, elle n’est généralement pas justifiable en vertu de l’art. 1 de la Charte.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Boutilier|grx23|2016 BCCA 235 (CanLII)|336 CCC (3d) 293}}{{perBCCA|D Smith J}}{{atL|grx23|84}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Boutilier|grx23|2016 BCCA 235 (CanLII)|336 CCC (3d) 293}}{{perBCCA|D Smith J}}{{atL|grx23|84}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (AG) v Bedford|g2f56|2013 SCC 72 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 1101}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|g2f56|129}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Procureur général) c. Bedford|g2f57|2013 CSC 72 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 RCS 1101}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|g2f57|129}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (AG)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|95}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter c. Canada (Procureur général)|gg5z5|2015 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z5|95}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Prescribed by Law==
==Prescrit par la loi==
The limitations on rights must be "prescribed by law". This refers to the requirement that the limitation on rights is the result of some conduct of a government or its agents following some accessible and intelligible law.  
Les limitations des droits doivent être "prévues par la loi". Cela fait référence à l'exigence selon laquelle la limitation des droits est le résultat d'une certaine conduite d'un gouvernement ou de ses agents suivant une loi accessible et intelligible.


The requirement here is concerned with those limitations that are arbitrary and not supported by law.<ref>
L'exigence ici concerne les limitations qui sont arbitraires et non soutenues par la loi.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Therens|1fv11|1985 CanLII 29 (SCC)|[1985] 1 SCR 613}}{{perSCC|Le Dain J}} (dissent){{atL|1fv11|60}} ("The requirement that the limit be prescribed by law is chiefly concerned with the distinction between a limit imposed by law and one that is arbitrary.") but affirmed in ''Orbanski''<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Therens|1fv10|1985 CanLII 29 (CSC)|[1985] 1 RCS 613}}{{perSCC|Le Dain J}} (dissent){{atL|1fv10|60}} ( {{Tr}}« The requirement that the limit be prescribed by law is chiefly concerned with the distinction between a limit imposed by law and one that is arbitrary. » ) but affirmed in ''Orbanski''<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Orbanski; R v Elias|1l0b0|2005 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2005] 2 SCR 3}}{{atL|1l0b0|36}}
{{CanLIIRP|Orbanski; R v Elias|1l09w|2005 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2005] 2 RCS 3}}{{atL|1l09w|36}}
</ref>
</ref>


A law will be invalid where it is too vague as "where there is no intelligible standard and where the legislature has given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set of circumstances."<ref>
Une loi sera invalide si elle est trop vague, comme {{Tr}}« lorsqu'il n'y a pas de norme intelligible et lorsque le législateur a donné le pouvoir discrétionnaire plénier de faire ce qui semble le mieux dans un large éventail de circonstances. »<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson C.J. and Lamer and Wilson JJ}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6h|1989 CanLII 87 (CSC)|[1989] 1 RCS 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson C.J. et Lamer et Wilson JJ}}</ref>


; Meaning of "Law"
; Signification de {{Tr}}« Loi »
"Law" in this context refers to both the common law as well as statutory law or regulations.<ref>
Le terme « loi » dans ce contexte fait référence à la fois à la common law ainsi qu'aux lois ou réglementations statutaires.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Shupe|27w0j|1987 CanLII 3171 (AB QB)|38 CCC (3d) 64}}{{perABQB|Cooke J}}{{atL|27w0j|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Shupe|27w0j|1987 CanLII 3171 (AB QB)|38 CCC (3d) 64}}{{perABQB|Cooke J}}{{atL|27w0j|19}}<br>
{{supra1|Therens}}{{atL|1fv11|60}} ("The limit may also result from the application of a common law rule.") aff'd in ''Orbanski''
{{supra1|Therens}}{{atL|1fv10|60}} ( {{Tr}}« The limit may also result from the application of a common law rule. » ) aff'd in ''Orbanski''
</ref>
</ref>


The limitation can be created expressly by law or "by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements."<ref>
La limitation peut être créée expressément par la loi ou {{Tr}}« par implication nécessaire des termes d'une loi ou d'un règlement ou de ses exigences opérationnelles ».<ref>
{{supra1|Therens}}{{atL|1fv11|60}} ("The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements. ")<br>
{{supra1|Therens}}{{atL|1fv10|60}} ( {{Tr}}« The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements.  » )<br>
{{supra1|Orbanski}}{{atL|1l0b0|36}}<br>
{{supra1|Orbanski}}{{atL|1l0b0|36}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Law Includes Policy
; La loi comprend la politique
Certain types of policy can fall into the meaning of "law". The policy must be found to have the following:
Certains types de politiques peuvent relever du terme {{Tr}}« loi ». La politique doit présenter les éléments suivants :
<ref>
<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component|24cnk|2009 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 295}}{{atL|24cnk|50}} (For policy to be included in s.1, "it must be asked whether the government entity was authorized to enact the impugned policies and whether the policies are binding rules of general application. If so, the policies can be “law” for the purposes of s. 1. At the second stage of the enquiry, ... it must be determined whether the policies are sufficiently precise and accessible.")
{{CanLIIRPC|Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority c. Fédération canadienne des étudiantes et étudiants — Section Colombie-Britannique|24cnl|2009 CSC 31 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 295}}{{atL|24cnl|50}} (For policy to be included in s.1, "it must be asked whether the government entity was authorized to enact the impugned policies and whether the policies are binding rules of general application. If so, the policies can be “law” for the purposes of s. 1. At the second stage of the enquiry, ... it must be determined whether the policies are sufficiently precise and accessible. » )
</ref>
</ref>
# the government entity was authorized to enact the policy
# l'entité gouvernementale était autorisée à mettre en œuvre la politique
# the policy is of "general application"
# la politique est "d'application générale"
# the policy is "sufficiently precise and accessible"
# la politique est "suffisamment précise et accessible"


The requirements for a policy are meant to distinguish between policies that are "legislative" in nature and those that are "administrative" in nature.<ref>
Les exigences d'une politique visent à faire la distinction entre les politiques de nature {{Tr}}« législative » et celles de nature {{Tr}}« administrative ».<ref>
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|64}} ("Where a policy is not administrative in nature, it may be “law” provided that it meets certain requirements.") and{{atL|24cnk|65}} ("Thus, where a government policy is authorized by statute and sets out a general norm or standard that is meant to be binding and is sufficiently accessible and precise, the policy is legislative in nature and constitutes a limit that is “prescribed by law”.")
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|64}} ( {{Tr}}« Where a policy is not administrative in nature, it may be “law” provided that it meets certain requirements. » ) and{{atL|24cnk|65}} ( {{Tr}}« Thus, where a government policy is authorized by statute and sets out a general norm or standard that is meant to be binding and is sufficiently accessible and precise, the policy is legislative in nature and constitutes a limit that is “prescribed by law”. » )
</ref>
</ref>
Those that are legislative are ones that are of "general application" and establish a "norm."<ref>
Celles qui sont législatives sont celles qui sont {{Tr}}« d'application générale » et établissent une {{Tr}}« norme ».<ref>
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|64}} ("In order to be legislative in nature, the policy must establish a norm or standard of general application that has been enacted by a government entity pursuant to a rule-making authority.")
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|64}} ( {{Tr}}« In order to be legislative in nature, the policy must establish a norm or standard of general application that has been enacted by a government entity pursuant to a rule-making authority. » )
</ref>
</ref>
Those that are administrative are created for the purpose of "administrative efficiency". They are for internal use only and are often informal. They are sometimes simply used as interpretive aids rather than setting out rights and obligations.<ref>
Ceux qui sont administratifs sont créés dans un but d'« efficacité administrative ». Ils sont réservés à un usage interne et sont souvent informels. Ils sont parfois simplement utilisés comme aides à l’interprétation plutôt que comme énoncés de droits et d’obligations.<ref>
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|63}} ("Administrative rules relate to the implementation of laws contained in a statutory scheme and are created for the purpose of administrative efficiency. The key question is thus whether the policies are focussed on “indoor” management.  In such a case, they are meant for internal use and are often informal in nature; ... . Such rules or policies act as interpretive aids in the application of a statute or regulation.")
{{supra1|Greater Vancouver}}{{atL|24cnk|63}} ( {{Tr}}« Administrative rules relate to the implementation of laws contained in a statutory scheme and are created for the purpose of administrative efficiency. The key question is thus whether the policies are focussed on “indoor” management.  In such a case, they are meant for internal use and are often informal in nature; ... . Such rules or policies act as interpretive aids in the application of a statute or regulation. » )
</ref>
</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}


==Oakes Test==
==Test d'Oakes==
 
Le test permettant de déterminer si l'objectif de la loi est manifestement justifiable dans une société libre et démocratique est connu sous le nom de « test d'Oakes ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv5|1986 CanLII 46 (CSC)|[1986] 1 RCS 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}</ref>


The test to determine if the purpose of the law is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society is known as the "Oakes Test."<ref>
Le test est appliqué une fois que le demandeur a prouvé qu'une des dispositions de la Charte a été violée.
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv6|1986 CanLII 46 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}</ref>


The test is applied once the claimant has proven that one of the provisions of the Charter has been violated.  
Il incombe à la Couronne de satisfaire au critère Oakes. Une violation d’un droit ne peut être justifiée que si les éléments suivants sont établis selon la prépondérance des probabilités :
#Il doit y avoir un objectif urgent et réel
#Les moyens doivent être proportionnés
##Les moyens doivent être rationnellement liés à l'objectif
##Il doit y avoir une atteinte minimale aux droits
##Il doit y avoir une proportionnalité entre l'infraction et l'objectif


The onus is on the Crown to pass the Oakes test. A violation of a right can only be justified where the following elements are made out on a balance of probabilities:
{{Réflist|2}}
#There must be a pressing and substantial objective
#The means must be proportional
##The means must be rationally connected to the objective
##There must be minimal impairment of rights
##There must be proportionality between the infringement and objective


{{Reflist|2}}
==Objectif pressant et substantiel==
==Pressing and Substantial Objective==
Le premier volet du critère {{Tr}}« Oakes » exige que la loi ait un {{Tr}}« objectif urgent et réel ».
The first branch of the ''Oakes'' test requires that the law have a "pressing and substantial objective".


A sufficiently "pressing and substantial" objective is one that is "consistent with some of the foundational principles on which our particular free and democratic society is based."<ref>
Un objectif suffisamment {{Tr}}« urgent et substantiel » est celui qui est {{Tr}}« conforme à certains des principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose notre société libre et démocratique ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General)|1g6pl|2003 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 SCR 912}}{{perSCC|Lebel J}} (concurring){{atL|1g6pl|180}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General)|1g6pl|2003 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 RCS 912}}{{perSCC|Lebel J}} (concurring){{atL|1g6pl|180}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 493}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 493}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
Or stated in another way, they cannot be "discordant" with "the principles integral to a free and democratic society."<ref>
En d’autres termes, ils ne peuvent pas être {{Tr}}« en contradiction » avec {{Tr}}« les principes essentiels d’une société libre et démocratique ».<ref>
{{ibid1|Figueroa}}{{atL|1g6pl|80}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}
{{ibid1|Figueroa}}{{atL|1g6pl|80}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}
</ref>
</ref>
Ligne 129 : Ligne 131 :
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Minimal Impairment==
==Déficience minimale==


The impugned right must be restricted "as little as possible."<ref>
Le droit contesté doit être restreint {{Tr}}« le moins possible ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv6|1986 CanLII 46 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv5|1986 CanLII 46 (CSC)|[1986] 1 RCS 103}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}
</ref>
</ref>
However, it is only necessary that the impairment be simply within a range of reasonable options. It does not need to be optimal.<ref>
Il suffit toutefois que la dépréciation se situe simplement dans une fourchette d’options raisonnables. Il n'est pas nécessaire que cela soit optimal.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1995] 3 SCR 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1frgz|160}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (CSC)|[1995] 3 RCS 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1frgz|160}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523f|2001 SCC 1 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 45}}{{perSCC| McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|523f|96}} ("This Court has held that to establish justification it is not necessary to show that Parliament has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving its end.  It suffices if the means adopted fall within a range of reasonable solutions to the problem confronted.")
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523g|2001 CSC 1 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 RCS 45}}{{perSCC| McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|523g|96}} ( {{Tr}}« This Court has held that to establish justification it is not necessary to show that Parliament has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving its end.  It suffices if the means adopted fall within a range of reasonable solutions to the problem confronted. » )
</ref>
</ref>


The purpose of this inquiry is to decide whether "there are less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal."<ref>
Le but de cette enquête est de décider s'il existe « des moyens moins nocifs pour atteindre l'objectif législatif ».<ref>
{{ibid1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z4|102}}
{{ibid1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z5|102}}
</ref>
</ref>
It ensures that the rights deprivation is "confined what is reasonably necessary to achieve" the legislation's objective.<ref>
Il garantit que la privation des droits est {{Tr}}« limitée à ce qui est raisonnablement nécessaire pour atteindre » l'objectif de la législation.<ref>
{{ibid1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z4|102}} ("The analysis at this stage is meant to ensure that the deprivation of Charter rights is confined to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state’s object.")
{{ibid1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z5|102}} ( {{Tr}}« The analysis at this stage is meant to ensure that the deprivation of Charter rights is confined to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state’s object. » )
</ref>
</ref>


The main question at the impairment stage is "whether there is an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner."<Ref>
La principale question au stade de la dépréciation est « de savoir s’il existe un moyen alternatif, moins radical, d’atteindre l’objectif de manière réelle et substantielle ».<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|55}} ("The test at the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner.")<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|55}} ( {{Tr}}« The test at the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner. » )<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{atsL|gg5z4|102|}}, {{atsL-np|gg5z4|118|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z5|2015 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 331}}{{atsL|gg5z5|102|}}, {{atsL-np|gg5z5|118|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3w|2016 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 906}}{{atL|gsm3w|70}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3x|2016 CSC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 RCS 906}}{{atL|gsm3x|70}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The burden is upon the government to show the absence of "less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner."<ref>
Il incombe au gouvernement de démontrer l’absence de {{Tr}}« moyens moins drastiques pour atteindre l’objectif de manière réelle et substantielle ».<ref>
{{supra1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z4|103}} ("The burden is on the government to show the absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner" [quotes removed])
{{supra1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z5|103}} ( {{Tr}}« The burden is on the government to show the absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner" [quotes removed])
</ref>
</ref>


In considering the efficiency of the objective, it is not necessary that the alternative would achieve the objective "to exactly the same extent or degree" as the impugned law.<ref>
In considering the efficiency of the objective, it is not necessary that the alternative would achieve the objective "to exactly the same extent or degree" as the impugned law.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutterian Brethren}}{{atL|24rr4|55}}("...in considering whether the government’s objective could be achieved by other less drastic means, the court need not be satisfied that the alternative would satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the impugned measure.  In other words, the court should not accept an unrealistically exacting or precise formulation of the government’s objective which would effectively immunize the law from scrutiny at the minimal impairment stage.")
{{ibid1|Hutterian Brethren}}{{atL|24rr4|55}}( {{Tr}}« ...in considering whether the government’s objective could be achieved by other less drastic means, the court need not be satisfied that the alternative would satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the impugned measure.  In other words, the court should not accept an unrealistically exacting or precise formulation of the government’s objective which would effectively immunize the law from scrutiny at the minimal impairment stage. » )
</ref>
</ref>
The objective should need to be defined so precisely or exactly as to render all alternatives insufficient.<ref>
L'objectif devrait devoir être défini de manière si précise ou exacte que toutes les alternatives soient insuffisantes.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutterian Brethren}}
{{ibid1|Frères huttériens}}
</ref>
</ref>


The law must be "reasonably tailored" to the objective so as to impair no more than "reasonably necessary" in consideration of "the practical difficulties and conflicting tensions" arising from the law.<ref>
La loi doit être {{Tr}}« raisonnablement adaptée » à l'objectif de manière à ne porter atteinte qu'à ce qui est {{Tr}}« raisonnablement nécessaire » compte tenu des {{Tr}}« difficultés pratiques et des tensions contradictoires » découlant de la loi.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523f|2001 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|Sharpe CJ}}{{atL|523f|96}}
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523g|2001 CSC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 RCS 45}}{{perSCC-H|Sharpe CJ}}{{atL|523g|96}}
{{supra1|RJR-MacDonald}}{{AtL|1frgz|160}} (" The law must be reasonably tailored to its objectives; it must impair the right no more than reasonably necessary, having regard to the practical difficulties and conflicting tensions that must be taken into account")<br>
{{supra1|RJR-MacDonald}}{{AtL|1frgz|160}} (" The law must be reasonably tailored to its objectives; it must impair the right no more than reasonably necessary, having regard to the practical difficulties and conflicting tensions that must be taken into account » )<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|102}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z5|2015 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z5|102}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 567}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|53}} (law must be "reasonably tailored to the pressing and substantial  goal put forward to justify the limit")<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 567}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|53}} (law must be "reasonably tailored to the pressing and substantial  goal put forward to justify the limit » )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It must be considered that any attempt to protect one right may intrude on another right. There can be no perfect balance between them.<ref>
Il faut considérer que toute tentative de protéger un droit peut empiéter sur un autre droit. Il ne peut y avoir d'équilibre parfait entre eux.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards Books and Art Ltd|1ftpt|1986 CanLII 12 (SCC)|[1986] 2 SCR 713}}{{atL|1ftpt|183}}("Moreover, attempts to protect the rights of one group will also inevitably impose burdens on the rights of other groups. There is no perfect scenario in which the rights of all can be equally protected.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards Books and Art Ltd|1ftpt|1986 CanLII 12 (CSC)|[1986] 2 RCS 713}}{{atL|1ftpt|183}}( {{Tr}}« Moreover, attempts to protect the rights of one group will also inevitably impose burdens on the rights of other groups. There is no perfect scenario in which the rights of all can be equally protected. » )<br>
{{supra1|Sharpe}}
{{supra1|Sharpe}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Evidence of Policy Evaluation
; Preuve de l’évaluation des politiques
The government should be expected to present evidence show ''why'' the ultimate position was chosen.<ref>
On devrait s'attendre à ce que le gouvernement présente des preuves démontrant « pourquoi » la position finale a été choisie.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1fqrv|118| to 119}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1fqrv|118| à 119}} <br>
{{supra1|RJR MacDonald}}{{atL|1frgz|160}} ("...if the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective measure was not chosen, the law may fail")<br>
{{supra1|RJR MacDonald}}{{atL|1frgz|160}} ( {{Tr}}« ...if the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective measure was not chosen, the law may fail » )<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 SCC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1qljj|69|, 76, 86}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 CSC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 RCS 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1qljj|69|, 76, 86}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Showing that the government engaged in consultation with the affected parties will help establish that the government considered all the options when legislating.<ref>
Montrer que le gouvernement a engagé des consultations avec les parties concernées contribuera à établir que le gouvernement a envisagé toutes les options lorsqu'il a légiféré.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia|1rqmf|2007 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 391}}{{perSCC| J}}{{atL|1rqmf|157}} (" Legislators are not bound to consult with affected parties before passing legislation.  ...it may be useful to consider, in the course of the s. 1 justification analysis, whether the government considered other options or engaged consultation with the affected parties, in choosing to adopt its preferred approach.  The Court has looked at pre-legislative considerations in the past in the context of minimal impairment.  This is simply evidence going to whether other options, in a range of possible options, were explored.")
{{CanLIIRP-C|Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia|1rqmf|2007 CSC 27 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 RCS 391}}{{perSCC| J}}{{atL|1rqmf|157}} (" Legislators are not bound to consult with affected parties before passing legislation.  ...it may be useful to consider, in the course of the s. 1 justification analysis, whether the government considered other options or engaged consultation with the affected parties, in choosing to adopt its preferred approach.  The Court has looked at pre-legislative considerations in the past in the context of minimal impairment.  This is simply evidence going to whether other options, in a range of possible options, were explored. » )
</ref>
</ref>


; Sources for Guidance
; Sources d’orientation
The court may look at other countries as well as other provinces.<Ref>
Le tribunal peut examiner d'autres pays ainsi que d'autres provinces.<Ref>
{{supra1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z4|103| to 104}}<br>
{{supra1|Carter}}{{atL|gg5z5|103| to 104}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp.|1rvv2|2007 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|1rvv2|138}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp.|1rvv3|2007 CSC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 RCS 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|1rvv3|138}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 SCC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1qljj|81| to 84}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 CSC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 RCS 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1qljj|81| à 84}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Lavoie v Canada|51sx|2002 SCC 23 (CanLII)|[2002] 1 SCR 769}}{{perSCC|Bastarache CJ}}{{atsL|51sx|66| to 67}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Lavoie v Canada|51sz|2002 CSC 23 (CanLII)|[2002] 1 RCS 769}}{{perSCC|Bastarache CJ}}{{atsL|51sz|66| à 67}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
However, there must be consideration for the different social issues and needs for each province. <ref>
Cependant, il faut tenir compte des différents enjeux et besoins sociaux de chaque province. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Quebec (Attorney General) v A|2013 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 SCR 61}}{{AtL|fvsc0|449}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}} (dissenting in part){{At-nc|fvsc0|449}} ("Having regard to the need to allow legislatures a margin of appreciation on difficult social issues and the need to be sensitive to the constitutional responsibility of each province to legislate for its population, the answer to this question is no.")
{{CanLIIRP-C|Quebec (Attorney General) v A|2013 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 RCS 61}}{{AtL|fvsc0|449}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}} (dissenting in part){{At-nc|fvsc0|449}} ( {{Tr}}« Having regard to the need to allow legislatures a margin of appreciation on difficult social issues and the need to be sensitive to the constitutional responsibility of each province to legislate for its population, the answer to this question is no. » )
</ref>
</ref>


The Court may consider international treaties signed by Canada.<ref>
La Cour peut examiner les traités internationaux signés par le Canada.<ref>
{{supra1|JTI-Macdonald}}{{AtL|1rvv2|10}}<br>
{{supra1|JTI-Macdonald}}{{AtL|1rvv3|10}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott|fw8x4|2013 SCC 11 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 SCR 467}}{{atL|fw8x4|67}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|fw8x4|67}} ("The balancing of competing Charter rights should also take into account Canada’s international obligations with respect to international law treaty commitments: ... Those commitments reflect an international recognition that certain types of expression may be limited in furtherance of other fundamental values: ")<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott|fw8x4|2013 CSC 11 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 RCS 467}}{{atL|fw8x4|67}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|fw8x4|67}} ( {{Tr}}« The balancing of competing Charter rights should also take into account Canada’s international obligations with respect to international law treaty commitments: ... Those commitments reflect an international recognition that certain types of expression may be limited in furtherance of other fundamental values:  » )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Rational Connection==
==Connexion rationnelle==
To show a rational connection, the government must show that it is reasonable to believe that the limit "may"&ndash;but not necessarily&ndash;advance the goal.<Ref>
Pour démontrer un lien rationnel, le gouvernement doit démontrer qu’il est raisonnable de croire que la limite {{Tr}}« peut » – mais pas nécessairement – ​​faire progresser l’objectif.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 567}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|48}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 567}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|48}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
Where the law does not in practice advance the goal, it may come into play on the third stage of analysis when balancing is considered.
Lorsque la loi ne fait pas avancer l’objectif dans la pratique, elle peut entrer en jeu lors de la troisième étape de l’analyse, lorsqu’il est question d’équilibrer les choses.


The impugned law cannot be "arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations."<ref>
La loi contestée ne peut être {{Tr}}« arbitraire, injuste ou fondée sur des considérations irrationnelles ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv6|1986 CanLII 46 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 103}}{{Atp|139}}
{{CanLIIRP|Oakes|1ftv5|1986 CanLII 46 (CSC)|[1986] 1 RCS 103}}{{Atp|139}}
</ref>
</ref>


There must be a "rational connection" (or "causal link") "between the purpose of the law and the means adopted to effect this purpose."<Ref>
Il doit y avoir un {{Tr}}« lien rationnel » (ou {{Tr}}« lien de causalité ») « entre l'objectif de la loi et les moyens adoptés pour atteindre cet objectif ».
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523f|2001 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|MacLachlin J}}{{atL|523f|94}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharpe|523g|2001 CSC 2 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 RCS 45}}{{perSCC-H|MacLachlin J}}{{atL|523g|94}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia|1rqmf|2007 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 391}}{{atL|1rqmf|148}} (" the government must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the means adopted in the Act are rationally connected to achieving its pressing and substantial objectives.")
{{CanLIIRPC|Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia|1rqmf|2007 CSC 27 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 RCS 391}}{{atL|1rqmf|148}} (" the government must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the means adopted in the Act are rationally connected to achieving its pressing and substantial objectives. » )
{{CanLIIRPC|Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General)|1g6ph|2003 SCC 34 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 SCR 835}}{{atL|1g6ph|34}}("the rational connection requirement is satisfied where there is “a link or nexus based on and in accordance with reason, between the measures enacted and the legislative objective”.")
{{CanLIIRPC|Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General)|1g6ph|2003 CSC 34 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 RCS 835}}{{atL|1g6ph|34}}( {{Tr}}« the rational connection requirement is satisfied where there is “a link or nexus based on and in accordance with reason, between the measures enacted and the legislative objective”. » )
</ref>
</ref>


There is no requirement of certainty of scheme's effectiveness. It is only necessary that the limtiation "may further the goal, not that it will do so."<ref>
Il n'existe aucune exigence de certitude quant à l'efficacité du programme. Il est seulement nécessaire que la limitation {{Tr}}« puisse faire avancer l’objectif, et non qu’elle le fasse ».<ref>
{{supra1|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren}}{{atL|24rr4|48}}<br>
{{supra1|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren}}{{atL|24rr4|48}}<br>
see also {{CanLIIRPC|Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General)|gfxx8|2015 SCC 1 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J}}{{atsL|gfxx8|143| to 144}}<br>
voir également {{CanLIIRPC|Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General)|gfxx8|2015 CSC 1 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J}}{{atsL|gfxx8|143| à 144}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


This stage should not be "particularly onerous."<ref>
Cette étape ne devrait pas être {{Tr}}« particulièrement onéreuse ».<ref>
{{supra1|Health Services}}{{atL|1rqmf|148}}<br>
{{supra1|Health Services}}{{atL|1rqmf|148}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice)|5239|2000 SCC 69 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 1120}}{{atL|5239|228}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice)|523b|2000 CSC 69 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 RCS 1120}}{{atL|523b|228}}<br>
{{supra1|Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General)}}{{atL|1g6ph|34}}<br>
{{supra1|Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General)}}{{atL|1g6ph|34}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp|1rvv2|2007 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1rvv2|40| to 41}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp|1rvv3|2007 CSC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 RCS 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|1rvv3|40| à 41}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Ordonnances LERDS
; Ordonnances LERDS
It was accepted by the court that parliament is permitted to infer that someone who is convicted of more than one sex offence is more likely to be of greater concern to the public risk, irrespective of whether multiple offences arise out of a single incident.<Ref>
La Cour a accepté que le Parlement soit autorisé à déduire qu'une personne reconnue coupable de plus d'une infraction sexuelle est plus susceptible de présenter un plus grand risque pour le public, que plusieurs infractions découlent ou non d'un seul incident.<Ref >
{{CanLIIRP|Long|hr4fz|2018 ONCA 282 (CanLII)|45 CR (7th) 98}}{{perONCA|Strathy CJ}}{{atL|hr4fz|131}} ("Parliament was entitled to draw the inference that conviction of more than one sexual offence is logically probative of an offender’s enhanced propensity to commit further sexual offences and is linked to an elevated risk of re-offending.")
{{CanLIIRP|Long|hr4fz|2018 ONCA 282 (CanLII)|45 CR (7th) 98}}{{perONCA|Strathy CJ}}{{atL|hr4fz|131}} ( {{Tr}}« Parliament was entitled to draw the inference that conviction of more than one sexual offence is logically probative of an offender’s enhanced propensity to commit further sexual offences and is linked to an elevated risk of re-offending. » )
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Proportional Balancing==
==Équilibrage proportionnel==
The proportionality stage is where the court must "weigh the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effects of the law" on the public good.<ref>
L'étape de proportionnalité est celle où le tribunal doit {{Tr}}« soupeser l'impact de la loi sur les droits protégés par rapport aux effets bénéfiques de la loi » sur le bien public.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3w|2016 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 906}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|gsm3w|77}} (" At this final stage of the proportionality analysis, the Court must “weig[h] the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good”")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3x|2016 CSC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 RCS 906}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|gsm3x|77}} (" At this final stage of the proportionality analysis, the Court must “weig[h] the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good” » )<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|122}} ("This stage of the Oakes analysis weighs the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good.  Given our conclusion that the law is not minimally impairing, it is not necessary to go on to this step.")
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z5|2015 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z5|122}} ( {{Tr}}« This stage of the Oakes analysis weighs the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good.  Given our conclusion that the law is not minimally impairing, it is not necessary to go on to this step. » )
</ref>
</ref>


Previous stages focus on the purpose of the law. This stage is the only one to take into account for the "severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups."<ref>
Les étapes précédentes se concentrent sur l’objet de la loi. Cette étape est la seule à prendre en compte pour la {{Tr}}« gravité des effets délétères d'une mesure sur les individus ou les groupes ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|76}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|24rr4|76}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The other steps do not consider the "relationship between the measures and the Charter right". They only consider the "relationship between the ends of the legislation and the means employed."<ref>
Les autres étapes ne tiennent pas compte de la {{Tr}}« relation entre les mesures et le droit garanti par la Charte ». Ils ne considèrent que le {{Tr}}« rapport entre les fins de la législation et les moyens employés ».
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1fqrv|125}}
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1fqrv|125}}
</ref>
</ref>


It considers the impact of the law. It includes consideration of the collective good to be achieved.<ref>
Il considère l’impact de la loi. Cela inclut la prise en compte du bien collectif à atteindre.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp|1rvv2|2007 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|1rvv2|45}} ("This inquiry focuses on the practical impact of the law. What benefits will the measure yield in terms of the collective good sought to be achieved? How important is the limitation on the right? When one is weighed against the other, is the limitation justified?")<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp|1rvv3|2007 CSC 30 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 RCS 610}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|1rvv3|45}} ( {{Tr}}« This inquiry focuses on the practical impact of the law. What benefits will the measure yield in terms of the collective good sought to be achieved? How important is the limitation on the right? When one is weighed against the other, is the limitation justified? » )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The balance between positive and negative effects of the law must be "measured by the values underlying the Charter."<Ref>
L'équilibre entre les effets positifs et négatifs de la loi doit être {{Tr}}« mesuré par les valeurs qui sous-tendent la Charte ».<Ref>
{{supra1|Thomson Newspapers}}{{atL|1fqrv|125}} ("The third stage of the proportionality analysis provides an opportunity to assess, in light of the practical and contextual details which are elucidated in the first and second stages, whether the benefits which accrue from the limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the Charter. ")
{{supra1|Thomson Newspapers}}{{atL|1fqrv|125}} ( {{Tr}}« The third stage of the proportionality analysis provides an opportunity to assess, in light of the practical and contextual details which are elucidated in the first and second stages, whether the benefits which accrue from the limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the Charter.  » )
</ref>
</ref>


The salutary effects must be those that "actually result" from the implementation of the law.<Ref>
Les effets salutaires doivent être ceux qui {{Tr}}« résultent effectivement » de la mise en œuvre de la loi.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp.|1frnq|1994 CanLII 39 (SCC)|[1994] 3 SCR 835}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{atp|887}} ("...I believe that the third step of the second branch of the Oakes test requires both that the underlying objective of a measure and the <u>salutary effects</u> that actually result from its implementation be proportional to the deleterious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and freedoms.")
{{CanLIIRP-C|Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp.|1frnr|1994 CanLII 39 (CSC)|[1994] 3 RCS 835}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{atp|887}} ( {{Tr}}« ...I believe that the third step of the second branch of the Oakes test requires both that the underlying objective of a measure and the <u>salutary effects</u> that actually result from its implementation be proportional to the deleterious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and freedoms. » )
</ref>
</ref>


This final stage is where the "conceptual heavy lifting and balancing" takes place.<ref>
Cette étape finale est celle où « le levage et l'équilibrage conceptuels des charges lourdes » ont lieu.<ref>
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atsL|gsm3w|78| to 79}} ("most of the heavy conceptual lifting and balancing ought to be done at the final step ...  It is only at this final stage that courts can transcend the law’s purpose and engage in a robust examination of the law’s impact on Canada’s free and democratic society ")
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atsL|gsm3x|78| à 79}} ( {{Tr}}« most of the heavy conceptual lifting and balancing ought to be done at the final step ...  It is only at this final stage that courts can transcend the law’s purpose and engage in a robust examination of the law’s impact on Canada’s free and democratic society  » )
</ref>
</ref>


This is where the court determines "on a normative basis whether a rights infringement is justified in a free and democratic society."<ref>
C'est ici que le tribunal détermine {{Tr}}« sur une base normative si une violation des droits est justifiée dans une société libre et démocratique ».<ref>
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3w|79}}
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3x|79}}
</ref>  
</ref>


In assessment, the court must make value judgments. These judgements should be explicit to ensure transparency.<ref>
Lors de son évaluation, le tribunal doit porter des jugements de valeur. Ces jugements doivent être explicites pour garantir la transparence.<ref>
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3w|79}}
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3x|79}}
</ref>
</ref>


There must be "appropriate deference" to the legislators "choice of means" and its full legislative objective.<ref>
Il doit y avoir une {{Tr}}« déférence appropriée » envers le {{Tr}}« choix des moyens » du législateur et son objectif législatif complet.<ref>
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3w|79}} ("Further, as mentioned, proceeding to this final stage permits appropriate deference to Parliament’s choice of means, as well as its full legislative objective.")
{{supra1|KRJ}}{{atL|gsm3x|79}} ( {{Tr}}« Further, as mentioned, proceeding to this final stage permits appropriate deference to Parliament’s choice of means, as well as its full legislative objective. » )
</ref>
</ref>


It is in the rare case where the law satisfies all previous stages but fails on the balancing.<ref>
C'est le cas rare où la loi satisfait à toutes les étapes précédentes mais échoue dans l'équilibrage.<ref>
e.g. {{supra1|KRJ}}
par exemple. {{supra1|KRJ}}
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Deference to Social Context==
==Déférence au contexte social==
The assessment is highly sensitive to the factual and cultural context of the law.<ref>
L'évaluation est très sensible au contexte factuel et culturel de la loi.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1fqrv|87}} (" The analysis under s. 1 of the Charter must be undertaken with a close attention to context. ... This is inevitable as the test devised in R v Oakes, [citation omitted], requires a court to establish the objective of the impugned provision, which can only be accomplished by canvassing the nature of the social problem which it addresses.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1fqrv|1998 CanLII 829 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 877}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1fqrv|87}} (" The analysis under s. 1 of the Charter must be undertaken with a close attention to context. ... This is inevitable as the test devised in R v Oakes, [citation omitted], requires a court to establish the objective of the impugned provision, which can only be accomplished by canvassing the nature of the social problem which it addresses. » )<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1995] 3 SCR 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1frgz|63}} ("This Court has on many occasions affirmed that the Oakes requirements must be applied flexibly, having regard to the specific factual and social context of each case.")<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (CSC)|[1995] 3 RCS 199}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1frgz|63}} ( {{Tr}}« This Court has on many occasions affirmed that the Oakes requirements must be applied flexibly, having regard to the specific factual and social context of each case. » )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


There will be greater defence where there the legislators have superior institutional competence.<ref>
Il y aura une plus grande défense là où les législateurs auront une compétence institutionnelle supérieure.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|M v H|1fqm4|1999 CanLII 686 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (6:1){{atL|1fqm4|78}} ("As a general matter, the role of the legislature demands deference from the courts to those types of policy decisions that the legislature  is best placed to make.")
{{CanLIIRP-C|M v H|1fqm4|1999 CanLII 686 (CSC)|[1999] 2 RCS 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (6:1){{atL|1fqm4|78}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general matter, the role of the legislature demands deference from the courts to those types of policy decisions that the legislature  is best placed to make. » )
</ref>
</ref>
This means that complex social problems or a complex regulatory response may be a reason to be deferential to the legislators.<Ref>
Cela signifie que des problèmes sociaux complexes ou une réponse réglementaire complexe peuvent être une raison de faire preuve de déférence envers les législateurs.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott|fw8x4|2013 SCC 11 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 SCR 467}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|fw8x4|78}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott|fw8x4|2013 CSC 11 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 RCS 467}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|fw8x4|78}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|24rr4|35|, 37}} and {{at-nc|24rr4|53}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony|24rr4|2009 CSC 37 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 RCS 567}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atsL|24rr4|35|, 37}} et {{at-nc|24rr4|53}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|97}}
{{CanLIIRP-C|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z5|2015 CSC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 RCS 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z5|97}}
</ref>
</ref>


The desire to engage in incrementalism to allow for gradual change to impugned legislation.<ref>
Le désir de s'engager dans une approche progressive pour permettre une modification progressive de la législation contestée.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 493}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}}{{atL|1fqt5|122}} ("... I took the position that the need for governmental incrementalism was an inappropriate justification for Charter violations.  I remain convinced that this approach is generally not suitable for that purpose, especially where, as here, the statute in issue is a comprehensive code of human rights provisions.  In my opinion, groups that have historically been the target of discrimination cannot be expected to wait patiently for the protection of their human dignity and equal rights while governments move toward reform one step at a time.  If the infringement of the rights and freedoms of these groups is permitted to persist while governments fail to pursue equality diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter will be reduced to little more than empty words.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 493}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}}{{atL|1fqt5|122}} ( {{Tr}}« ... I took the position that the need for governmental incrementalism was an inappropriate justification for Charter violations.  I remain convinced that this approach is generally not suitable for that purpose, especially where, as here, the statute in issue is a comprehensive code of human rights provisions.  In my opinion, groups that have historically been the target of discrimination cannot be expected to wait patiently for the protection of their human dignity and equal rights while governments move toward reform one step at a time.  If the infringement of the rights and freedoms of these groups is permitted to persist while governments fail to pursue equality diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter will be reduced to little more than empty words. » )<br>
{{supra1|M v H}}{{atL|1fqm4|128}}
{{supra1|M v H}}{{atL|1fqm4|128}}
</ref>
</ref>


There should rarely be deference when dealing with matters of criminal law given that "the government is the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed."<ref>
Il devrait rarement y avoir de déférence lorsqu'il s'agit de questions de droit pénal étant donné que {{Tr}}« le gouvernement est le seul antagoniste de l'individu dont le droit a été violé ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ}} ("rather than mediating between different groups, the government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed. ...  In such circumstances, and indeed whenever the government's purpose relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial system, the courts can assess with some certainty whether the "least drastic means" for achieving the purpose have been chosen, especially given their accumulated experience in dealing with such questions")
{{CanLIIRP-C|Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (CSC)|[1989] 1 RCS 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ}} ( {{Tr}}« rather than mediating between different groups, the government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed. ...  In such circumstances, and indeed whenever the government's purpose relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial system, the courts can assess with some certainty whether the "least drastic means" for achieving the purpose have been chosen, especially given their accumulated experience in dealing with such questions » )
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Evidence==
==Preuve==
Typical available evidence that is considered in a s. 1 hearing include:
Les éléments de preuve disponibles typiques qui sont examinés dans une affaire fondée sur l'art. 1 audience comprend :
* preamble of legislation<ref>
* préambule de la législation<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lucas|1fqt3|1998 CanLII 815 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 439}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Lucas|1fqt3|1998 CanLII 815 (CSC)|[1998] 1 RCS 439}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}
</ref>
</ref>
* legislative hansard<ref>
* hansard législatif<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3w|2016 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 906}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KRJ|gsm3x|2016 CSC 31 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 RCS 906}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morgentaler|1fs14|1993 CanLII 74 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 463}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morgentaler|1fs14|1993 CanLII 74 (CSC)|[1993] 3 RCS 463}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v Attorney General of British Columbia|21v0s|2008 BCSC 1699 (CanLII)|304 DLR (4th) 588}}{{perBCSC|Rice J}}{{atsL|21v0s|42| to 64}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v Attorney General of British Columbia|21v0s|2008 BCSC 1699 (CanLII)|304 DLR (4th) 588}}{{perBCSC|Rice J}}{{atsL|21v0s|42| à 64}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
* Minister's speeches outside of the legislature<Ref>
* Discours du Ministre hors du Parlement<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ}}
{{CanLIIRP-C|Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (CSC)|[1989] 1 RCS 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ}}
</ref>
</ref>
* Reports, including Parliamentary committee reports, commission reports, or law reform reports;<Ref>
* Rapports, y compris les rapports de comités parlementaires, les rapports de commissions ou les rapports sur la réforme du droit ;<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Keegstra|1fsr1|1990 CanLII 24 (SCC)|[1990] 3 SCR 697}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Keegstra|1fsr1|1990 CanLII 24 (CSC)|[1990] 3 RCS 697}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|M v H|1fqm4|1999 CanLII 686 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (6:1){{atL|1fqm4|78}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|M v H|1fqm4|1999 CanLII 686 (CSC)|[1999] 2 RCS 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (6:1){{atL|1fqm4|78}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Harper v Canada (Attorney General)|1h2c9|2004 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 827}}{{perSCC|Bastarache J}}
{{CanLIIRP-C|Harper v Canada (Attorney General)|1h2c9|2004 CSC 33 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 RCS 827}}{{perSCC|Bastarache J}}
</ref>
</ref>
* Opinion polls<Ref>
* Sondages d'opinion<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bryan|1qsvr|2007 SCC 12 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 527}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Bryan|1qsvr|2007 CSC 12 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 RCS 527}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}
</ref>
</ref>
* Expert testimony<ref>
* Témoignage d'expert<ref>
{{ibid1|Bryan}}<br>
{{ibid1|Bryan}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE|1j0tg|2004 SCC 66 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 381}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP-C|Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE|1j0tg|2004 CSC 66 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 RCS 381}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Dernière version du 5 novembre 2024 à 21:37

Cette page a été mise à jour ou révisée de manière substantielle pour la dernière fois janvier 2019. (Rev. # 31681)
n.b.: Cette page est expérimentale. Si vous repérez une grammaire ou un texte anglais clairement incorrect, veuillez m'en informer à [email protected] et je le corrigerai dès que possible.

Principes généraux

L'article 1 de la [TRADUCTION] « Charte canadienne des droits et libertés » stipule :

Garantie des droits et libertés
Droits et libertés au Canada

1 La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés qui y sont énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par une règle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la

– CCRF

Note up: 1

Cette disposition est également connue sous le nom de [TRADUCTION] « clause de limites raisonnables » ou [TRADUCTION] « clause de limitation », car elle permet légalement au gouvernement de limiter les droits d'un individu garantis par la Charte. Partout où il y a une violation des droits légaux (art. 7 à 12) de la « Charte », l'art. 1 détermine si la violation est permise et exempte de tout recours en vertu de l'art. 24 de la « Charte ».

Fardeau et norme de preuve

Lorsqu'une violation d'un droit légal a été constatée, il incombe à la Couronne de justifier la limitation de ce droit en vertu de l'art. 1.[1] La norme de preuve repose sur la prépondérance des probabilités.[2]


« Démontrablement justifié »

L'expression « manifestement justifié » signifie qu'il doit y avoir un [TRADUCTION] « argument convaincant et convaincant ».[3]

En général, la Couronne doit démontrer la justification à l'aide de preuves empiriques.

Lorsque les données scientifiques ou sociales justifiant la limitation ne sont pas concluantes, la Couronne peut s'appuyer sur [TRADUCTION] « la raison et la logique ».[4] Dans les cas de violations minimes, l’absence de sciences sociales est de moindre importance.[5]

  1. ↑ R c Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1986] 1 RCS 103, par Dickson CJ
  2. ↑ , ibid.
    R v Sharpe at para 102(citation complète en attente)
  3. ↑ , ibid. ( [TRADUCTION] « Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a s. 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit » )
  4. ↑ Libman v Quebec (A.G.), 1997 CanLII 326 (CSC), [1997] 3 RCS 569, par curiam
    RJR-MacDonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), 1995 CanLII 64 (CSC), 1995] 3 RCS 199, par McLachlin J
    Thomson Newspapers Co. c. Canada (Procureur général), 1998 CanLII 829 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 877, par Bastarache J
    R c Sharpe, 2001 CSC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 RCS 45, par McLachlin CJ
    Harper c. Canada (Procureur général), 2004 CSC 33 (CanLII), [2004] 1 RCS 827, par Bastarache J, au para 77
    R c Bryan, 2007 CSC 12 (CanLII), [2007] 1 RCS 527, par Bastarache J, aux paras 16 à 19, 29
    Association de la police montée de l’Ontario c. Canada (Procureur général), 2015 CSC 1 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 3, par McLachlin CJ and LeBel J, aux paras 143 à 144
  5. ↑ e.g. B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association c. Colombie‑Britannique (Procureur général), 2017 CSC 6 (CanLII), [2017] 1 RCS 93, par McLachlin CJ

Violations d'article 7

Exagération et manifestement disproportionnée

Lorsqu’une loi est jugée trop large ou manifestement disproportionnée, elle n’est généralement pas justifiable en vertu de l’art. 1 de la Charte.[1]

  1. ↑ R c Boutilier, 2016 BCCA 235 (CanLII), 336 CCC (3d) 293, par D Smith J, au para 84
    Canada (Procureur général) c. Bedford, 2013 CSC 72 (CanLII), [2013] 3 RCS 1101, par McLachlin CJ, au para 129
    Carter c. Canada (Procureur général), 2015 CSC 5 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 331, par curiam, au para 95

Prescrit par la loi

Les limitations des droits doivent être "prévues par la loi". Cela fait référence à l'exigence selon laquelle la limitation des droits est le résultat d'une certaine conduite d'un gouvernement ou de ses agents suivant une loi accessible et intelligible.

L'exigence ici concerne les limitations qui sont arbitraires et non soutenues par la loi.[1]

Une loi sera invalide si elle est trop vague, comme [TRADUCTION] « lorsqu'il n'y a pas de norme intelligible et lorsque le législateur a donné le pouvoir discrétionnaire plénier de faire ce qui semble le mieux dans un large éventail de circonstances. »[2]

Signification de [TRADUCTION] « Loi »

Le terme « loi » dans ce contexte fait référence à la fois à la common law ainsi qu'aux lois ou réglementations statutaires.[3]

La limitation peut être créée expressément par la loi ou [TRADUCTION] « par implication nécessaire des termes d'une loi ou d'un règlement ou de ses exigences opérationnelles ».[4]

La loi comprend la politique

Certains types de politiques peuvent relever du terme [TRADUCTION] « loi ». La politique doit présenter les éléments suivants : [5]

  1. l'entité gouvernementale était autorisée à mettre en œuvre la politique
  2. la politique est "d'application générale"
  3. la politique est "suffisamment précise et accessible"

Les exigences d'une politique visent à faire la distinction entre les politiques de nature [TRADUCTION] « législative » et celles de nature [TRADUCTION] « administrative ».[6] Celles qui sont législatives sont celles qui sont [TRADUCTION] « d'application générale » et établissent une [TRADUCTION] « norme ».[7] Ceux qui sont administratifs sont créés dans un but d'« efficacité administrative ». Ils sont réservés à un usage interne et sont souvent informels. Ils sont parfois simplement utilisés comme aides à l’interprétation plutôt que comme énoncés de droits et d’obligations.[8]

  1. ↑ R c Therens, 1985 CanLII 29 (CSC), [1985] 1 RCS 613, par Le Dain J (dissent), au para 60 ( [TRADUCTION] « The requirement that the limit be prescribed by law is chiefly concerned with the distinction between a limit imposed by law and one that is arbitrary. » ) but affirmed in Orbanski
    R c Orbanski; R v Elias, 2005 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2005] 2 RCS 3, au para 36
  2. ↑ Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 87 (CSC), [1989] 1 RCS 927, par Dickson C.J. et Lamer et Wilson JJ
  3. ↑ R c Shupe, 1987 CanLII 3171 (AB QB), 38 CCC (3d) 64, par Cooke J, au para 19
    Therens, supra, au para 60 ( [TRADUCTION] « The limit may also result from the application of a common law rule. » ) aff'd in Orbanski
  4. ↑ Therens, supra, au para 60 ( [TRADUCTION] « The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements.  » )
    Orbanski, supra, au para 36
  5. ↑ Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority c. Fédération canadienne des étudiantes et étudiants — Section Colombie-Britannique, 2009 CSC 31 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 295, au para 50 (For policy to be included in s.1, "it must be asked whether the government entity was authorized to enact the impugned policies and whether the policies are binding rules of general application. If so, the policies can be “law” for the purposes of s. 1. At the second stage of the enquiry, ... it must be determined whether the policies are sufficiently precise and accessible. » )
  6. ↑ Greater Vancouver, supra, au para 64 ( [TRADUCTION] « Where a policy is not administrative in nature, it may be “law” provided that it meets certain requirements. » ) and, au para 65 ( [TRADUCTION] « Thus, where a government policy is authorized by statute and sets out a general norm or standard that is meant to be binding and is sufficiently accessible and precise, the policy is legislative in nature and constitutes a limit that is “prescribed by law”. » )
  7. ↑ Greater Vancouver, supra, au para 64 ( [TRADUCTION] « In order to be legislative in nature, the policy must establish a norm or standard of general application that has been enacted by a government entity pursuant to a rule-making authority. » )
  8. ↑ Greater Vancouver, supra, au para 63 ( [TRADUCTION] « Administrative rules relate to the implementation of laws contained in a statutory scheme and are created for the purpose of administrative efficiency. The key question is thus whether the policies are focussed on “indoor” management. In such a case, they are meant for internal use and are often informal in nature; ... . Such rules or policies act as interpretive aids in the application of a statute or regulation. » )

Test d'Oakes

Le test permettant de déterminer si l'objectif de la loi est manifestement justifiable dans une société libre et démocratique est connu sous le nom de « test d'Oakes ».[1]

Le test est appliqué une fois que le demandeur a prouvé qu'une des dispositions de la Charte a été violée.

Il incombe à la Couronne de satisfaire au critère Oakes. Une violation d’un droit ne peut être justifiée que si les éléments suivants sont établis selon la prépondérance des probabilités :

  1. Il doit y avoir un objectif urgent et réel
  2. Les moyens doivent être proportionnés
    1. Les moyens doivent être rationnellement liés à l'objectif
    2. Il doit y avoir une atteinte minimale aux droits
    3. Il doit y avoir une proportionnalité entre l'infraction et l'objectif
  1. ↑ R c Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1986] 1 RCS 103, par Dickson CJ

Objectif pressant et substantiel

Le premier volet du critère [TRADUCTION] « Oakes » exige que la loi ait un [TRADUCTION] « objectif urgent et réel ».

Un objectif suffisamment [TRADUCTION] « urgent et substantiel » est celui qui est [TRADUCTION] « conforme à certains des principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose notre société libre et démocratique ».[1] En d’autres termes, ils ne peuvent pas être [TRADUCTION] « en contradiction » avec [TRADUCTION] « les principes essentiels d’une société libre et démocratique ».[2]

  1. ↑ Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2003] 1 RCS 912, par Lebel J (concurring), au para 180
    Vriend v Alberta, 1998 CanLII 816 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 493, par Cory and Iacobucci JJ
  2. ↑ , ibid., au para 80, par Iacobucci J

Déficience minimale

Le droit contesté doit être restreint [TRADUCTION] « le moins possible ».[1] Il suffit toutefois que la dépréciation se situe simplement dans une fourchette d’options raisonnables. Il n'est pas nécessaire que cela soit optimal.[2]

Le but de cette enquête est de décider s'il existe « des moyens moins nocifs pour atteindre l'objectif législatif ».[3] Il garantit que la privation des droits est [TRADUCTION] « limitée à ce qui est raisonnablement nécessaire pour atteindre » l'objectif de la législation.[4]

La principale question au stade de la dépréciation est « de savoir s’il existe un moyen alternatif, moins radical, d’atteindre l’objectif de manière réelle et substantielle ».[5]

Il incombe au gouvernement de démontrer l’absence de [TRADUCTION] « moyens moins drastiques pour atteindre l’objectif de manière réelle et substantielle ».[6]

In considering the efficiency of the objective, it is not necessary that the alternative would achieve the objective "to exactly the same extent or degree" as the impugned law.[7] L'objectif devrait devoir être défini de manière si précise ou exacte que toutes les alternatives soient insuffisantes.[8]

La loi doit être [TRADUCTION] « raisonnablement adaptée » à l'objectif de manière à ne porter atteinte qu'à ce qui est [TRADUCTION] « raisonnablement nécessaire » compte tenu des [TRADUCTION] « difficultés pratiques et des tensions contradictoires » découlant de la loi.[9]

Il faut considérer que toute tentative de protéger un droit peut empiéter sur un autre droit. Il ne peut y avoir d'équilibre parfait entre eux.[10]

Preuve de l’évaluation des politiques

On devrait s'attendre à ce que le gouvernement présente des preuves démontrant « pourquoi » la position finale a été choisie.[11]

Montrer que le gouvernement a engagé des consultations avec les parties concernées contribuera à établir que le gouvernement a envisagé toutes les options lorsqu'il a légiféré.[12]

Sources d’orientation

Le tribunal peut examiner d'autres pays ainsi que d'autres provinces.[13] Cependant, il faut tenir compte des différents enjeux et besoins sociaux de chaque province. [14]

La Cour peut examiner les traités internationaux signés par le Canada.[15]

  1. ↑ R c Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1986] 1 RCS 103, par Dickson CJ
  2. ↑ RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1995 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1995] 3 RCS 199, par McLachlin J, au para 160
    R c Sharpe, 2001 CSC 1 (CanLII), [2001] 1 RCS 45, par McLachlin CJ, au para 96 ( [TRADUCTION] « This Court has held that to establish justification it is not necessary to show that Parliament has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving its end. It suffices if the means adopted fall within a range of reasonable solutions to the problem confronted. » )
  3. ↑ , ibid., au para 102
  4. ↑ , ibid., au para 102 ( [TRADUCTION] « The analysis at this stage is meant to ensure that the deprivation of Charter rights is confined to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state’s object. » )
  5. ↑ Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 567, par McLachlin CJ, au para 55 ( [TRADUCTION] « The test at the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner. » )
    Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 5 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 331, aux paras 102, 118
    R c KRJ, 2016 CSC 31 (CanLII), [2016] 1 RCS 906, au para 70
  6. ↑ Carter, supra, au para 103 ( [TRADUCTION] « The burden is on the government to show the absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner" [quotes removed])
  7. ↑ , ibid., au para 55( [TRADUCTION] « ...in considering whether the government’s objective could be achieved by other less drastic means, the court need not be satisfied that the alternative would satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the impugned measure. In other words, the court should not accept an unrealistically exacting or precise formulation of the government’s objective which would effectively immunize the law from scrutiny at the minimal impairment stage. » )
  8. ↑ , ibid.
  9. ↑ R c Sharpe, 2001 CSC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 RCS 45, par Sharpe CJ, au para 96 RJR-MacDonald, supra, au para 160 (" The law must be reasonably tailored to its objectives; it must impair the right no more than reasonably necessary, having regard to the practical difficulties and conflicting tensions that must be taken into account » )
    Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 5 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 331, par curiam, au para 102
    Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 567, par McLachlin CJ, au para 53 (law must be "reasonably tailored to the pressing and substantial goal put forward to justify the limit » )
  10. ↑ R c Edwards Books and Art Ltd, 1986 CanLII 12 (CSC), [1986] 2 RCS 713, au para 183( [TRADUCTION] « Moreover, attempts to protect the rights of one group will also inevitably impose burdens on the rights of other groups. There is no perfect scenario in which the rights of all can be equally protected. » )
    Sharpe, supra
  11. ↑ Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 829 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 877, par Bastarache J, aux paras 118 à 119
    RJR MacDonald, supra, au para 160 ( [TRADUCTION] « ...if the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective measure was not chosen, the law may fail » )
    Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CSC 9 (CanLII), [2007] 1 RCS 350, par McLachlin CJ, aux paras 69, 76, 86
  12. ↑ Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia, 2007 CSC 27 (CanLII), [2007] 2 RCS 391, par J, au para 157 (" Legislators are not bound to consult with affected parties before passing legislation. ...it may be useful to consider, in the course of the s. 1 justification analysis, whether the government considered other options or engaged consultation with the affected parties, in choosing to adopt its preferred approach. The Court has looked at pre-legislative considerations in the past in the context of minimal impairment. This is simply evidence going to whether other options, in a range of possible options, were explored. » )
  13. ↑ Carter, supra, au para 103
    Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2007] 2 RCS 610, par McLachlin CJ, au para 138
    Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CSC 9 (CanLII), [2007] 1 RCS 350, par McLachlin CJ, aux paras 81 à 84
    Lavoie v Canada, 2002 CSC 23 (CanLII), [2002] 1 RCS 769, par Bastarache CJ, aux paras 66 à 67
  14. ↑ Quebec (Attorney General) v A, CSC 5 (CanLII) [2013 1 RCS 61], {{{4}}}, au para 449, par Deschamps J (dissenting in part) at para fvsc0 ( [TRADUCTION] « Having regard to the need to allow legislatures a margin of appreciation on difficult social issues and the need to be sensitive to the constitutional responsibility of each province to legislate for its population, the answer to this question is no. » )
  15. ↑ JTI-Macdonald, supra, au para 10
    Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 CSC 11 (CanLII), [2013] 1 RCS 467, au para 67, par Rothstein J, au para 67 ( [TRADUCTION] « The balancing of competing Charter rights should also take into account Canada’s international obligations with respect to international law treaty commitments: ... Those commitments reflect an international recognition that certain types of expression may be limited in furtherance of other fundamental values:  » )

Connexion rationnelle

Pour démontrer un lien rationnel, le gouvernement doit démontrer qu’il est raisonnable de croire que la limite [TRADUCTION] « peut » – mais pas nécessairement – ​​faire progresser l’objectif.[1] Lorsque la loi ne fait pas avancer l’objectif dans la pratique, elle peut entrer en jeu lors de la troisième étape de l’analyse, lorsqu’il est question d’équilibrer les choses.

La loi contestée ne peut être [TRADUCTION] « arbitraire, injuste ou fondée sur des considérations irrationnelles ».[2]

Il doit y avoir un [TRADUCTION] « lien rationnel » (ou [TRADUCTION] « lien de causalité ») « entre l'objectif de la loi et les moyens adoptés pour atteindre cet objectif ». R c Sharpe, 2001 CSC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 RCS 45, par MacLachlin J, au para 94
Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia, 2007 CSC 27 (CanLII), [2007] 2 RCS 391, au para 148 (" the government must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the means adopted in the Act are rationally connected to achieving its pressing and substantial objectives. » ) Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2003 CSC 34 (CanLII), [2003] 1 RCS 835, au para 34( [TRADUCTION] « the rational connection requirement is satisfied where there is “a link or nexus based on and in accordance with reason, between the measures enacted and the legislative objective”. » ) </ref>

Il n'existe aucune exigence de certitude quant à l'efficacité du programme. Il est seulement nécessaire que la limitation [TRADUCTION] « puisse faire avancer l’objectif, et non qu’elle le fasse ».[3]

Cette étape ne devrait pas être [TRADUCTION] « particulièrement onéreuse ».[4]

Ordonnances LERDS

La Cour a accepté que le Parlement soit autorisé à déduire qu'une personne reconnue coupable de plus d'une infraction sexuelle est plus susceptible de présenter un plus grand risque pour le public, que plusieurs infractions découlent ou non d'un seul incident.[5]

  1. ↑ Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 567, par McLachlin CJ, au para 48
  2. ↑ R c Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1986] 1 RCS 103, au p. 139
  3. ↑ Alberta v Hutterian Brethren, supra, au para 48
    voir également Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 1 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 3, par McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J, aux paras 143 à 144
  4. ↑ Health Services, supra, au para 148
    Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 CSC 69 (CanLII), [2000] 2 RCS 1120, au para 228
    Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General), supra, au para 34
    Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp, 2007 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2007] 2 RCS 610, par McLachlin CJ, aux paras 40 à 41
  5. ↑ R c Long, 2018 ONCA 282 (CanLII), 45 CR (7th) 98, par Strathy CJ, au para 131 ( [TRADUCTION] « Parliament was entitled to draw the inference that conviction of more than one sexual offence is logically probative of an offender’s enhanced propensity to commit further sexual offences and is linked to an elevated risk of re-offending. » )

Équilibrage proportionnel

L'étape de proportionnalité est celle où le tribunal doit [TRADUCTION] « soupeser l'impact de la loi sur les droits protégés par rapport aux effets bénéfiques de la loi » sur le bien public.[1]

Les étapes précédentes se concentrent sur l’objet de la loi. Cette étape est la seule à prendre en compte pour la [TRADUCTION] « gravité des effets délétères d'une mesure sur les individus ou les groupes ».[2]

Les autres étapes ne tiennent pas compte de la [TRADUCTION] « relation entre les mesures et le droit garanti par la Charte ». Ils ne considèrent que le [TRADUCTION] « rapport entre les fins de la législation et les moyens employés ». Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 829 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 877, par Bastarache J, au para 125 </ref>

Il considère l’impact de la loi. Cela inclut la prise en compte du bien collectif à atteindre.[3]

L'équilibre entre les effets positifs et négatifs de la loi doit être [TRADUCTION] « mesuré par les valeurs qui sous-tendent la Charte ».[4]

Les effets salutaires doivent être ceux qui [TRADUCTION] « résultent effectivement » de la mise en œuvre de la loi.[5]

Cette étape finale est celle où « le levage et l'équilibrage conceptuels des charges lourdes » ont lieu.[6]

C'est ici que le tribunal détermine [TRADUCTION] « sur une base normative si une violation des droits est justifiée dans une société libre et démocratique ».[7]

Lors de son évaluation, le tribunal doit porter des jugements de valeur. Ces jugements doivent être explicites pour garantir la transparence.[8]

Il doit y avoir une [TRADUCTION] « déférence appropriée » envers le [TRADUCTION] « choix des moyens » du législateur et son objectif législatif complet.[9]

C'est le cas rare où la loi satisfait à toutes les étapes précédentes mais échoue dans l'équilibrage.[10]

  1. ↑ R c KRJ, 2016 CSC 31 (CanLII), [2016] 1 RCS 906, par Karakatsanis J, au para 77 (" At this final stage of the proportionality analysis, the Court must “weig[h] the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good” » )
    Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 5 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 331, par curiam, au para 122 ( [TRADUCTION] « This stage of the Oakes analysis weighs the impact of the law on protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good. Given our conclusion that the law is not minimally impairing, it is not necessary to go on to this step. » )
  2. ↑ Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 567, par McLachlin CJ, au para 76
  3. ↑ Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp, 2007 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2007] 2 RCS 610, par McLachlin CJ, au para 45 ( [TRADUCTION] « This inquiry focuses on the practical impact of the law. What benefits will the measure yield in terms of the collective good sought to be achieved? How important is the limitation on the right? When one is weighed against the other, is the limitation justified? » )
  4. ↑ Thomson Newspapers, supra, au para 125 ( [TRADUCTION] « The third stage of the proportionality analysis provides an opportunity to assess, in light of the practical and contextual details which are elucidated in the first and second stages, whether the benefits which accrue from the limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the Charter.  » )
  5. ↑ Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1994 CanLII 39 (CSC), [1994] 3 RCS 835, par Lamer CJ, au p. 887 ( [TRADUCTION] « ...I believe that the third step of the second branch of the Oakes test requires both that the underlying objective of a measure and the salutary effects that actually result from its implementation be proportional to the deleterious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and freedoms. » )
  6. ↑ KRJ, supra, aux paras 78 à 79 ( [TRADUCTION] « most of the heavy conceptual lifting and balancing ought to be done at the final step ... It is only at this final stage that courts can transcend the law’s purpose and engage in a robust examination of the law’s impact on Canada’s free and democratic society  » )
  7. ↑ KRJ, supra, au para 79
  8. ↑ KRJ, supra, au para 79
  9. ↑ KRJ, supra, au para 79 ( [TRADUCTION] « Further, as mentioned, proceeding to this final stage permits appropriate deference to Parliament’s choice of means, as well as its full legislative objective. » )
  10. ↑ par exemple. KRJ, supra

Déférence au contexte social

L'évaluation est très sensible au contexte factuel et culturel de la loi.[1]

Il y aura une plus grande défense là où les législateurs auront une compétence institutionnelle supérieure.[2] Cela signifie que des problèmes sociaux complexes ou une réponse réglementaire complexe peuvent être une raison de faire preuve de déférence envers les législateurs.[3]

Le désir de s'engager dans une approche progressive pour permettre une modification progressive de la législation contestée.[4]

Il devrait rarement y avoir de déférence lorsqu'il s'agit de questions de droit pénal étant donné que [TRADUCTION] « le gouvernement est le seul antagoniste de l'individu dont le droit a été violé ».[5]

  1. ↑ Thomson Newspapers Co. v Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 829 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 877, par Bastarache J, au para 87 (" The analysis under s. 1 of the Charter must be undertaken with a close attention to context. ... This is inevitable as the test devised in R v Oakes, [citation omitted], requires a court to establish the objective of the impugned provision, which can only be accomplished by canvassing the nature of the social problem which it addresses. » )
    RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1995 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1995] 3 RCS 199, par McLachlin J, au para 63 ( [TRADUCTION] « This Court has on many occasions affirmed that the Oakes requirements must be applied flexibly, having regard to the specific factual and social context of each case. » )
  2. ↑ M v H, 1999 CanLII 686 (CSC), [1999] 2 RCS 3, par Iacobucci J (6:1), au para 78 ( [TRADUCTION] « As a general matter, the role of the legislature demands deference from the courts to those types of policy decisions that the legislature is best placed to make. » )
  3. ↑ Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 CSC 11 (CanLII), [2013] 1 RCS 467, par Rothstein J, au para 78
    Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 CSC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 RCS 567, par McLachlin CJ, aux paras 35, 37 et at para 24rr4
    Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 5 (CanLII), [2015] 1 RCS 331, par curiam, au para 97
  4. ↑ Vriend v Alberta, 1998 CanLII 816 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 493, par Cory and Iacobucci JJ, au para 122 ( [TRADUCTION] « ... I took the position that the need for governmental incrementalism was an inappropriate justification for Charter violations. I remain convinced that this approach is generally not suitable for that purpose, especially where, as here, the statute in issue is a comprehensive code of human rights provisions. In my opinion, groups that have historically been the target of discrimination cannot be expected to wait patiently for the protection of their human dignity and equal rights while governments move toward reform one step at a time. If the infringement of the rights and freedoms of these groups is permitted to persist while governments fail to pursue equality diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter will be reduced to little more than empty words. » )
    M v H, supra, au para 128
  5. ↑ Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 87 (CSC), [1989] 1 RCS 927, par Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ ( [TRADUCTION] « rather than mediating between different groups, the government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed. ... In such circumstances, and indeed whenever the government's purpose relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial system, the courts can assess with some certainty whether the "least drastic means" for achieving the purpose have been chosen, especially given their accumulated experience in dealing with such questions » )

Preuve

Les éléments de preuve disponibles typiques qui sont examinés dans une affaire fondée sur l'art. 1 audience comprend :

  • préambule de la législation[1]
  • hansard législatif[2]
  • Discours du Ministre hors du Parlement[3]
  • Rapports, y compris les rapports de comités parlementaires, les rapports de commissions ou les rapports sur la réforme du droit ;[4]
  • Sondages d'opinion[5]
  • Témoignage d'expert[6]
  1. ↑ R c Lucas, 1998 CanLII 815 (CSC), [1998] 1 RCS 439, par Cory J
  2. ↑ R c KRJ, 2016 CSC 31 (CanLII), [2016] 1 RCS 906, par Karakatsanis J
    R c Morgentaler, 1993 CanLII 74 (CSC), [1993] 3 RCS 463, par Sopinka J
    British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v Attorney General of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1699 (CanLII), 304 DLR (4th) 588, par Rice J, aux paras 42 à 64
  3. ↑ Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 87 (CSC), [1989] 1 RCS 927, par Dickson CJ and Lamer and Wilson JJ
  4. ↑ R c Keegstra, 1990 CanLII 24 (CSC), [1990] 3 RCS 697, par Dickson CJ
    M v H, 1999 CanLII 686 (CSC), [1999] 2 RCS 3, par Iacobucci J (6:1), au para 78
    Harper v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 CSC 33 (CanLII), [2004] 1 RCS 827, par Bastarache J
  5. ↑ R c Bryan, 2007 CSC 12 (CanLII), [2007] 1 RCS 527, par Bastarache J
  6. ↑ , ibid.
    Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 CSC 66 (CanLII), [2004] 3 RCS 381, par Binnie J

Voir également

Récupérée de « https://carnetdroitpenal.ca/fr/index.php?title=Limitations_justifiables_des_droits&oldid=31681 »