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{{Fr|Demandes_de_Charte}} | |||
{{Currency2|December|2022}} | |||
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderPreTrial}} | |||
==General Principles== | |||
{{seealso|Constitutional Challenges to Legislation|Applications and Motions Procedure}} | |||
A Charter motion is a defence application alleging a breach of a provision {{CCRF}}. | |||
; Who Can Raise | |||
Where the defence have not made application to challenge the reasonable grounds to that underly police action such as a breath demand, there is no obligation on the Crown to present any evidence that underlies the authority that was executed.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Charette|234f1|2009 ONCA 310 (CanLII)|243 CCC (3d) 480}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atsL|234f1|48| to 49}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
In certain circumstances, trial judges may have a duty to raise a charter issue on behalf of the accused, particularly where they are self-represented.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Travers|4v5c|2001 NSCA 71 (CanLII)|154 CCC (3d) 426}}{{perNSCA|Oland JA}}</ref> | |||
However, interference of the judge by raising a Charter issue against the intent of counsel may amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Youngpine|22z72|2009 ABCA 89 (CanLII)|242 CCC (3d) 441}}{{perABCA|Fraser CJ}}</ref> | |||
; Proper Court | |||
A Charter application must be heard by a "court of competent jurisdiction". This is a court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person and the remedy.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Hynes|51xk|2001 SCC 82 (CanLII)|[2001] 3 SCR 623}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}</ref> | |||
This will generally be the trial judge.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Rahey|1ftp7|1987 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 588}}{{Plurality}}</ref> | |||
However, it will ''not'' include a preliminary inquiry judge.<ref> | |||
Hynes</ref> | |||
A superior court has "constant, complete and concurrent jurisdiction with the trial court for applications under s. 24(1) of the Charter."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Blencowe|1w4vv|1997 CanLII 12287 (ON SC)|118 CCC (3d) 529 }}{{perONSC|Watt J}} | |||
</ref> | |||
; Territorial Jurisdiction | |||
The Charter does not apply to Canadian authorities outside of Canada except when:<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Tan|g2k9x|2014 BCCA 9 (CanLII)|299 CRR (2d) 73}}{{perBCCA| Bennett JA}} | |||
</ref> | |||
# the foreign jurisdiction consents to its application; or | |||
# the do cut of the Canadian authorities violates international human rights obligations. | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Standard of Appellate Review=== | |||
A finding of a Charter violation deserves deference absent a palpable and overriding error.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Hills|j8l7j|2020 ABCA 263 (CanLII)|2 WWR 31}}{{atL|j8l7j|12}} (“ A finding that a Charter right has or has not been violated deserves deference absent an overriding and palpable error.”) | |||
</ref> | |||
The interpretation of the scope of a right is a question of law and is reviewable without reference.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Hills}} at 12 (“Whether a first-instance judge correctly interpreted the scope of the right is a question of law and this Court is free to substitute its opinion: R v Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121 at para 15, 327 AR 320.“) | |||
</ref> | |||
The standard of review on appeal for constitutional questions is on the standard of correctness.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRC|Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov|j46kb|2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|j46kb|53}} | |||
</ref> | |||
A decision in relation to an alleged Charter breach is reviewable on a standard that varies depending on the nature of the appeal:<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR|West||2012 NSCA 112 (CanLII)}}<Br> | |||
{{CanLIIR|Farrah (D.)||2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII)}}{{perMBCA|Chartier JA}}<Br> | |||
{{CanLIIR|Boliver||2014 NSCA 99 (CanLII)}} at para. 10<br> | |||
{{CanLIIR|REW||2011 NSCA 18 (CanLII)}} at paras. 30 – 33<br> | |||
{{CanLIIR|Mian||2014 SCC 54 (CanLII)}}, at para. 77<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
# "When examining a judge's decision on whether a Charter breach occurred, the appellate court will review the decision to ensure that the correct legal principles were stated and that there was no misdirection in their application. This raises questions of law and the standard of review is correctness." | |||
# "The appellate court will then review the evidentiary foundation which forms the basis for the judge's decision to see whether there was an error. On this part of the review, the judge's decision is entitled to more deference and, absent palpable and overriding error, the facts as found by the judge should not be disturbed" | |||
# "The appellate court will also examine the application of the legal principles to the facts of the case to see if the facts, as found by the judge, satisfy the correct legal test. In the criminal law context, this is a question of law and the standard of review is correctness" | |||
# "The decision on whether to exclude under s. 24(2) of the Charter is an admissibility of evidence issue which is a question of law. However, because this determination requires the judge to exercise some discretion, "considerable deference" is owed to the judge's s. 24(2) assessment when the appropriate factors have been considered." | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
The onus of proof is upon the party advancing the motion.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Currie|21f9l|2008 ABCA 374 (CanLII)|446 AR 41}}{{perABCA|Côté JA}}{{atL|21f9l|39}}</ref> | |||
The opposing party must be given notice of the motion and a chance to challenge the evidence as well as present evidence as well.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|21f9l|39}} | |||
</ref> | |||
Relief under the Charter must flow from a motion, it is not automatic.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|21f9l|39}}</ref> | |||
The motion must be based on evidence before the court.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|21f9l|39}}</ref> | |||
The responding Crown is entitled to wait until the completion of the applicant's evidence before deciding on how they wish to respond to the motion, including calling rebuttal witnesses.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Deveau|fn55t|2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII)|976 APR 5}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; Evidence | |||
In some cases, the judge may seek to have the defence summarize the evidence it anticipates to call. If the evidence does not reveal a basis upon which the evidence may be excluded the judge may refuse to let the defence enter into a voir dire on the issue.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Kutynec|g126b|1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA)|70 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Durette|1npnk|1992 CanLII 2779 (ON CA)|72 CCC (3d) 421}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}{{atp|436}} ("when an accused makes a Charter motion he or she can be asked to stipulate a sufficient foundation for the claim or its constituent issues.")<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The evidence can take the form of an affidavit and may in cases contain hearsay as to what the accused will testify to at trial.<ref> | |||
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|McCaw|htc45|2018 ONSC 3464 (CanLII)|48 CR (7th) 359}}{{perONSC|Spies J}}{{AtsL|htc45|3| and 5}} | |||
</ref> | |||
; Concession of Law | |||
The decision of Crown counsel to concede a point of law does not bind the court to the legal content or effect.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Hills|J8l7j|2020 ABCA 263 (CanLII)|2 WWR 31}}{{atL|j8l7j|29}} (“ Crown counsel’s position was a concession, it does not bind this Court as to its legal content or effect. ... As has been noted on numerous occasions, concessions of law are not binding on courts”)<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Duguay|1ft8l|1989 CanLII 110 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 93}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux-Dube J}} (in dissent)<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|United States of America v Cotroni|1ft5m|1989 CanLII 106 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 1469}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Elshaw|1fshp|1991 CanLII 28|[1991] 3 SCR 24}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Silveira|1frk8|1995 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 297}}{{atL|1frk8|100}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The Supreme Court “has traditionally taken a dim view of concessions in constitutional cases, given their potentially wide ramifications for persons or governments not parties to the particular case”.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|M v H|1fqm4|1999 CanLII 686 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 3}}{{atL|1fqm4|210}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}} (dissent) | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Summary Dismissals=== | |||
* [[Summary Dismissal Applications]] | |||
==Burden and Standard of Proof== | |||
The burden of proving a violation of any constitutional right, with some exception, is upon the applicant.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Collins|1ftnd|1987 CanLII 84 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 265}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Kutynec|g126b|1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA)|70 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}} ("As a basic proposition, an accused person asserting a Charter remedy bears both the initial burden of presenting evidence that his or her Charter rights or freedoms have been infringed or denied, and the ultimate burden of persuasion that there has been a Charter violation.") | |||
</ref> | |||
This requires that the applicant bear the "initial burden of presenting evidence."<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Collins}}{{atL|1ftnd|21}}</ref> | |||
; When Burden is Upon the Applicant | |||
Generally, the burden is upon the applicant for violations of: | |||
* the [[Right Against Self-Crimination|Right to Silence]] | |||
* the [[Applying for Judicial Authorizations|Warrant Searches]] and | |||
* the [[Right to Counsel]]. | |||
; When Burden is Upon the Crown | |||
Violations for a warrantless search and seizure puts the burden upon the Crown.<ref> | |||
see [[Warrantless Searches]]</ref> | |||
However, the defence must first establish a foundation that there was a search and it was warrantless.<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Collins}}{{atL|1ftnd|22}} ("The standard of persuasion required is only the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and, because of this, the allocation of the burden of persuasion means only that, in a case where the evidence does not establish whether or not the appellant's rights were infringed, the court must conclude that they were not")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Caslake|1fqww|1998 CanLII 838 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 51}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{atL|1fqww|11}} ("Hence, once the accused has demonstrated that the search was warrantless, the Crown has the burden of showing that the search was, on the balance of probabilities, reasonable")<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The burden for a challenge to [[Voluntariness|voluntariness]] of a statement is upon the Crown. | |||
Also where delay ceiling to bring a matter to a conclusion has been surpassed the burden is upon the Crown to prove s. 11(b) of the Charter has ''not'' be violated.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; Standard of Proof | |||
The evidence must be "sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent" to establish the breach on a balance of probabilities.<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Collins}}{{atL|1ftnd|30}} ("the standard of persuasion required can only be the civil standard of the balance of probabilities")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|FH v McDougall|20xm8|2008 SCC 53 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 41}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|20xm8|46}}</ref> | |||
If the evidence is not sufficiently persuasive one way or another, the court must find there was no Charter violation.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Hardenstine|2b93z|2010 BCSC 899 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Savage J}}{{AtsL|2b93z|27|}}, {{atsL-np|2b93z|34|}}, referring to ''R v Collins''</ref> | |||
Courts must be mindful that "the Charter must receive contextual application. The scope of a particular Charter right or freedom may vary according to the circumstances."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Jarvis|50d7|2002 SCC 73 (CanLII)|[2002] 3 SCR 757}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}{{atL|50d7|63}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Standing== | |||
A person must have personal Charter-protected rights to make a claim of a violation under the Charter and seek a remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter. <ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Rahey|1ftp7|1987 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 588}}{{Plurality}}{{atp|619}} | |||
</ref> | |||
There is no rule of automatic standing in challenging a search. Only a party who can establish a personal right to privacy (i.e. a "reasonable expectation of privacy") can challenge a search.<ref> | |||
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Fankhanel|2bqs6|1999 CanLII 19075 (AB QB)|249 AR 391}}{{perABQB-H|Veit J}}{{atL|2bqs6|12}} citing {{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{Plurality}} </ref> | |||
In section 8 Charter applications, standing exists where it has been established that the accused had a [[Reasonable Expectation of Privacy]] to the target of the search. | |||
Where the accused asserts a s. 8 privacy right, they cannot, in the defence evidence assert facts that contradict this right. For example, a privacy right over a residence requires that the accused acknowledge living there.<ref> | |||
See {{CanLIIRP|Farrah (D.)|fm37q|2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII)|274 CCC (3d) 54}}{{perMBCA|Chartier JA}}{{atsL|fm37q|18| to 25}}</ref> | |||
; Burden and Standard of Proof | |||
The onus is upon the applicant to prove standing on a balance of probabilities.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Pasian|gh41g|2015 ONSC 1557 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Goodman J}}{{atL|gh41g|17}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Logan|1k8tr|2005 ABQB 321 (CanLII)|388 AR 255}}{{perABQB|Macklin J}}{{atL|1k8tr|81}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; Discharge of Burden by Relying on Allegations as True | |||
An accused need not tender evidence to establish standing to enforce a Charter right. The court may assume as true any fact alleged by the Crown instead of tendering defence evidence.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|hp63x|2017 SCC 60 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 696}}{{perSCC|Côté J}}{{atL|hp63x|32}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
This permits an accused to invoke a s. 8 Charter right while maintaining their denial of identity as the culprit.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Jones}} | |||
</ref> | |||
; Enforcing Rights of Another Person | |||
An accused is not entitled to rely on a possible violation of the Charter rights of a co-accused.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Sandhu|1dc4r|1993 CanLII 1429 (BC CA)| (1993) 28 BCAC 203 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Prowse JA}}</ref> | |||
For example, where the accused is a passenger of the vehicle, the accused will not have standing to bring a Charter application as there is no privacy interest as a passenger, at least so diminished as to not have any Charter protection.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Ramos|flmzz|2011 SKCA 63 (CanLII)|371 Sask R 308}}{{perSKCA|Ottenbreit JA}}</ref> | |||
; Young Person Under 12 Years of Age | |||
A child under the age of 12 cannot be charged with an offence <ref>YCJA s.2 defines "young person" as age 12 to 18</ref>and so they do not have standing to make any claim for a breach of s. 8 Charter rights. | |||
; Crown Standing to Respond to an Application | |||
Where there has been a prior ruling of unconstitutionality within the province that was not appealed by the Crown does not estop the Crown from making submissions against a subsequent application on a new proceeding.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|McCaw|htc45|2018 ONSC 3464 (CanLII)|48 CR (7th) 359}}{{perONSC|Spies J}}{{atL|htc45|53}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==State Agent== | |||
The impugned conduct that implicates the Charter must be that of a state agent. This will generally be of concern for Charter rights such as: | |||
* the [[Right Against Self-Crimination|right to silence]]; | |||
* [[Voluntariness#Person in Authority|voluntariness of a statement]] made to a person in authority; | |||
* the [[Rights Against Search and Seizure|right against search and seizure]]; or | |||
* [[Arrest and Detention|detention]], including through citizen's arrest or private security | |||
; Application of the Charter | |||
Section 32 of the Charter provides that: | |||
{{quotation2| | |||
32 (1) This Charter applies | |||
:(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and | |||
:(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. | |||
|[http://canlii.ca/t/8q7l CCRF] | |||
|{{NoteUpCCRF|32|1}} | |||
}} | |||
Incriminating evidence collected by private persons "is routinely admitted without Charter scrutiny."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Dell|1l5rs|2005 ABCA 246 (CanLII)|199 CCC (3d) 110}}{{perABCA|Fruman JA}}{{atL|1l5rs|29}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
Independent actions of an informer to collect information from an offender in order to deliver the information to police is not an agent.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|McInnis|1f9fl|1999 CanLII 2671 (ON CA)|134 CCC (3d) 515}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Notice== | |||
An Accused must prove a Charter violation through conducting a ''voir dire''. Notice must give notice of a Charter application or else the application can be rejected without hearing evidence.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Hamill|1nnxs|1984 CanLII 39 (BC CA)| (1984) 13 CCC 338 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Esson JA}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Kutynec|g126b|1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA)|70 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}} at 16<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Vukelich|1f0d7|1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA)|108 CCC 193 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}}<br> | |||
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Graham|287z9|2008 NSPC 83 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Embree J}} - charter application rejected due to lack of notice</ref> | |||
There is a duty upon defence to raise any Charter issues before trial.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Kovac|1wd0j|1998 CanLII 14961 (ON SC)|[1998] OJ No 2347 (Ont. C.J.)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atp|9}} </ref> | |||
A threshold examination must be made to determine if on a balance of probabilities that the accused may be entitled to a Charter remedy and that the right was asserted as reasonably early as possible.<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Vukelich}}</ref> | |||
Where there is no timely notice, the Court may refuse an application.<ref>see {{supra1|Kutynec}}{{atL|g126b|19}}</ref> | |||
Where the court rules have not been complied with, the court “has wide discretion in respect of procedure to facilitate a fair and expeditious determination of Charter issues”<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Blom|1csxs|2002 CanLII 45026 (ON CA)| OR (3d) 51}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} at 21 and 22</ref> | |||
Thus, even a late request for a Charter application can still be heard by the court. | |||
Since the crown may not know the whole charter evidence before the motion, they are entitled to call evidence after hearing from the defence.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Deveau|fn55t|2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII)|976 APR 5}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}} </ref> | |||
The defence cannot object to the admission of evidence on the basis of a Charter violation where it is first raised in closing.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Kovac|1wd0j|1998 CanLII 14961 (ON SC)|[1998] OJ 2347 (Gen. Div.)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIR-N|Nagda| [2000] OJ No 5694 (Ont. C.J.)}} - Charter raised 10 months after trial, but before closing submission</ref> | |||
Prior to trial, the court may make inquiries into what Charter issues to be presented at trial.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Yorke|1mrr0|1992 CanLII 2521 (NS CA)|77 CCC (3d) 529}}{{perNSCA|Roscoe JA}} ("It is basic to any adversarial system that a litigant applying for curial relief advise the court and the opponent of the application")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIR-N|Kingsbury|, [1997] OJ No 5438 (Ont. C.J.)}} <br></ref> | |||
; Rules of Court | |||
Many provinces have rules that govern the notice requirements of Charter applications.<ref> | |||
e.g. Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Proceedings (Ontario) | |||
</ref> | |||
Under the Ontario Rules of Criminal Proceedings, the trial judge has discretion in whether to penalize non-compliance by refusing to permit the application. The judge must review several factors in the process<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Blom|1csxs|2002 CanLII 45026 (ON CA)|[2002] OJ No 3199 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}}{{atsL|1csxs|21| to 22}}<br> | |||
</ref> including:<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Tash|1vh06|2008 CanLII 1541 (ON SC)|[2008] OJ No 200 (ON SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|1vh06|15}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
* preference to have applications heard | |||
* prejudice to the opposite party | |||
* the efficient management of the courts, | |||
* the fair and orderly conduct of the trial and | |||
* the particularization of the Notice. | |||
; Absence of Notice | |||
The court may refuse to hear a Charter application where no notice is given.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Rambissoon|frg4h|2012 ONSC 3032 (CanLII)|[2012] OJ 2305 (SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Trotter J}}</ref> | |||
The right to make full answer and defence does not include right to trial by ambush.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Darrach|523t|2000 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 443}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}{{atL|523t|55}}</ref> | |||
Failure to comply with rules of motion is not always fatal to the motion.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Tillotson|flqqx|2011 ONSC 3390 (CanLII)|94 WCB (2d) 847}}{{perONSC|Reid J}}</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Sufficiency=== | |||
Notice must outline some facts, sometimes with a supporting affidavit. <ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Vukelich|1f0d7|1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA)|108 CCC (3d) 193}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}}{{atL|1f0d7|17}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Pires; R v Lising|1m021|2005 SCC 66 (CanLII)|[2005] 3 SCR 343}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atL|1m021|35}}</ref> | |||
There is no "absolute entitlement to an evidentiary hearing", rather there must be a "factual and legal basis" for any motion.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR-N|Clancey|, [1992] OJ 3968 (Ont CJ (Gen Div))}}</ref> | |||
Where insufficient notice is given on a constitutional challenge the court may refuse to entertain the argument.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR-N|Purtill| [2012] OJ 2769 (SCJ)}}</ref> | |||
{{Reflist|2}} | |||
===Timing=== | |||
; Before Trial | |||
Verbal notice on the day of trial can be found insufficient notice.<ref> | |||
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Mide|5r89|1998 ABPC 126 (CanLII)|[1998] AJ No 1384 (Alta. P.C.)}}{{perABPC|Fraser J}} </ref> | |||
; During Trial | |||
The defence should not generally be permitted to raise a Charter motion at any point after the close of the Crown's case.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Chamberlain|6k20|1994 CanLII 1165 (ON CA)| (1994), 30 CR (4th) 275}}{{TheCourtONCA}} - judge was correct in exercising discretion to refuse to hear application <br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Dwernychuk|1nnx8|1992 ABCA 316 (CanLII)|77 CCC (3d) 385}}{{TheCourt}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; After Trial | |||
Where a Charter issue is raised after the Crown's case, it cannot be based on the lack of evidence on the particular issue. By requiring the crown to present evidence supporting non-existent Charter motion is tantamount to shifting the burden on the crown to prove the absence of a breach.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Furlong|frldw|2012 NLCA 29 (CanLII)|1004 APR 77}}{{perNLCA|Hoegg JA}} </ref> | |||
{{Reflist|2}} | |||
===Failure to Given Timely Notice=== | |||
; Discretion | |||
It is in the ultimate discretion of the trial judge to decide whether to permit a late Charter application.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR-N|Habhab|, [1997] AJ No 175 (Alta P.C.)}} p. 9-10<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The trial judge had discretion to refuse to hear any motions with no notice or insufficient notice.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Smith|1glp1|2004 SCC 14 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 385}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1glp1|39}} | |||
</ref> | |||
The Court must balance the efficient use of court resources with the determination of court matters. | |||
<ref>{{CanLIIRP|Loveman|1p78z|1992 CanLII 2830 (ON CA)|71 CCC (3d) 123}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Motion to Dismiss Charter Motions== | |||
A trial judge may dismiss a motion under its powers to control proceedings for those applications that lack merit or are not brought in time.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Henneberry|gk235|2015 NSPC 96 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Chisholm J}} - re provincial court has authority even if not specifically mentioned in the Rules of Court<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Bugden|gj418|2015 CanLII 27426 (NL PC)}}{{perNLPC|Skanes J}}{{atL|gj418|27}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The judge should be "reluctant to foreclose an inquiry into an alleged violation" of the Charter.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Loveman|1p78z|1992 CanLII 2930 (ON CA)|[1992] OJ 346}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The judge should give consideration "whether there is an 'air of reality' to the alleged breach.<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Bugden}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Gauvin|g81jv|2014 ONSC 4108 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Quigley J}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The court may consider factors including:<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Loveman}} | |||
</ref> | |||
# whether or not there is any statutory rule or practice direction requiring notice; | |||
# the notice which was given to the Crown; | |||
# the point during the trial proceedings when the appellants’ counsel first indicated he intended to bring a Charter motion; | |||
# the extent to which the Crown was prejudiced by the absence of any specific reference to a Charter-based argument in the notice given to the Crown; and | |||
# the specific nature of the Charter argument which counsel propose to advance and the impact the application could have on the course of the trial. | |||
; Timing of the Charter Application | |||
A significant factor on the discretion to dismiss a Charter application is the timing when the motion was made.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Loveman}} ("The trial judge ought to consider whether the basis for the Charter motion was known or could reasonably have been known to the Defence prior to trial.")<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; Procedure | |||
The procedure to dismiss any motion will be dictated by the particular rules of court for the particular jurisdiction.<ref> | |||
NS, Prov Crt: [http://www.courts.ns.ca/Provincial_Court/NSPC_criminal_rules_forms.htm Nova Scotia Court Rules]<br> | |||
NS, Sup. Crt: Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Appeals== | |||
{{seealso|Appeals#Appeal of a Charter Voir Dire}} | |||
Reviewing a judge’s decision a whether there was a Charter breach is determined on the standard of correctness.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Farrah|fm37q|2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII)|274 CCC (3d) 54}}{{perMBCA|Chartier JA}}{{atL|fm37q|7}}</ref> | |||
However, the evidence underlying the Charter matter can only be reviewed on the standard of “palpable and overriding error”.<ref>ibid</ref> | |||
{{Reflist|2}} | |||
===Preserving Right of Appeal=== | |||
A guilty plea after a failed Charter application extinguishes all rights of appeal.<ref> | |||
see [[Guilty Plea]]<br> | |||
cf. {{CanLIIRP|Liberatore|gfl1x|2014 NSCA 109 (CanLII)|318 CCC (3d) 441}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}}{{atsL|gfl1x|9|}}, {{atsL-np|gfl1x|13|}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
When an application fails, "the proper procedure to follow when an accused wishes to preserve his or her right to appeal an adverse voir dire ruling is to admit the facts alleged by the Crown and invite the judge to convict."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Webster|21ls8|2008 BCCA 458 (CanLII)|238 CCC (3d) 270}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|21ls8|21}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
There are various options available including a joint statement of fact, no submissions no guilt or innocence, or agreement that a conviction be entered.<Ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Herritt|j3qw7|2019 NSCA 92 (CanLII)|384 CCC (3d) 25}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|j3qw7|69}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Hunt|jd2rd|2021 ABCA 49 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}} at footnote 64<Br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===On Appeal but Not Raised at Trial=== | |||
An accused may raise a new issue on appeal only with leave of the court.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Aisthorpe|1nzlk|2006 NLCA 40 (CanLII)|143 CRR (2d) 352}}{{perNLCA|Rowe JA}} | |||
</ref> | |||
Even where leave is not requested, particularly where the accused is self-represented on appeal, the court may still consider whether to grant leave.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|O'Keefe (No. 2)|frczp|2012 NLCA 25 (CanLII)|NJ No 167}}{{perNLCA|Harrington JA}}{{atsL|frczp|24| to 27}}</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Briefs== | |||
The crown does not need to file a brief responding to an accused's Charter motion. He may instead wait until the conclusion of the accused's evidence to decide.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Deveau|fn55t|2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII)|976 APR 5}}{{perNSCA| Fichaud JA}} | |||
</ref> | |||
; Affiant Reviewing Applicant's Brief | |||
Giving the factum or brief to the affiant to read is not impermissible however should be avoided where the factual inconsistencies may be used to undermine the witnesses credibility.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Lajeunesse, Paris|1n1gb|2006 CanLII 11655 (ON CA)|208 OAC 385, [2006] OJ No 1445}}{{perONCA|MacFarland JA}}{{atsL|1n1gb|24| to 28}} ("It would have been preferable had Crown counsel not supplied the factum to the main witness, particularly on the facts here where it would be argued that the factual inconsistencies undermined the credibility of the witness.")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Mahmood|fnr5s|2011 ONCA 693 (CanLII)|282 CCC (3d) 314}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fnr5s|63}} ("No bright line rule prohibits a party from disclosing to a witness on a Garofoli application the arguments to be advanced in support of the application, and thus the thrust of the proposed cross- examination. Each ... case depends and must be decided on its own facts. What would be improper in one case may be entirely appropriate in another")<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Charter Application to Evidence Collected in Foreign Countries== | |||
Actions of a foreign state outside of Canada cannot be subject to Charter review.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Schreiber v Canada|1fqtx|1998 CanLII 828 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 841}}{{perSCC|L’Heureux‑Dubé J J}} | |||
</ref> | |||
Proof of foreign law is a question of fact.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Guilbride|5lt9|2002 BCPC 254 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|Arnold J}}{{atL|5lt9|61}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The judge, in determining whether foreign law has been compiled with, may hear expert evidence from legal experts. The judge must not engage in interpreting the law themselves.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Guilbride}}{{atL|5lt9|61}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
The extent to which the experts agree there will be a "strong presumption" that the propositions in agreement accurately represents foreign law.<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Guilbride}}{{atL|5lt9|62}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Re McDonald|gw9nl|1935 CanLII 301 (NS CA)|4 DLR 342}}{{perNSCA|Mellish J}}<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
==Remedies== | |||
Charter remedies include: | |||
* [[Charter Remedies]] | |||
* [[Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter]] | |||
* [[Stay of Proceedings]] | |||
* [[Costs]] | |||
==See Also== | |||
* [[Voir Dire]] | |||
* [[Precedent - Charter Applications]] | |||
<!-- | |||
; Supporting Draft Documents | |||
* [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Cg28mOoB9INXKmR9xbwm0XIX1zarlc8hDm24qMIskpM/edit?usp=sharing Google Docs Generic Application] | |||
--> |
Version du 21 juin 2024 à 17:03
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Cette page a été mise à jour ou révisée de manière substantielle pour la dernière fois December 2022. (Rev. # 2486) |
n.b.: Cette page est expérimentale. Si vous repérez une grammaire ou un texte anglais clairement incorrect, veuillez m'en informer à [email protected] et je le corrigerai dès que possible. |
- < Procédure et pratique
- < Pré-procès et procès
General Principles
A Charter motion is a defence application alleging a breach of a provision du Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.
- Who Can Raise
Where the defence have not made application to challenge the reasonable grounds to that underly police action such as a breath demand, there is no obligation on the Crown to present any evidence that underlies the authority that was executed.[1]
In certain circumstances, trial judges may have a duty to raise a charter issue on behalf of the accused, particularly where they are self-represented.[2] However, interference of the judge by raising a Charter issue against the intent of counsel may amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias.[3]
- Proper Court
A Charter application must be heard by a "court of competent jurisdiction". This is a court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person and the remedy.[4] This will generally be the trial judge.[5] However, it will not include a preliminary inquiry judge.[6] A superior court has "constant, complete and concurrent jurisdiction with the trial court for applications under s. 24(1) of the Charter."[7]
- Territorial Jurisdiction
The Charter does not apply to Canadian authorities outside of Canada except when:[8]
- the foreign jurisdiction consents to its application; or
- the do cut of the Canadian authorities violates international human rights obligations.
- ↑
R c Charette, 2009 ONCA 310 (CanLII), 243 CCC (3d) 480, par Moldaver JA, aux paras 48 to 49
- ↑ R c Travers, 2001 NSCA 71 (CanLII), 154 CCC (3d) 426, par Oland JA
- ↑ R c Youngpine, 2009 ABCA 89 (CanLII), 242 CCC (3d) 441, par Fraser CJ
- ↑ R c Hynes, 2001 SCC 82 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 623, par McLachlin CJ
- ↑ R c Rahey, 1987 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 588
- ↑ Hynes
- ↑ R c Blencowe, 1997 CanLII 12287 (ON SC), 118 CCC (3d) 529, par Watt J
- ↑ R c Tan, 2014 BCCA 9 (CanLII), 299 CRR (2d) 73, par Bennett JA
Standard of Appellate Review
A finding of a Charter violation deserves deference absent a palpable and overriding error.[1]
The interpretation of the scope of a right is a question of law and is reviewable without reference.[2]
The standard of review on appeal for constitutional questions is on the standard of correctness.[3]
A decision in relation to an alleged Charter breach is reviewable on a standard that varies depending on the nature of the appeal:[4]
- "When examining a judge's decision on whether a Charter breach occurred, the appellate court will review the decision to ensure that the correct legal principles were stated and that there was no misdirection in their application. This raises questions of law and the standard of review is correctness."
- "The appellate court will then review the evidentiary foundation which forms the basis for the judge's decision to see whether there was an error. On this part of the review, the judge's decision is entitled to more deference and, absent palpable and overriding error, the facts as found by the judge should not be disturbed"
- "The appellate court will also examine the application of the legal principles to the facts of the case to see if the facts, as found by the judge, satisfy the correct legal test. In the criminal law context, this is a question of law and the standard of review is correctness"
- "The decision on whether to exclude under s. 24(2) of the Charter is an admissibility of evidence issue which is a question of law. However, because this determination requires the judge to exercise some discretion, "considerable deference" is owed to the judge's s. 24(2) assessment when the appropriate factors have been considered."
- ↑ R c Hills, 2020 ABCA 263 (CanLII), 2 WWR 31, au para 12 (“ A finding that a Charter right has or has not been violated deserves deference absent an overriding and palpable error.”)
- ↑ , ibid. at 12 (“Whether a first-instance judge correctly interpreted the scope of the right is a question of law and this Court is free to substitute its opinion: R v Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121 at para 15, 327 AR 320.“)
- ↑ Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 53
- ↑
R c West, 2012 NSCA 112 (CanLII)
R c Farrah (D.), 2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII), par Chartier JA
R c Boliver, 2014 NSCA 99 (CanLII) at para. 10
R c REW, 2011 NSCA 18 (CanLII) at paras. 30 – 33
R c Mian, 2014 SCC 54 (CanLII), at para. 77
Procedure
The onus of proof is upon the party advancing the motion.[1] The opposing party must be given notice of the motion and a chance to challenge the evidence as well as present evidence as well.[2]
Relief under the Charter must flow from a motion, it is not automatic.[3] The motion must be based on evidence before the court.[4]
The responding Crown is entitled to wait until the completion of the applicant's evidence before deciding on how they wish to respond to the motion, including calling rebuttal witnesses.[5]
- Evidence
In some cases, the judge may seek to have the defence summarize the evidence it anticipates to call. If the evidence does not reveal a basis upon which the evidence may be excluded the judge may refuse to let the defence enter into a voir dire on the issue.[6]
The evidence can take the form of an affidavit and may in cases contain hearsay as to what the accused will testify to at trial.[7]
- Concession of Law
The decision of Crown counsel to concede a point of law does not bind the court to the legal content or effect.[8]
The Supreme Court “has traditionally taken a dim view of concessions in constitutional cases, given their potentially wide ramifications for persons or governments not parties to the particular case”.[9]
- ↑ R c Currie, 2008 ABCA 374 (CanLII), 446 AR 41, par Côté JA, au para 39
- ↑ , ibid., au para 39
- ↑ , ibid., au para 39
- ↑ , ibid., au para 39
- ↑
R c Deveau, 2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII), 976 APR 5, par Fichaud JA
- ↑
R c Kutynec, 1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA), 70 CCC (3d) 289, par Finlayson JA
R c Durette, 1992 CanLII 2779 (ON CA), 72 CCC (3d) 421, par Finlayson JA, au p. 436 ("when an accused makes a Charter motion he or she can be asked to stipulate a sufficient foundation for the claim or its constituent issues.")
- ↑ e.g. R c McCaw, 2018 ONSC 3464 (CanLII), 48 CR (7th) 359, par Spies J, aux paras 3 and 5
- ↑
R c Hills, 2020 ABCA 263 (CanLII), 2 WWR 31, au para 29 (“ Crown counsel’s position was a concession, it does not bind this Court as to its legal content or effect. ... As has been noted on numerous occasions, concessions of law are not binding on courts”)
R c Duguay, 1989 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 93, par L'Heureux-Dube J (in dissent)
United States of America v Cotroni, 1989 CanLII 106 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1469, par La Forest J
R c Elshaw, 1991 CanLII 28, [1991] 3 SCR 24, par Iacobucci J
R c Silveira, 1995 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 297, au para 100, par Cory J
- ↑ M v H, 1999 CanLII 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 3, au para 210, par Gonthier J (dissent)
Summary Dismissals
Burden and Standard of Proof
The burden of proving a violation of any constitutional right, with some exception, is upon the applicant.[1] This requires that the applicant bear the "initial burden of presenting evidence."[2]
- When Burden is Upon the Applicant
Generally, the burden is upon the applicant for violations of:
- the Right to Silence
- the Warrant Searches and
- the Right to Counsel.
- When Burden is Upon the Crown
Violations for a warrantless search and seizure puts the burden upon the Crown.[3] However, the defence must first establish a foundation that there was a search and it was warrantless.[4]
The burden for a challenge to voluntariness of a statement is upon the Crown.
Also where delay ceiling to bring a matter to a conclusion has been surpassed the burden is upon the Crown to prove s. 11(b) of the Charter has not be violated.[5]
- Standard of Proof
The evidence must be "sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent" to establish the breach on a balance of probabilities.[6]
If the evidence is not sufficiently persuasive one way or another, the court must find there was no Charter violation.[7]
Courts must be mindful that "the Charter must receive contextual application. The scope of a particular Charter right or freedom may vary according to the circumstances."[8]
- ↑
R c Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265, par Lamer J
R c Kutynec, 1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA), 70 CCC (3d) 289, par Finlayson JA ("As a basic proposition, an accused person asserting a Charter remedy bears both the initial burden of presenting evidence that his or her Charter rights or freedoms have been infringed or denied, and the ultimate burden of persuasion that there has been a Charter violation.") - ↑ Collins, supra, au para 21
- ↑ see Warrantless Searches
- ↑
Collins, supra, au para 22 ("The standard of persuasion required is only the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and, because of this, the allocation of the burden of persuasion means only that, in a case where the evidence does not establish whether or not the appellant's rights were infringed, the court must conclude that they were not")
R c Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 51, par Lamer CJ, au para 11 ("Hence, once the accused has demonstrated that the search was warrantless, the Crown has the burden of showing that the search was, on the balance of probabilities, reasonable")
- ↑
R c Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII), [2016] 1 SCR 631, par Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ
- ↑
Collins, supra, au para 30 ("the standard of persuasion required can only be the civil standard of the balance of probabilities")
FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 41, par Rothstein J, au para 46 - ↑ R c Hardenstine, 2010 BCSC 899 (CanLII), par Savage J, aux paras 27, 34, referring to R v Collins
- ↑
R c Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73 (CanLII), [2002] 3 SCR 757, par Iacobucci and Major JJ, au para 63
Standing
A person must have personal Charter-protected rights to make a claim of a violation under the Charter and seek a remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter. [1]
There is no rule of automatic standing in challenging a search. Only a party who can establish a personal right to privacy (i.e. a "reasonable expectation of privacy") can challenge a search.[2]
In section 8 Charter applications, standing exists where it has been established that the accused had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to the target of the search.
Where the accused asserts a s. 8 privacy right, they cannot, in the defence evidence assert facts that contradict this right. For example, a privacy right over a residence requires that the accused acknowledge living there.[3]
- Burden and Standard of Proof
The onus is upon the applicant to prove standing on a balance of probabilities.[4]
- Discharge of Burden by Relying on Allegations as True
An accused need not tender evidence to establish standing to enforce a Charter right. The court may assume as true any fact alleged by the Crown instead of tendering defence evidence.[5] This permits an accused to invoke a s. 8 Charter right while maintaining their denial of identity as the culprit.[6]
- Enforcing Rights of Another Person
An accused is not entitled to rely on a possible violation of the Charter rights of a co-accused.[7]
For example, where the accused is a passenger of the vehicle, the accused will not have standing to bring a Charter application as there is no privacy interest as a passenger, at least so diminished as to not have any Charter protection.[8]
- Young Person Under 12 Years of Age
A child under the age of 12 cannot be charged with an offence [9]and so they do not have standing to make any claim for a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.
- Crown Standing to Respond to an Application
Where there has been a prior ruling of unconstitutionality within the province that was not appealed by the Crown does not estop the Crown from making submissions against a subsequent application on a new proceeding.[10]
- ↑
R c Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 128, par Cory J
R c Rahey, 1987 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 588, au p. 619 - ↑ e.g. R c Fankhanel, 1999 CanLII 19075 (AB QB), 249 AR 391, par Veit J, au para 12 citing R c Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 128
- ↑ See R c Farrah (D.), 2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII), 274 CCC (3d) 54, par Chartier JA, aux paras 18 to 25
- ↑
R c Pasian, 2015 ONSC 1557 (CanLII), par Goodman J, au para 17
R c Logan, 2005 ABQB 321 (CanLII), 388 AR 255, par Macklin J, au para 81
- ↑
R c Jones, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2017] 2 SCR 696, par Côté J, au para 32
- ↑ , ibid.
- ↑ R c Sandhu, 1993 CanLII 1429 (BC CA), (1993) 28 BCAC 203 (BCCA), par Prowse JA
- ↑ R c Ramos, 2011 SKCA 63 (CanLII), 371 Sask R 308, par Ottenbreit JA
- ↑ YCJA s.2 defines "young person" as age 12 to 18
- ↑
R c McCaw, 2018 ONSC 3464 (CanLII), 48 CR (7th) 359, par Spies J, au para 53
State Agent
The impugned conduct that implicates the Charter must be that of a state agent. This will generally be of concern for Charter rights such as:
- the right to silence;
- voluntariness of a statement made to a person in authority;
- the right against search and seizure; or
- detention, including through citizen's arrest or private security
- Application of the Charter
Section 32 of the Charter provides that:
32 (1) This Charter applies
- (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
- (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
Incriminating evidence collected by private persons "is routinely admitted without Charter scrutiny."[1]
Independent actions of an informer to collect information from an offender in order to deliver the information to police is not an agent.[2]
- ↑
R c Dell, 2005 ABCA 246 (CanLII), 199 CCC (3d) 110, par Fruman JA, au para 29
- ↑
R c McInnis, 1999 CanLII 2671 (ON CA), 134 CCC (3d) 515, par Rosenberg JA
Notice
An Accused must prove a Charter violation through conducting a voir dire. Notice must give notice of a Charter application or else the application can be rejected without hearing evidence.[1]
There is a duty upon defence to raise any Charter issues before trial.[2]
A threshold examination must be made to determine if on a balance of probabilities that the accused may be entitled to a Charter remedy and that the right was asserted as reasonably early as possible.[3] Where there is no timely notice, the Court may refuse an application.[4]
Where the court rules have not been complied with, the court “has wide discretion in respect of procedure to facilitate a fair and expeditious determination of Charter issues”[5] Thus, even a late request for a Charter application can still be heard by the court.
Since the crown may not know the whole charter evidence before the motion, they are entitled to call evidence after hearing from the defence.[6]
The defence cannot object to the admission of evidence on the basis of a Charter violation where it is first raised in closing.[7]
Prior to trial, the court may make inquiries into what Charter issues to be presented at trial.[8]
- Rules of Court
Many provinces have rules that govern the notice requirements of Charter applications.[9]
Under the Ontario Rules of Criminal Proceedings, the trial judge has discretion in whether to penalize non-compliance by refusing to permit the application. The judge must review several factors in the process[10] including:[11]
- preference to have applications heard
- prejudice to the opposite party
- the efficient management of the courts,
- the fair and orderly conduct of the trial and
- the particularization of the Notice.
- Absence of Notice
The court may refuse to hear a Charter application where no notice is given.[12]
The right to make full answer and defence does not include right to trial by ambush.[13]
Failure to comply with rules of motion is not always fatal to the motion.[14]
- ↑
R c Hamill, 1984 CanLII 39 (BC CA), (1984) 13 CCC 338 (BCCA), par Esson JA
R c Kutynec, 1992 CanLII 7751 (ON CA), 70 CCC (3d) 289, par Finlayson JA at 16
R c Vukelich, 1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA), 108 CCC 193 (BCCA), par McEachern JA
e.g. R c Graham, 2008 NSPC 83 (CanLII), par Embree J - charter application rejected due to lack of notice - ↑ R c Kovac, 1998 CanLII 14961 (ON SC), [1998] OJ No 2347 (Ont. C.J.), par Hill J, au p. 9
- ↑ Vukelich, supra
- ↑ see Kutynec, supra, au para 19
- ↑ R c Blom, 2002 CanLII 45026 (ON CA), OR (3d) 51, par Sharpe JA at 21 and 22
- ↑ R c Deveau, 2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII), 976 APR 5, par Fichaud JA
- ↑
R c Kovac, 1998 CanLII 14961 (ON SC), [1998] OJ 2347 (Gen. Div.), par Hill J
R c Nagda [2000] OJ No 5694 (Ont. C.J.)(*pas de liens CanLII) - Charter raised 10 months after trial, but before closing submission - ↑
R c Yorke, 1992 CanLII 2521 (NS CA), 77 CCC (3d) 529, par Roscoe JA ("It is basic to any adversarial system that a litigant applying for curial relief advise the court and the opponent of the application")
R c Kingsbury, [1997] OJ No 5438 (Ont. C.J.)(*pas de liens CanLII)
- ↑ e.g. Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Proceedings (Ontario)
- ↑
R c Blom, 2002 CanLII 45026 (ON CA), [2002] OJ No 3199 (ONCA), par Sharpe JA, aux paras 21 to 22
- ↑
R c Tash, 2008 CanLII 1541 (ON SC), [2008] OJ No 200 (ON SCJ), par Hill J, au para 15
- ↑ R c Rambissoon, 2012 ONSC 3032 (CanLII), [2012] OJ 2305 (SCJ), par Trotter J
- ↑ R c Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 443, par Gonthier J, au para 55
- ↑ R c Tillotson, 2011 ONSC 3390 (CanLII), 94 WCB (2d) 847, par Reid J
Sufficiency
Notice must outline some facts, sometimes with a supporting affidavit. [1]
There is no "absolute entitlement to an evidentiary hearing", rather there must be a "factual and legal basis" for any motion.[2]
Where insufficient notice is given on a constitutional challenge the court may refuse to entertain the argument.[3]
- ↑
R c Vukelich, 1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA), 108 CCC (3d) 193, par McEachern JA, au para 17
R c Pires; R v Lising, 2005 SCC 66 (CanLII), [2005] 3 SCR 343, par Charron J, au para 35 - ↑ R c Clancey, [1992] OJ 3968 (Ont CJ (Gen Div))(*pas de liens CanLII)
- ↑ R c Purtill [2012] OJ 2769 (SCJ)(*pas de liens CanLII)
Timing
- Before Trial
Verbal notice on the day of trial can be found insufficient notice.[1]
- During Trial
The defence should not generally be permitted to raise a Charter motion at any point after the close of the Crown's case.[2]
- After Trial
Where a Charter issue is raised after the Crown's case, it cannot be based on the lack of evidence on the particular issue. By requiring the crown to present evidence supporting non-existent Charter motion is tantamount to shifting the burden on the crown to prove the absence of a breach.[3]
- ↑ e.g. R c Mide, 1998 ABPC 126 (CanLII), [1998] AJ No 1384 (Alta. P.C.), par Fraser J
- ↑
R c Chamberlain, 1994 CanLII 1165 (ON CA), (1994), 30 CR (4th) 275, par curiam - judge was correct in exercising discretion to refuse to hear application
R c Dwernychuk, 1992 ABCA 316 (CanLII), 77 CCC (3d) 385, par curiam
- ↑ R c Furlong, 2012 NLCA 29 (CanLII), 1004 APR 77, par Hoegg JA
Failure to Given Timely Notice
- Discretion
It is in the ultimate discretion of the trial judge to decide whether to permit a late Charter application.[1]
The trial judge had discretion to refuse to hear any motions with no notice or insufficient notice.[2] The Court must balance the efficient use of court resources with the determination of court matters. [3]
- ↑
R c Habhab, [1997] AJ No 175 (Alta P.C.)(*pas de liens CanLII)
p. 9-10
- ↑ R c Smith, 2004 SCC 14 (CanLII), [2004] 1 SCR 385, par Binnie J, au para 39
- ↑ R c Loveman, 1992 CanLII 2830 (ON CA), 71 CCC (3d) 123, par Doherty JA
Motion to Dismiss Charter Motions
A trial judge may dismiss a motion under its powers to control proceedings for those applications that lack merit or are not brought in time.[1]
The judge should be "reluctant to foreclose an inquiry into an alleged violation" of the Charter.[2]
The judge should give consideration "whether there is an 'air of reality' to the alleged breach.[3]
The court may consider factors including:[4]
- whether or not there is any statutory rule or practice direction requiring notice;
- the notice which was given to the Crown;
- the point during the trial proceedings when the appellants’ counsel first indicated he intended to bring a Charter motion;
- the extent to which the Crown was prejudiced by the absence of any specific reference to a Charter-based argument in the notice given to the Crown; and
- the specific nature of the Charter argument which counsel propose to advance and the impact the application could have on the course of the trial.
- Timing of the Charter Application
A significant factor on the discretion to dismiss a Charter application is the timing when the motion was made.[5]
- Procedure
The procedure to dismiss any motion will be dictated by the particular rules of court for the particular jurisdiction.[6]
- ↑
R c Henneberry, 2015 NSPC 96 (CanLII), par Chisholm J - re provincial court has authority even if not specifically mentioned in the Rules of Court
R c Bugden, 2015 CanLII 27426 (NL PC), par Skanes J, au para 27
- ↑
R c Loveman, 1992 CanLII 2930 (ON CA), [1992] OJ 346, par Doherty JA
- ↑
Bugden, supra
R c Gauvin, 2014 ONSC 4108 (CanLII), par Quigley J
- ↑ Loveman, supra
- ↑
, ibid. ("The trial judge ought to consider whether the basis for the Charter motion was known or could reasonably have been known to the Defence prior to trial.")
- ↑
NS, Prov Crt: Nova Scotia Court Rules
NS, Sup. Crt: Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules
Appeals
Reviewing a judge’s decision a whether there was a Charter breach is determined on the standard of correctness.[1] However, the evidence underlying the Charter matter can only be reviewed on the standard of “palpable and overriding error”.[2]
- ↑ R c Farrah, 2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII), 274 CCC (3d) 54, par Chartier JA, au para 7
- ↑ ibid
Preserving Right of Appeal
A guilty plea after a failed Charter application extinguishes all rights of appeal.[1]
When an application fails, "the proper procedure to follow when an accused wishes to preserve his or her right to appeal an adverse voir dire ruling is to admit the facts alleged by the Crown and invite the judge to convict."[2] There are various options available including a joint statement of fact, no submissions no guilt or innocence, or agreement that a conviction be entered.[3]
- ↑
see Guilty Plea
cf. R c Liberatore, 2014 NSCA 109 (CanLII), 318 CCC (3d) 441, par Fichaud JA, aux paras 9, 13
- ↑
R c Webster, 2008 BCCA 458 (CanLII), 238 CCC (3d) 270, par Frankel JA, au para 21
- ↑
R c Herritt, 2019 NSCA 92 (CanLII), 384 CCC (3d) 25, par curiam, au para 69
R c Hunt, 2021 ABCA 49 (CanLII), par Beveridge JA at footnote 64
On Appeal but Not Raised at Trial
An accused may raise a new issue on appeal only with leave of the court.[1]
Even where leave is not requested, particularly where the accused is self-represented on appeal, the court may still consider whether to grant leave.[2]
- ↑ R c Aisthorpe, 2006 NLCA 40 (CanLII), 143 CRR (2d) 352, par Rowe JA
- ↑ R c O'Keefe (No. 2), 2012 NLCA 25 (CanLII), NJ No 167, par Harrington JA, aux paras 24 to 27
Briefs
The crown does not need to file a brief responding to an accused's Charter motion. He may instead wait until the conclusion of the accused's evidence to decide.[1]
- Affiant Reviewing Applicant's Brief
Giving the factum or brief to the affiant to read is not impermissible however should be avoided where the factual inconsistencies may be used to undermine the witnesses credibility.[2]
- ↑ R c Deveau, 2011 NSCA 85 (CanLII), 976 APR 5, par Fichaud JA
- ↑
R c Lajeunesse, Paris, 2006 CanLII 11655 (ON CA), 208 OAC 385, [2006] OJ No 1445, par MacFarland JA, aux paras 24 to 28 ("It would have been preferable had Crown counsel not supplied the factum to the main witness, particularly on the facts here where it would be argued that the factual inconsistencies undermined the credibility of the witness.")
R c Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693 (CanLII), 282 CCC (3d) 314, par Watt JA, au para 63 ("No bright line rule prohibits a party from disclosing to a witness on a Garofoli application the arguments to be advanced in support of the application, and thus the thrust of the proposed cross- examination. Each ... case depends and must be decided on its own facts. What would be improper in one case may be entirely appropriate in another")
Charter Application to Evidence Collected in Foreign Countries
Actions of a foreign state outside of Canada cannot be subject to Charter review.[1]
Proof of foreign law is a question of fact.[2] The judge, in determining whether foreign law has been compiled with, may hear expert evidence from legal experts. The judge must not engage in interpreting the law themselves.[3]
The extent to which the experts agree there will be a "strong presumption" that the propositions in agreement accurately represents foreign law.[4]
- ↑ Schreiber v Canada, 1998 CanLII 828 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 841, par L’Heureux‑Dubé J J
- ↑
R c Guilbride, 2002 BCPC 254 (CanLII), par Arnold J, au para 61
- ↑
, ibid., au para 61
- ↑
, ibid., au para 62
Re McDonald, 1935 CanLII 301 (NS CA), 4 DLR 342, par Mellish J
Remedies
Charter remedies include: