« Inférences » : différence entre les versions

{{CanLIIRx|Wheyee|j1k8v|2019 ABQB 548 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Horner J}}{{atL|j1k8v|98}} ( {{Tr}}« There the court describes that drawing of inferences as a product of inductive reasoning which derives conclusions based on the uniformity of prior human experience. An inference is a deduction of fact which may be logically or reasonably drawn from another set of established facts. However, it is a conclusion that may, not must, be drawn, depending on the court’s weighing of the whole of the evidence.» )<br>

Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence 2023 at para 12.01 ( {{Tr}}« An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the proceedings. It is a conclusion that may, not must be drawn in the circumstances.» )

{{supra1|Wheyee}}{{AtL|j1k8v|99}} ( {{Tr}}« Drawing inferences can be described as a two-step process. The first step is to find that the facts from which the inference is to be drawn have been proven in the trial. If not then any inference is of necessity nothing more than speculation. The second step is to make an inference from the proven facts that is reasonable, rational and logical» )<br>

{{supra1|Wheyee}}{{AtL|j1k8v|99}} (" Drawing inferences can be described as a two-step process. The first step is to find that the facts from which the inference is to be drawn have been proven in the trial. If not then any inference is of necessity nothing more than speculation.» )

{{CanLIIRP|Torrie|g16lb|1967 CanLII 285 (ON CA)|[1967] 3 CCC 303}}{{perONCA|Evans JA}}{{Atp|306}} ( {{Tr}}« I recognize that the onus of proof must rest with the Crown to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, but I do not understand this proposition to mean that the Crown must negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused.» )<br>

{{UKCase|Caswell v Powell Duffy Associated Collieries Ltd.|, [1940] A.C.}}{{atp|169}} ( {{Tr}}« ...inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation and there can be no inferences unless there are objective facts from which to infer other facts which it is sought to establish.» )<br>

{{CanLIIRP|Lukianchuk|1hq6f|2001 BCSC 119 (CanLII)|[2001] BCJ No 3000}}{{perONSC|Romilly J}}{{AtL|1hq6f|19}}: ( {{Tr}}« The criminal law requires a very high degree of proof especially for inferences consistent with guilt, but it does not demand certainty.» )

; Inférences de ''mens rea''

Les inférences sont fréquemment utilisées pour établir la ''mens rea'' d'une infraction d'[[intention|intention]], de [[connaissance et aveuglement volontaire|connaissance]] ou d'[[connaissance et aveuglement volontaire|aveuglement volontaire]].

La règle de Hodge ne s'applique pas pour déterminer la ''mens rea'' d'une infraction.<ref>

voir également {{CanLIIRP|Walle|fs5k7|2012 CSC 41 (CanLII)|[2012] 2 RCS 438}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}} (7:0){{atL|fs5k7|64}} (“a person usually knows what the predictable consequences of his or her actions are, and means to bring them about”» )<Br>

{{CanLIIRP|Durocher|j2ll1|2019 SKCA 97 (CanLII)|SJ No 367}}{{perSKCA|Schwann JA}}{{atL|j2ll1|47}} ( {{Tr}}« R v J.V., 2015 ONCJ 837, held that, for the purposes of the Evans test, authorship can be inferred circumstantially through “such things as the source of the information, access to the relevant email or social media address, the disclosure of details known to the purported author and the nature of the exchanges between the parties …” (at para 3).» )

{{CanLIIRP|Evans|1frzr|1993 CanLII 86 (CSC)|[1993] 3 RCS 653}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} ( {{Tr}}« ...in respect of the authenticity of admissions... [i]f there is some evidence to permit the issue to be submitted to the trier of fact, the matter must be considered in two stages.  First, a preliminary determination must be made as to whether, on the basis of evidence admissible against the accused, the Crown has established on a balance of probabilities that the statement is that of the accused.  If this threshold is met, the trier of fact should then consider the contents of the statement along with other evidence to determine the issue of innocence or guilt.  While the contents of the statement may only be considered for the limited purpose to which I have referred above in the first stage, in the second stage the contents are evidence of the truth of the assertions contained therein.» )

{{CanLIIRP|JC|jdj61|2021 ONCA 131 (CanLII)|70 CR (7th) 38}}{{perONCA|Paciocco JA}}{{AtL|jdj61|58}} ( {{Tr}}« The first such rule is that judges must avoid speculative reasoning that invokes “common-sense” assumptions that are not grounded in the evidence or appropriately supported by judicial notice» )<br>

{{CanLIIR-N|Fuller| (1971), 1 N.R. 112 at 114}} per Hall JA, ("[t]he tribunal of fact cannot resort to speculative and conjectural conclusions» )<br>

{{CanLIIRP|Chanmany|gskjd|2016 ONCA 576 (CanLII)|338 CCC (3d) 578}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{AtL|gskjd|45}} ( {{Tr}}« An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established at trial. There cannot be an inference without objective facts from which to infer the fact or facts a party seeks to establish.» )

{{supra1|JC}} at para 61 ( {{Tr}}« Properly understood, the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions does not bar using human experience about human behaviour to interpret evidence. It prohibits judges from using “common-sense” or human experience to introduce new considerations, not arising from evidence, into the decision-making process, including considerations about human behaviour.» )