« Réfutation et réponse » : différence entre les versions

{{CanLIIRP|KT|fx5wz|2013 ONCA 257 (CanLII)|295 CCC (3d) 283}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fx5wz|42}} ( {{Tr}}« The rule governing the order of proof in the context of a criminal trial prevents unfair surprise, prejudice, and confusion that could result if the Crown were allowed to split its case.  Were it not for this rule, the Crown could put in part of its evidence in its case-in-chief, enough to survive a motion for a directed verdict, allow the defence to play through with its case, then add further evidence to bolster the case presented in-chief")</ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Drake|g7c6d|1970 CanLII 577 (SK QB)|1 CCC (2d) 396}}{{perSKQB|MacPherson JA}} ( {{Tr}}« There is a well-known principle that evidence which is clearly relevant to the issues and within the possession of the Crown should be advanced by the Crown as part of its case, and such evidence cannot properly be admitted after the evidence of the defence by way of rebuttal. In other words, the law regards it as unfair for the Crown to lie in wait and to permit the accused to trap himself.")

{{ibid1|KT}}{{atL|fx5wz|43}} ( {{Tr}}« But the rule about the order of proof erects no absolute bar to the introduction of further evidence by the Crown after the defence has closed. The Crown may be permitted to call evidence in reply after completion of the defence case where ...[1] the defence has raised some new matter or defence with which the Crown had no opportunity to deal and that the Crown could not reasonably have anticipated; or...[2] some matter that emerged during the Crown’s case has taken on added significance as a result of evidence adduced in the defence case.")</ref>