« Intention » : différence entre les versions

Ligne 43 :

</ref>

Dans ses efforts pour assurer la paix et l’ordre, la société s’intéresse peu aux motivations de l’accusé derrière l’acte qu’il envisage.<ref>

{{CanLIIRPC|Dynar v United States|1fr0t|1997 CanLII 359 (CSC)|[1997] 2 RCS 462}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}} at para 81 ("It does not matter to society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank.")

{{CanLIIRPC|Dynar v United States|1fr0t|1997 CanLII 359 (CSC)|[1997] 2 RCS 462}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}} at para 81 ( {{Tr}}« It does not matter to society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank.")

</ref>

Ligne 67 :

; Absence de motif

Il existe une différence en droit entre une absence de preuve établissant un motif et une absence prouvée de motif.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Ali|jg41f|2021 ONCA 362 (CanLII)|156 OR (3d) 81}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|jg41f|121}} ("There is a well recognized difference between the absence of evidence of motive and a proved absence of motive")

{{CanLIIRP|Ali|jg41f|2021 ONCA 362 (CanLII)|156 OR (3d) 81}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|jg41f|121}} ( {{Tr}}« There is a well recognized difference between the absence of evidence of motive and a proved absence of motive")

{{CanLIIRP|Lewis|1mkv7|1979 CanLII 19 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 821}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (9:0){{atL|1mkv7|38}}

{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqk|2019 CSC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 RCS 579}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atsL|j0fqk|133| à 36}}

Ligne 107 :

; Intention générale

Lors de l'examen des infractions d'intention générale, l'attention est portée sur « l'intention appliquée aux actes considérés indépendamment de leurs objectifs ». Elle ne prend en compte que l'intention de « commettre un acte ».<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|The Queen v George|21vcd|1960 CanLII 45 (CSC)|[1960] RCS 871}}{{perSCC-H|Fauteux J}} at p 877 (SCR) ("In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime ... .")

{{CanLIIRP|The Queen v George|21vcd|1960 CanLII 45 (CSC)|[1960] RCS 871}}{{perSCC-H|Fauteux J}} at p 877 (SCR) ( {{Tr}}« In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime ... .")

</ref>

Autrement dit, il s'agit de l'intention qui est « appliquée aux actes accomplis pour atteindre une fin immédiate ». <Ref>

Ligne 117 :

Les actions d'intention générale comprennent celles qui sont des actes purement physiques produits par une « passion momentanée ». <ref>

{{ibid1|George}} at p. 890 (SCR) ("The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent")

{{ibid1|George}} at p. 890 (SCR) ( {{Tr}}« The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent")

</ref>

Ligne 150 :

</ref>

On dit qu'il y a une « concentration sur un objectif autre que celui immédiat ». <Ref>

{{supra1|Daley}} at para 35 ("Specific intent offences require the mind to focus on an objective further to the immediate one at hand")

{{supra1|Daley}} at para 35 ( {{Tr}}« Specific intent offences require the mind to focus on an objective further to the immediate one at hand")

</ref>

Ligne 213 :

</ref>

* une intention de produire un résultat.<ref>

{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ("a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused intend and bring about certain consequences, if the formation of that intent involves more complex thought and reasoning processes.")

{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ( {{Tr}}« a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused intend and bring about certain consequences, if the formation of that intent involves more complex thought and reasoning processes.")

</ref>

* connaissance des circonstances ou des conséquences de l'acte.<REf>

{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ("a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused have actual knowledge of certain circumstances or consequences, where the knowledge is the product of more complex thought and reasoning processes")

{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ( {{Tr}}« a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused have actual knowledge of certain circumstances or consequences, where the knowledge is the product of more complex thought and reasoning processes")

</ref>

Ligne 281 :

L’inférence de longue date selon laquelle une personne entend les conséquences naturelles de ses actes s’applique à de nombreuses situations.<ref>{{CanLIIRP|Missions|1knrn|2005 NSCA 82 (CanLII)|196 CCC (3d) 253}}{{perNSCA|Rosecoe JA}} (3:0){{atL|1knrn|21}}

{{CanLIIRP|Bergeron|ghbs4|2015 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 544}}{{perBCCA|Tysoe JA}} (3:0){{atsL|ghbs4|21| à 22}} ("It is well established that a trier of fact is entitled to draw the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.")

{{CanLIIRP|Bergeron|ghbs4|2015 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 544}}{{perBCCA|Tysoe JA}} (3:0){{atsL|ghbs4|21| à 22}} ( {{Tr}}« It is well established that a trier of fact is entitled to draw the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.")

{{CanLIIRP|Starratt|g19d0|1971 CanLII 541 (ON CA)|5 CCC (2d) 32 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Gale CJ}}{{atL|g19d0|3}}

See {{CanLIIRP|Giannotti|g14q9|1956 CanLII 160 (ON CA)|115 CCC 203}}{{perONCA|Roach JA}}

@@ Ligne 43 : / Ligne 43 : @@
 </ref>
 Dans ses efforts pour assurer la paix et l’ordre, la société s’intéresse peu aux motivations de l’accusé derrière l’acte qu’il envisage.<ref>
-{{CanLIIRPC|Dynar v United States|1fr0t|1997 CanLII 359 (CSC)|[1997] 2 RCS 462}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}} at para 81 ("It does not matter to society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank.")<Br>
+{{CanLIIRPC|Dynar v United States|1fr0t|1997 CanLII 359 (CSC)|[1997] 2 RCS 462}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}} at para 81 ( {{Tr}}« It does not matter to society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank.")<Br>
 {{CanLIIRP|Hamilton|1l86r|2005 CSC 47|[2005] 2 S.C.R. 432}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atsL|1l86r|38| à 45}}
 </ref>
@@ Ligne 67 : / Ligne 67 : @@
 ; Absence de motif
 Il existe une différence en droit entre une absence de preuve établissant un motif et une absence prouvée de motif.<ref>
-{{CanLIIRP|Ali|jg41f|2021 ONCA 362 (CanLII)|156 OR (3d) 81}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|jg41f|121}} ("There is a well recognized difference between the absence of evidence of motive and a proved absence of motive")<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Ali|jg41f|2021 ONCA 362 (CanLII)|156 OR (3d) 81}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|jg41f|121}} ( {{Tr}}« There is a well recognized difference between the absence of evidence of motive and a proved absence of motive")<Br>
 {{CanLIIRP|Lewis|1mkv7|1979 CanLII 19 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 821}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (9:0){{atL|1mkv7|38}}<br>
 {{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqk|2019 CSC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 RCS 579}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atsL|j0fqk|133| à 36}}<br>
@@ Ligne 107 : / Ligne 107 : @@
 ; Intention générale
 Lors de l'examen des infractions d'intention générale, l'attention est portée sur « l'intention appliquée aux actes considérés indépendamment de leurs objectifs ». Elle ne prend en compte que l'intention de « commettre un acte ».<ref>
-{{CanLIIRP|The Queen v George|21vcd|1960 CanLII 45 (CSC)|[1960] RCS 871}}{{perSCC-H|Fauteux J}} at p 877 (SCR) ("In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime ... .")
+{{CanLIIRP|The Queen v George|21vcd|1960 CanLII 45 (CSC)|[1960] RCS 871}}{{perSCC-H|Fauteux J}} at p 877 (SCR) ( {{Tr}}« In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime ... .")
 </ref>
 Autrement dit, il s'agit de l'intention qui est « appliquée aux actes accomplis pour atteindre une fin immédiate ». <Ref>
@@ Ligne 117 : / Ligne 117 : @@
 Les actions d'intention générale comprennent celles qui sont des actes purement physiques produits par une « passion momentanée ». <ref>
-{{ibid1|George}} at p. 890 (SCR) ("The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent")<br>
+{{ibid1|George}} at p. 890 (SCR) ( {{Tr}}« The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent")<br>
 </ref>
@@ Ligne 150 : / Ligne 150 : @@
 </ref>
 On dit qu'il y a une « concentration sur un objectif autre que celui immédiat ». <Ref>
-{{supra1|Daley}} at para 35 ("Specific intent offences require the mind to focus on an objective further to the immediate one at hand")
+{{supra1|Daley}} at para 35 ( {{Tr}}« Specific intent offences require the mind to focus on an objective further to the immediate one at hand")
 </ref>
@@ Ligne 213 : / Ligne 213 : @@
 </ref>
 * une intention de produire un résultat.<ref>
-{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ("a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused intend and bring about certain consequences, if the formation of that intent involves more complex thought and reasoning processes.")
+{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ( {{Tr}}« a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused intend and bring about certain consequences, if the formation of that intent involves more complex thought and reasoning processes.")
 </ref>
 * connaissance des circonstances ou des conséquences de l'acte.<REf>
-{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ("a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused have actual knowledge of certain circumstances or consequences, where the knowledge is the product of more complex thought and reasoning processes")
+{{supra1|Tatton (ONCA)}}{{atL|g6g9d|38}} ( {{Tr}}« a heightened mental element could take the form of a requirement that the accused have actual knowledge of certain circumstances or consequences, where the knowledge is the product of more complex thought and reasoning processes")
 </ref>
@@ Ligne 281 : / Ligne 281 : @@
 L’inférence de longue date selon laquelle une personne entend les conséquences naturelles de ses actes s’applique à de nombreuses situations.<ref>{{CanLIIRP|Missions|1knrn|2005 NSCA 82 (CanLII)|196 CCC (3d) 253}}{{perNSCA|Rosecoe JA}} (3:0){{atL|1knrn|21}}<br>
-{{CanLIIRP|Bergeron|ghbs4|2015 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 544}}{{perBCCA|Tysoe JA}} (3:0){{atsL|ghbs4|21| à 22}} ("It is well established that a trier of fact is entitled to draw the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.")<br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Bergeron|ghbs4|2015 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 544}}{{perBCCA|Tysoe JA}} (3:0){{atsL|ghbs4|21| à 22}} ( {{Tr}}« It is well established that a trier of fact is entitled to draw the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.")<br>
 {{CanLIIRP|Starratt|g19d0|1971 CanLII 541 (ON CA)|5 CCC (2d) 32 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Gale CJ}}{{atL|g19d0|3}}<br>
 See {{CanLIIRP|Giannotti|g14q9|1956 CanLII 160 (ON CA)|115 CCC 203}}{{perONCA|Roach JA}}<br>

« Intention » : différence entre les versions

« Intention » : différence entre les versions