Le carnet de droit pénal

« Problèmes de fouille informatique » : différence entre les versions

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Les mandats de perquisition en vertu de l'article 487 constituent la manière la plus courante d'autoriser un agent à examiner le contenu d'un ordinateur.<ref>
Les mandats de perquisition en vertu de l'article 487 constituent la manière la plus courante d'autoriser un agent à examiner le contenu d'un ordinateur.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Blazevic|5qng|2011 ONSC 7549 (CanLII)|213 AR 285}}{{perONSC|PJL Smith J}}{{atL|5qng|32}}, ("the police have the right to search computers with a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to assist them in uncovering evidence associated with an offence.")
{{CanLIIRP|Blazevic|5qng|2011 ONSC 7549 (CanLII)|213 AR 285}}{{perONSC|PJL Smith J}}{{atL|5qng|32}}, ( {{Tr}}« the police have the right to search computers with a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to assist them in uncovering evidence associated with an offence.")
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; Adresse IP et RPG à rechercher
; Adresse IP et RPG à rechercher
La connexion d'une adresse IP à un compte FAI peut constituer un motif raisonnable de croire qu'un ordinateur sera présent à l'adresse, mais il faudra souvent quelque chose de plus.<ref>
La connexion d'une adresse IP à un compte FAI peut constituer un motif raisonnable de croire qu'un ordinateur sera présent à l'adresse, mais il faudra souvent quelque chose de plus.<ref>
voir {{CanLIIRP|Weir|5rdq|2001 ABCA 181 (CanLII)|156 CCC (3d) 188}}{{TheCourtABCA}} ("While it is possible that the computer may have been at a different location than the billing address, it was not unreasonable to conclude that something as sensitive as child pornography would be kept on a computer in a person’s home.")</ref>
voir {{CanLIIRP|Weir|5rdq|2001 ABCA 181 (CanLII)|156 CCC (3d) 188}}{{TheCourtABCA}} ( {{Tr}}« While it is possible that the computer may have been at a different location than the billing address, it was not unreasonable to conclude that something as sensitive as child pornography would be kept on a computer in a person’s home.")</ref>


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Omission de prendre des notes, mais rien n'empêche l'accusé de {{Tr}}« contester de manière significative » la fouille.<ref>
Omission de prendre des notes, mais rien n'empêche l'accusé de {{Tr}}« contester de manière significative » la fouille.<ref>
{{CanLIIRT|Villaroman|hsmnh|2018 ABCA 220 (CanLII)|363 CCC (3d) 141 }}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) {{AtL|hsmnh|17}} ("The forensic examiner testified at length about how he conducted the search. The failure to take detailed notes does not appear to have undermined the appellant’s ability to meaningfully challenge the reasonableness of the search.") appealed on different grounds at 2016 CSC 33.
{{CanLIIRT|Villaroman|hsmnh|2018 ABCA 220 (CanLII)|363 CCC (3d) 141 }}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) {{AtL|hsmnh|17}} ( {{Tr}}« The forensic examiner testified at length about how he conducted the search. The failure to take detailed notes does not appear to have undermined the appellant’s ability to meaningfully challenge the reasonableness of the search.") appealed on different grounds at 2016 CSC 33.
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La police peut examiner les fichiers informatiques qui lui sont présentés dans le cadre d'une plainte sans faire appel à l'article 8 de la Charte. Il n'existe aucune obligation de se renseigner sur la manière dont le plaignant a obtenu les dossiers.<Ref>
La police peut examiner les fichiers informatiques qui lui sont présentés dans le cadre d'une plainte sans faire appel à l'article 8 de la Charte. Il n'existe aucune obligation de se renseigner sur la manière dont le plaignant a obtenu les dossiers.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|King|jh781|2021 ABCA 271 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|King|jh781|2021 ABCA 271 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Orlandis-Habsburgo|h59h9|2017 ONCA 649 (CanLII)|352 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|h59h9|34}} ("I have considerable difficulty with the submission that s. 8 is engaged if the police look at information in which an accused has a legitimate privacy interest, even if that information is brought to the police by an independent third party acting on its own initiative. On that approach, s. 8 would be engaged if a "whistleblower" took confidential documents belonging to her employer to the police to demonstrate the employer's criminal activity. Must the police refuse to look at the documents to avoid violating the employer's s. 8 rights? As Duarte teaches, it is one thing to say that Canadian values dictate that the state's power to decide when and how it will intrude upon personal privacy must be carefully circumscribed, and quite another to say that an individual's private information is cloaked in the protection of s. 8 no matter how that information comes to the police.")
{{CanLIIRP|Orlandis-Habsburgo|h59h9|2017 ONCA 649 (CanLII)|352 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|h59h9|34}} ( {{Tr}}« I have considerable difficulty with the submission that s. 8 is engaged if the police look at information in which an accused has a legitimate privacy interest, even if that information is brought to the police by an independent third party acting on its own initiative. On that approach, s. 8 would be engaged if a "whistleblower" took confidential documents belonging to her employer to the police to demonstrate the employer's criminal activity. Must the police refuse to look at the documents to avoid violating the employer's s. 8 rights? As Duarte teaches, it is one thing to say that Canadian values dictate that the state's power to decide when and how it will intrude upon personal privacy must be carefully circumscribed, and quite another to say that an individual's private information is cloaked in the protection of s. 8 no matter how that information comes to the police.")
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Les rapports d'extraction de téléphones portables sont principalement classés comme des {{Tr}}« preuves réelles ».<ref>
Les rapports d'extraction de téléphones portables sont principalement classés comme des {{Tr}}« preuves réelles ».<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Bernard|h3w44|2016 NSSC 358 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Gogan J}}{{atL|h3w44|26}} ("I find that the content of both Exhibits 9 and 10 [full extraction reports] are electronic real evidence.")
{{CanLIIRx|Bernard|h3w44|2016 NSSC 358 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Gogan J}}{{atL|h3w44|26}} ( {{Tr}}« I find that the content of both Exhibits 9 and 10 [full extraction reports] are electronic real evidence.")
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Ces résultats d'extraction ne nécessitent pas de tests ou de vérifications indépendants puisqu'ils copient et organisent simplement les données trouvées sur l'appareil sans tirer de conclusions.<ref>
Ces résultats d'extraction ne nécessitent pas de tests ou de vérifications indépendants puisqu'ils copient et organisent simplement les données trouvées sur l'appareil sans tirer de conclusions.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Miro|gvzx6|2016 ONSC 4982 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Fitzpatrick J}}{{atL|gvzx6|39}} ("The software and devices he used copied or removed files out of the seized devices and then organized them so D/C Dunhill, and not the software, could draw conclusions about what was present.")
{{CanLIIRx|Miro|gvzx6|2016 ONSC 4982 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Fitzpatrick J}}{{atL|gvzx6|39}} ( {{Tr}}« The software and devices he used copied or removed files out of the seized devices and then organized them so D/C Dunhill, and not the software, could draw conclusions about what was present.")
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Récupérée de "https://carnetdroitpenal.ca/fr/index.php/Problèmes_de_fouille_informatique"