« Ajournements » : différence entre les versions

;Ajournement à la demande du juge

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 31

{{removed|(2), (3) et (4)}}

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 803; {{LegHistory90s|1991, ch. 43}}, art. 9;  

{{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 79;  

{{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 112;

; Ajournement

{{removed|(1.01), (1.02), (1.1), (2), (3) et (4)}}

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 537; {{LegHistory90s|1991, ch. 43}}, art. 9; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 53; {{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 64;

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 571;

L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 203

Le terme {{Tr}}« juge » aux fins de l'art. 571, qui se trouve dans la partie XIX, est défini à l'art. 552 comme un {{Tr}}« juge de la cour supérieure ».<ref>

{{removed|(1), (1.1), (1.2) et (2)}}

{{removed|(4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) et (5)}}

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 606;

L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 125;

{{removed|(4) et (5)}}

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 645;

L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 133; {{LegHistory90s|1997, ch. 18}}, art. 76;

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, ch. 44}}, art. 31

{{CanLIIRx|Gerlitz|gdt09|2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}{{atL|gdt09|21}} ( {{Tr}}« The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations» )<br>

{{CanLIIRP|Toor|5rkh|2001 ABCA 88 (CanLII)|155 CCC (3d) 345}}{{perABCA|Paperny JA}} (alone){{atL|5rkh|15}} ("[t]he granting of adjournments and the exercise of judicial discretion are generally afforded a considerable degree of deference, and the law is well established in the area.» )<br>

{{supra1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« On an appeal from a refusal it would appear that a court of appeal will not find the learned trial judge erred notwithstanding his reasons may not be fully articulated if the record discloses evidence from which it can be inferred that the absence of counsel was brought about by the accused for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.» )

{{supra1|JCG}}{{atsL|230fz|12| à 13}} ( {{Tr}}« ...“the gravity of the charge, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the Crown and for the accused» )<br>

Le juge peut également tenir compte de la {{Tr}}« personnalité et des compétences » de l'accusé.<Ref>

{{CanLIIRP|EWB|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0) ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>

{{ibid1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )<br>

{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« The right to counsel at trial is not absolute» )<br>

{{supra1|Beals}} (3:0) ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>

{{ibid1|EWB}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.» )<br>

{{infra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} (in upholding refusal the SKCA said "We are all of the view the appellants were not deprived of their right to a fair trial or their right to make full answer in defence and there was no miscarriage of justice.» )

{{CanLIIRP|Rak|1l76t|1999 CanLII 12229 (SK CA)|172 Sask R 301 (CA)}}{{perSKCA|Lane JA}}{{atL|1l76t|7}} ( {{Tr}}« The appellants had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and their refusal to cooperate with counsel led to a refusal of Legal Aid.  The failure to have counsel did not result in an unfair trial.  Gregory Rak handled the defence rather adroitly on his own and his father’s behalf and was effective in his cross-examination.  He demonstrated a clear ability to understand the documentary evidence.  As well the trial judge was extremely helpful to the appellants throughout the course of the trial.» )

{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings» )<br>

{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter» )

{{supra1|Rak}}{{atL|1l76t|2}} ( {{Tr}}« The standard of review of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in refusing an adjournment may be reviewed by an appellate court “if it is based upon reasons that are not well-founded in law and results in a deprivation of the accused’s right to make full answer in defence” ... the right to make full answer in defence “must be weighed conscientiously and delicately along with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice”.» )

{{supra1|Beals}} ( {{Tr}}« The scope of review by an appeal court of a refusal, notwithstanding it involves the review of the exercise of a discretionary power, is wide as the consequences of a refusal are to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel. On appeal the appellant must show that in refusing the adjournment the trial judge deprived the appellant of his right to make full answer and defence and thus made an error in principle which constituted a miscarriage of justice (Barrette v R. and Manhas v R., supra).» )