« Complot (infraction) » : différence entre les versions

|CrownElection= {{OBIndictableElection}} (465(1)(b) and (c))<br> {{OBSummaryElection}} (465(1)(d))  

|Jurisdiction=s. 465(1)(b), (c):<br>{{OBJurisdictionAll}}<br>art. 465(1)(a):<br>{{OBJurisdictionExclusive}}<br>art.465(1)(d):<br>{{OBJurisdictionSumm}}  

|IndictableMax= {{OBTime|5, 10 years}} or {{OBMaxLife}} }}

{{PleadingsExclusive|art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}} }}

{{PleadingsIndictElection|art. 465(1)(b) and (c)}}

{{PleadingsSummary|art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}}}}

|art. 465(1)(a), (b) || {{ReleaseProfile-Indictable}}  

|art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}} || {{ReleaseProfile-Hybrid}}  

{{ReleaseOptions-Indictable|art. 465(1)(a), (b)}}

{{ReleaseOptions-Hybrid|art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}} }}

|art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}},<br>art. 465(1)(b)(i) {{DescrSec|465(1)(b)(i)}},<br>art. 465(1)(b)(ii) {{DescrSec|465(1)(b)(ii)}},<br>art. 465(1)(c) {{DescrSec|465(1)(c)}},<br>art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}}  || {{OKMark}} <!--wire--> || {{OKMark}} <!--DO-->||{{OKMark}} <!--SPIO--> || {{XMark}} <!--consent--> || {{OKMark}}

{{removed|(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7)}}

|"{{ellipsis1}} contrary to section 465{{CCC}}."

|"{{ellipsis1}} contrary to section 466{{CCC}}."

# {{box}} les parties avaient l'intention de s'entendre pour mettre à exécution un « projet commun » et ont effectivement accepté

L'objectif de la criminalisation des complots est d'« empêcher qu'un objectif illicite » ne soit atteint et ensuite d'« empêcher qu'un préjudice grave ne se produise ». Le Parlement avait l'intention d'intervenir « plus tôt dans le continuum du danger accru représenté par une cohorte de malfaiteurs agissant de concert ».<ref>{{CanLIIRP|Dery|1q1ht|2006 CSC 53 (CanLII)|[2006] 2 RCS 669}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|1q1ht|44}}<br>  

{{CanLIIRP|Meyer|fvj4v|2012 ONCJ 791 (CanLII)|[2012] OJ No 6235}}{{perONCJ|Pacciocco J}}{{atL|fvj4v|21}}("The law of conspiracy achieves this policy [of preventing serious harm from occurring] by allowing a pre-emptive strike where there is a true agreement to achieve a mutual criminal objective.")

Il doit y avoir une « intention de s'entendre, la conclusion d'un accord et un projet commun ».<ref>

La Couronne n'a qu'à prouver qu'il y a eu « une réunion des volontés en vue d'un projet commun de faire quelque chose d'illégal ».<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Carter|1z1c7|1982 CanLII 35 (CSC)|[1982] 1 RCS 938}}{{perSCC-H|juge McIntyre}}</ref>

Une conspiration doit comprendre (1) un accord et (2) l’objectif illégal ou le « projet commun ».<ref>

{{supra1|O'Brien}}{{atsL|21v9k|2| à 3}}, ("It is of course, essential that the conspirators have the intention to agree, and this agreement must be complete ... there must exist an intention to put the common design into effect.")<br>

{{supra1|O'Brien}}{{atL|21v9k|4}} ("The law punishes conspiracy so that the unlawful object is not attained. It considers that several persons who agree together to commit an unlawful act, are a menace to society, and even if they do nothing in furtherance of their common design, the state intervenes to exercise a repressive action, so that the intention is not materialized, and does not become harmful to any one.")

{{supra1|Dynar}}{{atL|1fr0t|105}} (Il n'est pas pertinent de savoir si « d'un point de vue objectif, la perpétration de l'infraction peut être impossible. »)</ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Papalia|1tx7p|1979 CanLII 38 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 256}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} ("The essence of criminal conspiracy is proof of agreement...")

An agreement can be implied or tacit. It requires a meeting of the minds to create a common intention to commit an offence.

The parties must have knowledge of a common goal and agreement to achieve it.<ref>

{{CanLIIRPC|Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. v Canada (Attorney General)|1z493|1980 CanLII 226 (CSC)|54 CCC (2d) 373, [1980] 2 RCS 644}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}}</ref>

There must be a "consensus to effect an unlawful purpose."<ref>

{{supra2|1tx7p|Papalia}} (“two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. ”)<br>

It is not enough that there be a common intention.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|O'Brien|21v9k|1954 CanLII 42|[1954] RCS 666}}{{perSCC|Taschereau J}}</ref>  

Nor is passive acquiescence to a criminal plan sufficient<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|McNamara|gd1kv|1981 CanLII 3120 (ON CA)|56 CCC (2d) 193}}{{TheCourtONCA}} at 452 ("Mere knowledge of, discussion of or passive acquiescence in a plan of criminal conduct is not, of itself, sufficient")

, knowledge of the plan<ref>

, or nor wilful blindness.

It is not a "formal agreement" and may be implicit.<ref>

Where there is a pre-existing conspiracy, the accused must have adopted it or consented to participate in achieving the goal.<ref>

A conditional agreement can still be an agreement.<ref>

The charge must identify the crime(s) planned.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Saunders|1fsvd|1990 CanLII 1131 (CSC)|[1990] 1 RCS 1020}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}</ref>

And it should generally identify the co-conspirators.<ref>

It is a valid defence to establish that the accused pretended to agree to the conspiracy.<ref>

The trier of fact must find "that the accused intended to enter into the agreement."<ref>

Conspiracy cannot be committed by way of an accused being reckless as to the object of the agreement.<ref>

{{supra1|Lamontagne}}{{atp|576}} "one notes that the crime of conspiracy cannot be committed by mere recklessness as to the object of the agreement")<br>

However, the accused can be liable where he is reckless as to the method of execution of the agreement.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Park|2524l|2009 ABQB 470 (CanLII)|465 AR 20}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}} ("recklessness may only be applied with respect to the method of execution of the agreement")<br>

Willful blindness can satisfy the ''mens rea'' requirement of conspiracy.<ref>

{{supra2|2524l|Park}} ("The ''mens rea'' requirement for conspiracy may be satisfied where willful blindness is established")<br>

A party to an offence, including conspiracy "must have some knowledge of the essential nature of the offence to be committed, but not necessarily knowledge of all the details."<ref>

{{supra2|2524l|Park}}{{atps|569 to 571}}<br>

Evidence of "how" the agreement is to be carried out, specifically to over acts to be taken are elements to the agreement element of the offence.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Douglas|1fsnr|1991 CanLII 81 (CSC)|[1991] 1 RCS 301}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fsnr|28}} ("How that agreement is to be  carried out, that is to say, the steps taken in furtherance of the agreement (the overt acts) are simply elements going to the proof of the essential ingredient of the offence, namely the agreement.")

===Common Design===

There must be a "a common plan with a common objective."<ref>  

{{CanLIIRP|Cotroni, (sub nom. Papalia)|1tx7p|1979 CanLII 38 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 256}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}

The Crown must establish that the accused had an intention to become a party to the common design with the knowledge of its implications.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Papalia|1tx7p|1979 CanLII 38 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 256}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (“In addition to proof of common design, it was incumbent on the Crown to establish that each accused had the intention to become a party to that common design with knowledge of its implications.”)

It is not required that it be proven that every member of the conspiracy be involved in its execution or that they were involved throughout the entire time. It is enough if the evidence "demonstrates that the conspiracy proven included some of the accused; establishes that it occurred at some time within the time frame alleged in the indictment; and had as its object the type of crime alleged."<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Douglas|1fsnr|1991 CanLII 81 (CSC)|[1991] 1 RCS 301}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fsnr|41}}<br>

{{CanLIIRP|Papalia|1tx7p|1979 CanLII 38 (CSC)|[1979] 2 RCS 256}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} ("The essence of criminal conspiracy is proof of agreement...")<br>

A member of a conspiracy who refuses to execute the plan is still guilty.<ref>

Involvement in only part of a whole plan will still be found guilty.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Shirose|1fqp4|1999 CanLII 676 (CSC)|[1999] 1 RCS 565}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}</ref>

An accused cannot be convicted for attempted conspiracy.<ref>

===Evidence===

Words of the co-conspirator are admissible against the accused. They are not hearsay and are rather the actus reus.<ref>  

{{CanLIIR-N|Cook|(1984), 39 CR (3d) 300}} aff'd in [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftv8 1986 CanLII 47] (CSC), [1986] 1 RCS 144{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}</ref>

Further, the co-conspirators exception to hearsay makes statements admissible against the accused.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Perciballi|1fbs7|2001 CanLII 13394|154 CCC (3d) 481}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}} aff'd in [http://canlii.ca/t/51ss 2002 CSC 51] (CanLII){{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}<br>

Statements by the co-conspirator that are not related to the conspiracy are not admissible against the accused.<ref>

===Aiding and Abetting===

There has been a divided line of case law on whether a conviction can be made for being a party to a conspiracy.<ref>

{{CanLIIRP|Park|2524l|2009 ABQB 470 (CanLII)|465 AR 20}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}}{{atps|540 to 575}}<br>

The members of a conspiracy do not need to all play an equal role in the endeavour, nor do they need to personally commit the offence they have agreed. Any degree of assistance can create membership.<Ref>

{{CanLIIRP|JF|fwb36|2013 CSC 12 (CanLII)|[2013] 1 RCS 565}}{{perSCC| J}}{{atL|fwb36|54}} (...it is not necessary that all members of a conspiracy play, or intend to play, equal roles in the ultimate commission of the unlawful object.  Indeed, members in a conspiracy need not personally commit, or intend to commit, the offence which each has agreed should be committed:... Any degree of assistance in the furtherance of the unlawful object can lead to a finding of membership as long as agreement to a common plan can be inferred and the requisite mental state has been established.")<br>

{{removed|(1) and (2)}}

1998, ch. 35, art. 121;

|art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}},<br>art. 465(1)(b)(i) {{DescrSec|465(1)(b)(i)}},<br>art. 465(1)(b)(ii) {{DescrSec|465(1)(b)(ii)}},<br>art. 465(1)(c) {{DescrSec|465(1)(c)}},<br>art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}} || || ||

{{SProfileMax|art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}} | {{NA}} | {{MaxLife}} }}

{{SProfileMax|s.  465(1)(b)(i) {{DescrSec| 465(1)(b)(i)}} | {{NA}} | {{Max10Years}} }}

{{SProfileMax|s.  465(1)(b)(ii) {{DescrSec| 465(1)(b)(ii)}} | {{NA}} | {{Max5Years}} }}

{{SProfileMax|s.  465(1)(d) {{DescrSec| 465(1)(d)}} | {{NA}} | {{MaxSummary}} }}

{{MaxPenaltyIndictment|art. 465(1)(a), (b), and (c)|'''{{MaxLife}}''' under s. 465(1)(a), ''''{{Max10Years}}''' under s. 465(1)(b)(i), and '''{{Max5Years}}''' under s. 465(1)(b)(ii)}} Where prosecuted under s. 465(1)(c) the maximum penalty will match that of the index offence.

{{MaxPenaltySummary|art. 465(1)(d)|'''{{summaryconviction}}'''}}

|art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}} || {{NA}} || {{SProfileNoDischargeOrCSO}}

|art. 465(1)(d) {{DescrSec|465(1)(d)}}|| {{NA}} || {{SProfileAll}}

{{NoDischargeAvailable|art. 465(1)(a)}}

{{NoCSOAvailable|C|art. 465(1)(a)}}

| [[Ordonnances ADN]] ||art. 465(1)(b)(i), (ii) ||

* {{SecondDNA(AorB)|art. 465(1)(b)(i),(ii)}}

| [[Admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle différée|Ordonnance de libération conditionnelle différée]] ||art. 465(1)(a) {{DescrSec|465(1)(a)}} ||

* {{ParoleDelayEligible|1|art. 465(1)(a) [conspiracy to commit murder]}}